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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The opening up of  the energy sector to competition was achieved much later than the opening 
of other sectors of the economy in the context of the objective set in 1985 to create, by 1992, 
a  single market  in Europe  without  internal  frontiers.  The  Electricity  and  Gas  Directives
1
, 
which were  adopted  in  1996  and  1998  and had to  be  implemented in February  1999  and 
August 2000 respectively, partly filled this gap  and represent an important step towards the 
creation of an internal market in these sectors. The objective of  the directives is to open up the 
electricity  and  gas  tnarkets  through  the  gradual  introduction  of  competition,  thereby 
increasing  the  efficiency  of the  energy  sector  and  the  competitiveness  of the  European 
economy as a whole. 
Full opening of energy markets is a key factor in improving Europe's competitiveness and the 
welfare of its citizens.  Electricity is  the  most important secondary source of energy in the 
European Union and the electricity industry is  one of the largest sectors of the· economy in 
Europe.  Annual  production is  some  2 500  Terawatt hours
2
,  generating  turnover  of around 
EUR 15 0 billion.  Natural  gas ·is  increasing  its  importance  in  primary  EU  energy  supply, 
notably as the fuel of choice in power generation. The annual end-sales value of gas in the EU 
is estimated at around EUR 100 billion per year (incl. taxes). 
Energy  costs  represent an  important  share  of European production  costs.  In a  global  and 
competitive market place it is vital to ensure efficiency in  energy supply and  competitively 
based energy prices.  The  high oil  prices  experienced  in recent months combined with the 
traditional oil-linkage of gas pricing in Europe has made the potential benefits of gas-to-gas 
competition, a key element of  the creation of  the internal energy market, particularly apparent. 
In this Communication it is  concluded that, to  date, the effects of market opening have been 
positive, with regard to both the development of the market as such and the impact of market 
opening on related important policy fields, such as public service objectives, environment and 
security of supply. However, in order to  complete the internal energy market and to reap its 
full  benefits,  further  measures  are  now necessary.  The  nature  of the  measures  which  are 
required in order to provide for  such an  impetus are  identified; they concern the  degree of 
market opening ("quantitative proposals'')' and the minimum obligations regarding access to 
the  network,  consumer protection,  regulation  and  the  unbundling  of the  transmission  and 
distribution function in integrated gas and electricity companies ("qualitative proposals'.'). 
On  the  basis  of these  conclusions,  the  Commission has  tabled  a  formal  proposal  for  the 
amendment of the Electricity and Gas Directives. Also proposed is a Regulation setting out 
principles and procedures regarding the conditions for access to the network for cross border 
exchanges of  electricity. 
The  Communication  thus  meets  the  demand  of the  European  Council  of  Lisbon  of 
J3-24 March  2000  for  rapid  work  to  be  undertaken  to  complete  the  internal  market  for 
electricity  and  gas.  It  also  responds  to  the  request  of the  European  Parliament  to  the 
Commission  to  adopt  a  detailed  timetable  for  the  achievement  of accurately  defined 
objectives with a view to  gradually but completely liberalising the energy markets
3
.  On the 
Electricity Directive 96/92/EC, OJ L 27,30.1.1997 and Gas Directive 98/30/EC, OJ L 204, 21.7.1998. 
Or 2 500 billion kilowatt-hours. 
Resolution 'Liberalisation of  energy markets' AS-0180/2000 of6 July 2000. 
2 basis of a previous Communication from the Commission
4
, which provided an initial analysis 
of the state of play with regard to  electricity market opening and examined the actions to  be 
taken to  facilitate  the functioning of the  internal  electricity market,  the  Energy  Council  of 
30 May 2000 echoed the call of the Lisbon European Council
5
. 
In  preparing  this  Communication  and  before  drawing  conclusions,  the  Commission 
considered it important that the vie\\I'S  of all parties with an interest in the matter, i.e.  social 
• 
partners,  generators~ gas producers, Transmission System Operators (hereinafter referred to as  • 
TSOs  ),  distributors,  consumers and other interested parties, were heard.  Therefore,  a public 
hearing  was  organised  in  September  2000.  Nearly  120  associations  and  companies 
participated. 
2.  THE INTEIL~AL  MARKETS FOR ELECTRICITY AND GAS- PROGRESS SO FAR 
2.1.  The legal framework 
The  EU  Electricity  and  Gas  Directives  (96/92/EC  and  98/30/EC)  entered  into  force  on 
19 February  1997  and  10  August  1998  respectively  and  had,  as  the  general  rule,  to  be 
implemented into national legislation two years later. 
While the two directives reflect the different specific technical and commercial characteristics 
of each of  the two sectors, they are to a large extent based on the same key measures intended 
to  open  up  the  markets  to  competition.  Exclusive  rights  to  import  and  export  gas  and 
electricity and to build and operate gas and electricity facilities have been abolished following 
the  implementation of the  Directives.  With  regard  to  electricity,  the  construction  of new 
generating capacity has also been fully  open~d  up to competition. 
With  regard to  the  degree  of market  opening,  the  Directives  set  minimum  targets  for  the 
opening  of the  market  which,  in  the  case  of electricity,  correspond  to  30o/o  of domestic 
consumption in 2000 and 35o/o in 2003. For the gas market, opening must be 20% in 2000 and 
28% by 2003. This opens up the possibility for the largest consumers to choose their suppliers 
freely.  With respect to  gas,  all  gas  fired  power  generators  are  also  given  this  possibility, 
irrespective of  their annual consumption. 
Although opening an important part of the market (quantitative opening) is vital in developing 
competition, this  alone  does  not ensure that the  market works  in practice.  In this  context, 
access to the network is a key issue, in particular taking into account that it is likely to remain 
a natural monopoly. In fact,  it will in most cases not be economic to  duplicate the  existing 
networks that, therefore, constitute essential infrastructure. It is thus vital that market players 
can get fair access to the transmission and distribution grids including all the necessary related 
ancillary facilities ("third party access" or TPA). The achievement of this is more likely if the 
operation  of the  transmission  and  distribution  systems  (in  practice,  often  operated  by 
vertically  integrated  companies)  are  functionally  separated  from  the  other  commercial 
interests, in particular generation/production and supply. 
4  COM(2000) 297, .. Recent progress with building the internal electricity market
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This Communication follows up on the Communication of 16 May 2000 in which the Commission gave 
its  preliminary  thinking  on  the  way  in  which  the  liberalisation  of the  electricity  sector  could 
be completed. 
3 The directives offered Member States the choice between a third party access system based on
published tariffs applicable to all customers ("Regulated third party access") and a system
based on negotiations between the parties, with published main commercial conditions
("Negotiated third party access"). With respect to unbundling, integrated companies  are
obliged to unbundle their different business activities by separating their accounts and
preserving the confidentiality of commercially  sensitive information through "Chinese walls".
Moreover, the Electricity Directive requires that an independent (at least in management
terms) transmission system operator ("TSO") is designated to ensure non-discrimination  in
system use between the incumbent and new entrants. In order to ensure non-discrimination,
Member  States are furthermore  obliged to designate a competent and independent  "dispute
settlement"  authority.
2.2.  Implementation in practice6
All Member States have now adopted national legislation implementing the provisions of the
Directive concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity. Belgium has yet to
adopt the secondary legislation (implementing decrees) needed in order to apply the laws.
As regards gas, most Member States had implemented  the Gas Directive into primary national
legislation on 10 August 2000. For these countries the Commission  is presently examining
implementing  legislation, to ensure that all the detailed requirements of the Directives are
met. However,  three Member States (France, Luxembourg and Germany) have yet to
complete this process and infringement procedures have been launched.
Notwithstanding  this, the initial experience in terms of implementing  the Directives has been
encouraging. In terms of market opening, for example, the vast majority of Member States are
going f"tth"r than legally required, und -*y  have already decided to progressively move to
full market opening.
EU gas and electricity market opening - 2000
Detailed information can be found on the Commission"  website:
electricity - http://europa.eu.inVcomm/energylen/elec_single_market/index-en.html
gas - http://europa.eu.inVcomm/ener  gylen/gas_single_markeVindex-en.htmlFurthermore, a clear majority of Member States have chosen structural  measures
accompanying market opening most likely to promote effective competition. In fact most
Member States have opted for regulated third party access, the authorisation procedure for
new generation capacity, full legal unbundling of transmission  system operators, and the
creation of independent regulatory authorities.
However, the trend towards regulated third party access and strict unbundling is less
pronounced in gas than in electricity; only six Member States are either pursuing or seriously
considering legal or ownership separation of the transportation and commercial supply
activities of integrated companies.
At this stage therefore, it may be said that the state of implementation is encouraging.
However, practical experience  has already shown that further improvements and efforts are
necessary to guarantee  a smooth operation of the two markets.
As shown above, the degree of market opening differs considerably between Member States
and'without further action this trend is likely to continue.  Whilst an overwhelming majority of
Member States currently expect to liberalise all electricity customers by 2007 and gas
customers by 2008, the picture is far from uniform. This situation has given rise to significant
concerns among most Member States and market players. Their concern is that if this
situation is maintained over a longer period, a real level playing field will not develop within
the internal market. The reciprocity  provisions of the electricity and Gas Directives have been
designed,  otr a temporary basis, to address the issue of quantitative imbalances in market
opening. However, experience in the electricity.market  has shown that such a clause may not
be able to address all aspects of creating a real level playing field between Member States
and operatorsT.
Indeed, at the Public Hearing, the importance of this was stressed by an overwhelming
majority of those commenting. The significantly different competitive environment between
Member States, for example, in terms of purchasing possibilities for cheaper electricity by
SMEs, was viewed as an important distortion of competition. In fact over 80% of respondents
at the hearing argued in favour of full market opening in the short to medium term.
Market opening is important, but to be effeptive in practice fair and non-discriminatory
access to the network must be guaranteed. Whilst important progress has been achieved in
this respect, in particular in electricity, there is still a need for further improvement. The
numerous  complaints received by the Commission,  national administrations and
regulatory/competition authorities, indicate that the ultimate goal of non-discriminatory
access to the network has not yet been fully achieved in practice. Furthennore, undertakings
For example, increasingly  sophisticated  trading iurangements  render it impossible to trace the origin of
gas or electricity.• 
• 
have indicated to the Commission that where clear and effective unbundling does not exist, 
together with standard and published third party access tariffs,  this  represents a significant 
barrier to market entry, as it is not believed that effective and non-discriminatory access to the 
network  will  exist.  As  such,  this  represents  a  significant  limit  to  the  development  of an 
effective internal energy market. The systems and rules for third party access and the degree 
of unbundling play a fundamental  role  in this  respect.  These  fundamental  elements in  the 
creation of fair competition have also been highlighted in the recent Green Paper on security 
of supply
8 
. 
It can therefore  be  concluded  that  in  order  for  real  competition  to  develop  and  provide 
tangible results both for suppliers and consumers, effective unbundling and proper, fair  and 
non-discriminatory conditions for access to the European gas and electricity networks will be 
required.  Without both of these  conditions fulfilled,  distortions  of competition will always 
remain  likely.  With  regard  to  the  structure  of the  gas  sector,  the  development  of real 
supply-side gas competition in the gas sector at the up-stream end of the gas supply chain is 
also vital. Both the Gas Directive and competition policy may have an important role to play 
in achieving this. 
These qualitative issues were also underlined by participants at the hearing as  being vital to 
ensure  the  development  of real,  effective  and  fair  competition.  Indeed,  over  70%  of the 
respondents  at  the  public  hearing  were  in  favour  of strengthening  existing  unbundling 
provisions.  In  fact,  aside  from  the  representatives  of the  .gas  industry,  only  two  of the 
organisations and companies present believed the current provisions in the Directive to  be 
adequate  to  ensure  fair  competition.  Furthermore,  with respect  to  third  party  access,  the 
system of case-by-case negotiated third party access,  presently permitted by the  Directive, 
was favoured by none of  the respondents. 
Also  in this  context,  many  participants  underlined  the  importance  of the  existence  of an 
independent national regulatory authority, and indeed some insisted on the need for having a 
regulator at the European level.  A Regulator is  important in arriving at a truly competitive 
market, especially to  ensure non-discriminatory access to  the network.  Regulators have the 
competence to set or approve network tariffs and intervene ex-ante in the market, as opposed 
to competition authorities, which can only deal with competition problems ex-post and under 
procedures, which are not adapted to deal with the setting of  tariffs. 
Finally, it is important to  develop a common approach on this  issue,  on the  basis of high 
standards,  to  ensure  a  level-playing  field,  particularly  in  the  light  of the  development  of 
similar rules in accession countries. 
Thus, in conclusion, even though the existing market opening process is producing positive 
benefits for European competitiveness on the whole, there seem- already at this early stage-
to be several weaknesses in the current legal framework which will need to be remedied if a 
fully operational internal market for gas and electricity is to be achieved. 
COM(2000) 769, p. 71. 
6 2.3.  Price developments
9 
Electricity prices for industrial consumers have gone down in almost all Member States since 
the Electricity Directive was implemented. In  general, the most significant price reductions 
can be found in the Men1ber States that have opened more than the minimum legally required 
and  which were  the  market exposed to  effective  domestic  or import competition.  This  is 
shown  in  the  following  graph,  which  depicts  the  price  developments  for  large  industrial 
consumers since 199 5. 
Electricity Price Development for Industry 1995 - 2000 
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Source:  Eurostat. 
Note:  Prices exclude energy taxes and VAT and prices have been deflated. "Industry" is  defined as  having an 
annual electricity consumption of  2 GWh. 
In the  UK,  which was the first country to  liberalise, large price reductions have been seen 
since market opening started in 1990; prices for UK industrial users, for example, have been 
reduced, on average, by 35% in real terms since this date, compared to a Community average 
of 25o/o.  In Finland and Sweden, where market opening started later,  price reductions have 
also  been significant;  20o/o  in  Finland since  1995  and  15%  in Sweden since  1996.  This is 
retnarkable considering that the electricity price in these two countries was already amongst 
the lowest in Europe before market opening. Finally, in Germany, where market opening has 
taken place only recently, prices reduced rapidly, on average by 25% between March 1998 
and August 2000. 
Electricity price reductions are not confined to industry even though the effects have been less 
pronounced  for  households.  The  largest price  reductions  can  be  found  in  Member  States 
where consumers are free to change supplier, and in particular where it is de facto easy to do 
so.  Experience from Finland and Svveden shows, for  example, that households were able to 
benefit from market opening once the requirement to invest in expensive metering equipment 
was abolished,  and the concept of standardised load protiles
10  \vas  introduced.  Since  1998, 
10 
The main source for this chapter is  Eurostat, which twice a year publishes statistics on  electricity and 
gas prices. 
Under a standardised load profile, an  assumption on the consumption of electricity of a type of small 
consumer is made, in volume and timing of  demand. Any discrepancies with the profile are settled after 
periodic readings of  the existing meter, eliminating the need for expensive minute-to-minute reading of 
the consumer's actual consumption and offsetting that against his/her contracted volume. 
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average  pnces  for  domestic  consumers  have  fallen  by  13o/o  In  Finland  and  by  16o/o  In 
Sweden
1 
• 
Thus, the price development of electricity has been very positive since the process of market 
opening begun in the European Union. However, we cannot conclude that prices will continue 
to  decrease as market opening progresses.  One of the most important determining factors in 
the  price  of electricity  is  the  fuel  used  for  its  generation.  The  European  Union  has,  for 
example, little influence on the development of the price of crude oil, and, at least at present, 
of natural gas, which in the majority of Member States is linked to the oil price. What a real 
competitive market does ensure, however,  is  that the price adequately reflects demand and 
supply and that efficiency gains are made, which were not achieved under the former market 
structure dominated by national monopolies. 
The  picture  is  less  clear for  gas.  The effect  on  gas  prices  from  market opening has  been 
significantly distorted by the  increase  in  oil  prices and the  development in the  Euro/US  $ 
exchange rate. To some extent, this reflects the structural differences between gas production 
and electricity generation and the contractual arrangements for gas supply including gas price 
linkage to  oil prices. Until real gas-to-gas competition develops, gas prices will not properly 
reflect the  supply  and  demand  situation of the  gas  market,  independently  of that  for  oil. 
Nonetheless in the UK, for example, the introduction of competition, along with other factors 
such as plentiful fuel supplies and the relative isolation of  the UK market, did initially lead to 
lower gas prices. Between 1990 and 1999, average UK industrial gas prices fell by 45%, and 
by  20o/o  for  domestic  consumers
12
•  However,  following  the  entry  into  operation  of the 
Interconnector from Bacton in the UK to Zeebrugge in Belgium in October 1998, gas prices 
in the  UK roughly  doubled during 2000,  mainly  as  a result of increasing  Continental  gas 
prices linked to the price of oil which has increased considerably over the last 18 months. 
I 
Huge disparities in terms of gas price exist between Member States. This situation is likely to 
lead to  distortions of the market in industries that use energy.  It should also  be noted that 
SMEs are at the moment often disadvantaged compared to large industrial customers in terms 
of  prices, in particular if  they remain captive customers without choice of  supplier. 
The  monitoring  of the  internal  electricity  and  gas  markets  is  important  to  ensure  the 
development of effective competition and also to  ensure that lower prices for electricity and 
gas  do  not  have  a  negative  impact  on  the  development  of  environmentally  friendly 
technologies  relating  to  renewables  and  energy  efficiency.  This  concerns  not  only  final 
electricity  prices,  but  also  competition  indicators  - examining  for  example  the  level  of 
customers switching following market opening, changes in market shares, and the extent of 
new market entry by electricity companies. However it is important to also remember that just 
the threat of entry can be enough to  encourage incumbent suppliers to  reduce their prices. 
Analysis of market shares may not be an accurate indicator of the impact of liberalisation. It 
will therefore also be important to  benchmark transmission and distribution tariffs across the 
Community,  to  ensure  that  national  regulators  have  the  information  necessary  to  ensure 
proper comparison of domestic tariff levels.  The Comrnission has recently launched a study 
on this issue, and this will continue to be part of  its ongoing work. 
II 
12 
According to the Association of Swedish Electricity Distributors,  10% of all households have changed 
supplier between  1 November 1999  and  31  August 2000.  The  electricity prices  have,  however,  also 
gone  down  for  other households.  The  association  estimates that 2/3  of all  electricity suppliers have 
reduced their price. 
Source: Department of  Trade and Industry: "UK Energy Sector Indicators - 1999". 
8 2.4.  The development of trade within the internal market 
2. 4.1.  Current situation and trends in the internal market 
The  objective of the Electricity and  Gas  Directives is  the  creation of one truly  integrated 
single market, not fifteen more or less liberalised but largely national markets. It is therefore 
encouraging  that  cross-border  trade  is  also  progressing.  The  total  volume  of trade  in 
electricity,  for  instance,  is  equivalent to  around  8%  of total  electricity  production  in the 
Community. As indicated in the Green Paper on security of supply
13
,  this level of trade is 
much lower than in other sectors that have gained much from  the internal market, such as 
telecommunications, financial services and industrial products. 
The table below shows the level of  physical exports and imports for each country for 1999
14
: 
GWh  Imports  Exports 
Belgium  8 918  8 204 
German~  39 304  38 018 
Spain  11  858  5 905 
France  4 471  66 668 
Greece  1 813  1 652 
Italy  42 539  527 
Luxembourg  6 175  657 
Netherlands  22 406  3 753 
Austria  10 494  14 402 
Portugal  3 513  4 453 
Switzerland  20 856  30 123 
Central Europe  5 030  13 012 
Even though cross border trade is still limited, this does not mean that competition has not 
had  an effect.  In fact,  as  already noted,  the  price of electricity has  reduced  in nearly  all 
Member States since  the  implementation of the Electricity Directive.  Both competition at 
national level as well as the pressure of foreign competition has meant that, despite physical 
constraints, electricity producers have had to lower prices in order to keep their customers. 
Furthermore, an important indicator of  the extent to \Yhich a real, integrated internal market is 
developing, is  the number of customers which have chosen to switch supplier, and whether 
new supplies come from a generator situated in another Member State. The Commission has 
therefore begun a monitoring exercise in this respect,  and has requested such information, 
where available, from industry, Member States and national regulators. Whilst data is not yet 
available for all Member States, a number of  indicators can already be identified. 
13 
14 
COM(2000) 769, p. 69. 
Trade within the Scandinaviari system (NORDEL) and between Ireland and the UK are not included. 
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According to presently available information, which the Commission was able to collect, the 
number of customers having switched supplier is the highest in those Member States where 
market opening started early. For instance, in Finland around 20% have changed supplier, and 
in Sweden and the United Kingdom most industrial customers are believed to have changed 
supplier  at  least  once  since  the  introduction  of competition  in  1996.  But  also  in  the 
Member States where market opening was introduced later, a trend towards changing supplier 
is discernible. As regards France, Germany, Spain and Portugal, for instance, it is  estimated 
that around 5% of  eligible customers have changed supplier. 
As regards the country of origin of the new supplier chosen by customers, there is only very 
limited information available.  It  appears,  however,  that  most  customers  tend to  opt for  a 
national supplier, except in countries dominated by a single domestic supplier. It is important 
to  monitor developments,  and more  information in this  respect can be  expected from  the 
indicators the Commission, through EUROST  AT, is currently developing in order to monitor 
and assess the functioning of  the internal market. 
These developments demonstrate  the  beginning of a  true  Community competitive market. 
However, they also show that such a market is far from being completed. 
In countries whose electricity market is dominated by one or two generators which produce 
all  the  electricity  consumed  in  a  country,  a  competitive  environment,  that  is  true  market 
competition, can only be realised if  a high level of  imports is possible. 
Furthermore, if cross border trade remains limited and markets are principally national, it is 
probable that generation capacity in the Union will not be efficiently utilised. For example, if 
physical restraints on exports remain, it is possible that new generation installations will be 
constructed in one country despite the existence of  spare capacity in another that risks closure. 
Finally such a situation is likely to impact on the security of supply situation in the Union if 
new installations use an imported energy source - for example natural gas - while existing 
stations, risking closure, are powered by sources of energy which pose less or no problems in 
terms of  security of  supply, such as renewables. 
In order to address these issues, it is essential that the possibilities for trade be maximised. In 
this context, three major actions are necessary: 
•  appropriate rules with respect to the pricing of cross-border trade; 
•  rules for allocation and management of  scarce interconnection capacity; and 
•  where economically justified, the increase of  existing physical interconnection capacity.· 
All of  these issues represent an essential complement to the electricity and Gas Directives. 
2.4.2.  The work of  the Florence and Madrid Fora 
To  deal  with  these  issues,  and  in  particular  the  first  two  considerations,  the 
European  Commission  took  the  initiative  to  set  up  two  new  bodies  - the 
Electricity Regulatory Forum of  Florence in 1998 and the European Gas Regulatory· Forum of 
Madrid in 1999. The issues mentioned above are technical and complex in nature and rapidly 
developing and the fora represent an appropriate and flexible mechanism for making progress. 
The  Fora convene  twice  a  year  and  consist  of Member  States'  representatives,  national 
10 regulatory authorities, the European Commission, Transmission System Operators, electricity 
and gas suppliers and traders, consumers, network users, and power and gas exchanges. 
For  both of these  Fora,  the  first  step  has  been  the  creation  of a  body  representing  the 
transmission  system  operators  (TSOs).  Thus,  for  electricity  the  European  Transmission 
System Operators Association (ETSO) has been created, which is a wholly new and separate 
body from other Electricity Industry associations or bodies. With respect to gas, a grouping of 
transmission system operators- GTE- was set up in the summer of 2000. In addition to this, 
national  electricity  and  gas  Regulators  have  created  the  Council  of European  Energy 
Regulators (CEER). These developments have proved important in reaching common ground 
on a number of  the issues under consideration. 
2. 4. 3.  Transmission tariffs for cross-border trade in electricity 
When the directive was adopted, each Member State dealt with the issue of tarification for 
cross-border trade on the basis of  their national system. This leads to considerable differences 
in tariff structures across the Community. Some countries impose charges only on consumers, 
whilst  other  put  tariffs  partly  on  generators,  partly  on  consumers.  Furthermore,  some 
Member States impose charges on transits, other do not. This leads to important distortions of 
competition and, in many cases pancaking: the imposition of charges by all countries located 
between the generator and consumer, an approach that has no relation to the costs incurred. 
Thus, the first task of the Florence Forum was the agreement of a  harmonised system for 
cross-border tarification. 
The Forum rapidly agreed the basic principles upon which such a tarification system must be 
based;  transparency,  simplicity,  cost-reflectiveness and non-discrimipation.  Furthermore,  it 
subsequently  succeeded in agreeing the  basis of the  mechanism that would be  needed to 
implement these principles: 
•  the mechanism must be based on physical flows of electricity, not the distance between 
two contracting parties; 
•  where countries export significant net quantities of electricity, they cause physical flows 
and transits. These transit flows cause costs in countries hosting them; 
•  these "host" countries should be compensated for the costs caused to their networks by the 
market parties in the TSO area responsible for them; 
•  these compensations should be made via payments made between TSOs. 
At the fifth meeting of  the Florence Forum in March 2000 agreement in principle was reached 
to  introduce  a  tarification system for  cross-border trade  in electricity  based on the  above 
principles,  for  a  provisional  test  phase  of one  year.  Thus,  TSOs would  compensate  one 
another for transits on the basis of financial  calculations proposed and verified at national 
level. One important issue, however, was left to subsidiarity: the way in which national TSOs 
reflect the result of the compensations paid and received in their national tariff system. On 
this particular point it was agreed to leave the issue during the provisional one-year period to 
the discretion of  the Member States. However, the national mechanisms would remain subject 
to overall coordination and control by the European Commission to ensure that the potentially 
different approaches at Member State level would not result in unreasonable distortion of the 
internal electricity market. 
11 The Commission has not yet been prepared to endorse the entry into force of the provisional 
system.  On the  basis  of the  information  received  from  all  national  regulators/competent 
authorities concerned, it could not be excluded that the potentially different approaches would 
result  in  unreasonable  distortion  of the  internal  market.  In  fact,  different  groups  of 
Member States  exist,  falling  into  two broad categories:  one  group  intends  to  introduce  an 
export charge whereas the second intends to  opt for a system of repartition of  costs over all 
users of the network.  Under such circumstances  an  introduction of the provisional system 
would be  likely to  lead to  an unacceptable degree of discrimination between operators and 
distortions of  trade, the more so as the level of  the export charge envisaged by some countries 
would lead in many cases to considerably higher transaction costs than under current national 
tariff systems. 
This was also stressed by representatives of large industrial consumers, traders, a number of 
Member States and a number of national regulators  which on various occasions expressed 
their serious concerns with respect to the concept and the level of  the intended export charge. 
The Commission believes that already the provisional mechanism, though being temporary, 
needs to be based on principles that ensure a proper functioning of the internal market and 
does not contain elements, which constitute a barrier to trade. The most appropriate way to 
achieve this goal is  that those two Member States envisaging the introduction of an export 
charge would examine whether they could refrain from introducing it or whether the proposed 
level  of the charge could be  significantly reduced,  in order to limit possible distortions of 
trade and competition. 
The  Commission  has  undertaken  further  discussions  with  individual  regulators/national 
authorities in order to resolve this issue with the objective of allowing the introduction of the 
provisional system in the near future. 
However,  in  the  course  of these  discussions  the  Member  States  concerned,  in  particular 
Germany, have declared to  be willing to reduce their intended export tariff only under the 
condition that all other Member States introduce in tum ap_  export charge of the same level, 
including those opting for a system of  repartition of costs over all users of  the network. Such 
an  approach  would,  however,  be  unacceptable  for  the  latter  Member  States  and  for  the 
Commission.  In  fact,  the  Commission  in  its  proposal  for  a  definitive  tarification  system 
outlined below (2.4.5.) suggests the principle of  repartition of costs for all Member States and, 
consequently,. it would be inconsistent to encourage those Member States willing to adopt this 
approach already under the provisional system to abandon it and introduce an export charge. 
The introduction of a provisional system would have been an important step forward, in order 
to gain experience with the inter-TSO compensation mechanism and to achieve an abolition 
of  existing tariffs, which would also lead to a simplification of  the tariff structures. 
However, if no satisfactory solution can be found, purely national systems will continue to be 
applied to cross-border transmission, until a robust definitive system enters into force in line 
with the  proposal  outlined below (2.4.5.).  These transitory national  systems  will  however 
remain subject to the competition rules of  the Treaty. 
However, even if the provisional system can finally enter into force,  a number of important 
issues remain to be resolved before a definitive tarification system fully in line with the basic 
principles mentioned above can be put into place. These include the precise methodology for 
calculating the cost of hosting transits, harmonisation of the methodology of financing the 
payments, and the harmonisation of certain aspects of national tarification systems ne~essary 
12 for the development of fair and undistorted trade
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. It has not been possible to  resolve these 
issues within the context of  the Florence Forum. 
2. 4. 4.  Congestion Management 
Whilst the Commission places a high priority on ensuring the construction of necessary and 
economically  justified  new  interconnection  capacity,  it  must  be  recognised  that  certain 
interconnections  will  remain  congested for  the  foreseeable  future.  To  develop the  internal 
market it is vital, therefore, that the capacity that is  available is  allocated in a manner most 
likely to achieve a competitive internal market. The Florence Forum endeavoured to develop 
commonly  agreed  guidelines  to  ensure  that  this  objective  was  met  when  Member  States 
allocate capacity. A working group representing the Regulators, Commission, representatives 
of  the Member States and, where appropriate, industry, was set up to draw up such guidelines, 
which were agreed at the last meeting of  the Florence Forum in November 2000. In particular, 
they  conclude  that  capacity  should· be  allocated  through  market-based  mechanisms.  The 
adoption  of these  guidelines  represents  a  step  forward  on  this  issue.  However,  their 
implementation in practice at national level is wholly voluntary in nature. 
2. 4. 5.  The need  for further measures 
The Florence Forum has proven a highly effective tool in developing a degree of consensus 
on highly complicated,  rapidly evolving and ·controversial  issues.  Whilst it will  remain  an 
important instrument in this  respect,  in  particular because  it ensures  the  representation of 
industry  and  consumers,  recent  experience,  in  particular  in  the  context  of the  intended 
introduction of a provisional tarification system,  has  demonstrated that the process  suffers 
from  a  number  of disadvantages  when  it  is  necessary  to  reach  concrete  decisions  on 
specific issues: 
•  the process is an informal one, based on bi-annual meetings lasting two days. As such it is 
inappropriate  to  take  concrete  decisions  on  very  detailed  issues  that  require  in-depth 
discussions; 
•  to make progress on any issue requires full consensus of all parties; 
•  any  decisions reached can only be  implemented if all  parties respect them; there  are  no 
procedures to ensure implementation; 
•  certain issues such as  the calculation of the correct level of inter-TSO payments require 
_regular detailed decisions to be .taken. The Forum is not able to appropriately address such 
Issues. 
In  this  light,  the  Commission has  concluded that to  build on the· progress  achieved at _the 
Forum,  it is  now  necessary  to  adopt  a  legislative  instrument  for  a  clear  decision-making 
process for making final progress on the issues of cross-border transmission tarification and 
congestion management on interconnectors. If the full  benefits of the internal market are to 
fall to consumers, such an instrument is vital. Furthermore, such an instrument will ensure the 
full involvement of  the Parliament and Council. 
IS  This concerns notably the extent to which network charges are split between generators and consumers. 
13 Member States alone cannot resolve this issue: to develop an effective tarification system a 
harmonised  approach  is  imperative  and  cannot  be  developed  at  national  level.  As 
demonstrated above, an informal collaborative approach will not lead to the implementation 
of an  appropriate  system  with  necessary  procedural  and  democratic  safeguards.  Such  a 
proposal  is  therefore  wholly  in  line  with  the  subsidiarity  principle,  and  indeed  is  made 
necessary by it. Thus, together with the adoption of  this Communication, the Commission has 
decided  to  propose  to  the  Parliament  and  Council  the  adoption  of a  "Regulation  on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity in the internal 
electricity market"
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2.4.6.  Gas: The Madrid Forum 
The European Gas Regulatory Forum (the Madrid Forum) first met in 1999, and has now met 
three times. 
Work  is  less  advanced  in  this  sector  compared  with  electricity  due  to  the  fact  that  the 
Gas Directive was implemented  18  months later than the Electricity Directive.  However,  a 
number  of important  issues  are  now  being  actively  addressed  in  the  Madrid  Forum  and 
substantial progress is  being made.  The third meeting of the  Forum held  in October 2000 
marked a turning point during which the main issues were identified and a number of key 
principles and a clear agenda for future work was set out. 
A higher degree of correlation exists between the physical and contract path for gas than for 
electricity;  in  particular  in  relation  to  international  transits  bringing  gas  from  fields  of 
production to  consuming markets.  Gas  transport  between  and  through Member States  has 
taken place for many years and more than 50% of all gas consumed within the EU crosses at 
least one border. Cross-border tariffs, based on physical flow through systems, already exist. 
However, the correlation between physical and contracted flows will be eroded as a result of 
competition. It is therefore vital to ensure that European gas tarification systems take account 
of this fact and that third party access tariffs are cost-reflective. For example, tariffs should 
not be distance related when actual transponation costs incurred do  not reflect the notional 
contracted path e.g. when swaps are involved. 
Furthermore, whilst at present congestion has not posed a significant limitation with respect to 
the development of  the European gas market, this is mentioned with increasing frequency as a 
potential barrier to trade and refusal of access. As a first step towards providing timely and 
accurate information on available capacities in the European gas  grid, the gas transmission 
system operators have been requested to develop and publish a detailed map of the European 
gas network identifying available transmission capacities at all major entry and exit points of 
the network. 
Finally,  in  order  to  facilitate  the  entry  of new  market  players,  the  establishment  of 
non-discriminatory grid access codes defining the rights and obligations of  network users will 
be necessary. The Madrid Forum has called for inter-TSO arrangements to be established with 
a view to  facilitate  cross-border trade  and  to  serve  as  a clearing mechanism for  transport 
between different systems. These additional measures are clearly necessary to ensure that the 
full benefits resulting from the internal market are passed on to consumers. The work pursued 
in the context of the Madrid Forum will therefore need to be continued and completed. It is 
16  OJ 
14 not yet appropriate to propose the adoption of legislative measures with respect to issues such 
as  tarification  and  congestion  management  for  gas,  for  the  reasons  mentioned  above. 
Nonetheless, the Commission will keep this question under review and, if necessary, propose 
appropriate measures. 
2.4. 7.  Infrastructure: the development of  an electricity infrastructure plan and the revision 
of  the TEN guidelines 
Electricity infrastructure 
Stimulation  of intra-Community  trade  in  electricity  depends  on  an  optimum  use  of the . 
existing interconnections between Member States, to be achieved, as outlined above, through 
the  provision  of fair  and  transparent  rules  on  cross-border  tarification  and  congestion 
management. 
Furthermore,  and  equally  important,  the  construction  of new  infrastructure  needs  to  be 
encouraged.  The  European  transmission  system  is  not  yet  sufficiently  developeq  for  the 
purpose of a real  internal market with effective trade  opportunities.  This  is  not  surprising 
since,  in, the  past,  interconnection  lines  were  built  by  vertically  integrated  monopoly 
companies that did not have objectives beyond the improvement of their own system security 
and quality of service. 
Two  years after the  entry into  force  of the  Electricity  Directive,  the  following  three  main 
interconnection bottlenecks exist: 
- the  Iberian  peninsula  remains,  to  a  significant  extent,  isolated  due  to  insufficient 
interconnection  capacity  with  France  and,  as  a  consequence,  the  rest  of the  European 
network; 
interconnection  capacity  available  to  Italy  (from  France,  Switzerland  and  Austria)  1s 
insufficient; 
- the UK has only one interconnector with France with limited capacity; other projects are 
under examination, but implementation costs are high. 
However, congestion problems also occur frequently at other points in the European network, 
for instance in the Benelux and Central Europe, and between Scandinavia and the continent. 
In many cases,  as  at the France-Spain border, the only solution for  developing trade is the 
construction of new connections  or the  increase  in capacity of existing  lines  as  far  as  is 
technically possible. 
The construction of new infrastructure is often not a financial problem since the undertakings 
. are prepared to invest in new networks in response to the demand on the market. In general, 
the  problem  is  more  of a  political  nature.  Often,  plans  to  construct  new  interconnection 
capacity  run up  against constraints  calling  for  a  balance  to  be  struck between the  public 
interest,  whether  Community  or national,  and  local  reservations  about  new infrastructure. 
Construction of new lines  often raises  local  opposition at strategic points, for  example,  as 
mentioned above,  around the  Pyrennees or Alps,  making  it  difficult  to  go  ahead with the 
intended scheme. 
15 The  Community  has  to  play  a  key  role  in  this  respect  to  ensure  that  the  operation  of 
the  market  is  not  hampered  by  physical  constraints.  In. the  Green  Paper  on  Security  of 
Energy Supply
17  the Commission underlined that a lack of network infrastructure can slow 
the  integration of national  markets  and  thus  limit  security  of supply.  In this  context,  due 
consideration should of course also be given to the enlargement of  the internal market and the 
additional interconnection capacity this requires. 
To overcome these problems, effort must first be made to  upgrade the capacity available on 
existing lines.  Second, where necessary, the constructions of new lines must be  facilitated. 
For  this  purpose,  work  should  be  initiated  to  elaborate  a  European  interconnection  plan 
identifying  schemes  of 'European interest'  through  a  new  procedure.  A  proposal  will  be 
. presented in line with the forthcoming revision of the guidelines on Transeuropean Networks. 
Such a plan would help to overcome divergent local and national hurdles. 
As a first step in forming this plan, and keeping in mind the objective of better coordination of 
trade  between  Member  States,  the  Commission  will  launch  a  review  with  the  following 
themes 
1.  An analysis of the definitions and criteria used when estimating available capacity at 
national level as  well as  by larger associations of networks (UCTE, NORDEL, UK); 
in certain cases a relative increase in declared available capacity could be proposed. 
Technical  operating  standards  (maximum  temperature  of cables,  for  example)  will 
also be examined and proposals submitted for revision and harmonisation. 
2.  Possibilities for technical improvements, such as the reinforcement of transformers or 
certain sections of cable or the introduction of new technology will be examined also 
with a view to increase physical capacity on certain interconnectors. 
3.  After this evaluation of possibilities for  increasing capacity on existing networks the 
study  will  then  establish  the  minimum  level  of interconnection  between  networks 
required for a functioning internal market and will identify the new connections that 
are needed. 
In this context, it is important that the Electricity Directive ensures that Member States have 
available all necessary instruments to require such reinforcement, and that such measures are 
compatible with the Directive. Such provisions are therefore included in the proposed revision 
of  the Directive. 
Gas infrastructure 
As  in the case of electricity,  a well-integrated network is  an essential precondition for  the 
effective  operation  of the  internal  gas  market  as  well  as  for  security  of supply.  This. 
requirement  has  been  highlighted by  the  sharp  rise  in  demand  for  natural  gas  within the 
. European Union over the past decade and the particular situation that has emerged following 
the recent impl~mentation of  the Gas Directive. 
Generally speaking, gas. network interconnection within the EU is developing well, driven by 
a combination of  market demand developments, the need for additional transport capacity and 
gas security considerations. 
17  COM(2000) 769, p. 70. 
16 Over the last few years, a large number of major new pipeline systems have been brought into 
operation, which have strengthened and further integrated the EU gas network both internally 
within the EU and in relation to external suppliers. Major new gas transmission infrastructure 
has  been set up by gas  operators in recent years to  meet growing demand.  These include 
projects  in  the  northern part of the  EU  (including  the  UK-Continent Interconnector,  new 
supply pipelines from Norway and related reinforcement in continental Europe), the central 
part (including various gas pipelines iJ!.  Germany and Austria) and in the southern part of the 
Eurupean Union (new gas networks in Portugal, Greece and western Spain, new gas pipelines 
from Algeria).  . 
However, increased demand and cross-border trade as a result of market opening may result 
in congestion and the need to deal with congestion issues similar to the ones mentioned above 
for electricity networks already seem to be emerging, e.g. at the Dutch frontier, in Ireland and 
in France (liquefied natural  gas).  An approach similar to the that envisaged for  electricity 
networks with regard to identifying new interconnections, establishing appropriate tarification 
and capacity allocation mechanisms will, as far as  applicable, therefore likewise be adopted 
for gas networks. 
Revising the guidelines of  Trans European Networks 
In  1994  the  European  Union  launched  the  political  framework  for  the  promotion  of 
Trans European Networks (TENs) and from  1995 the TENs programme to cover electricity 
and gas networks starte4. Currently, 44 projects of  community interest covering links between · 
Member States and with third countries have  been identified  in the  electricity  sector and 
46 projects referred to pipelines, LNG terminals and storage in the natural  gas  sector.  The 
establishment and development of Trans European Networks for energy are contributing to 
the achievement of the internal market.  It  also  contributes to the reliability and security of 
supply of electricity and natural gas in the Community and contributes to the cohesion effort. 
One  of the  priorities  of the  energy  transeuropean  network  policy  is  the  development  of 
interconnectors between Member States  and also  internal  connections, which extend these 
connections  at  national  level.  The  development of trade  in  the  framework  of the  internal 
market has led the Commission to propose a revision in the guidelines applicable regarding 
energy transeuropean networks which will stress the goal of  the optimal functioning of  energy 
networks in the context of  the internal market for energy, with due consideration for its future 
enlargement. 
With this in mind, a report on the implementation of  ihe guidelines for energy trans-european 
networks, as well as a revision of  these guidelines will be adopted shortly by the Commission. 
In  this  context it will  be necessary to  give  appropriate  support and  focus  on projects  of 
particular environmental benefit, and in particular those likely to reduce the level of losses on 
the networks.  This revision will include the resolution of problems of missing links in the 
network,  congestion  and  the  recognition  of  new  requirements  resulting  from  the 
implementation of the  Electricity  and  Gas  Directives  and the  growing  number of eligible 
customers. 
17 2. 4. 8.  Conclusion 
It is clear that the develop1nent of the conditions to promote trade in electricity and gas, must 
and  will  remain  one  of the  priorities  for  the  Commission.  The  adoption  of the  proposed 
Regulation  on  cross-border  transmission  tarification  and  congestion  management  will 
represent a  major step  forward.  Nonetheless,  this  initiative  must be  complemented by  the 
construction of new infrastructure where technically feasible and economically justified. This 
latter task will receive particular attention from the Commission. 
2.5.  Public service objectives 
In the  context of the electricity and gas sectors, public service issues cover a wide range of 
aspects relevant to ensure the continued secure supply of high quality electricity and - where 
connected- gas at competitive prices. In the past, this overall public service objective has, in 
almost all  EU countries,  been pursued through  the  public  ownership  and  operation  of all 
electricity  generation,  transport  and  supply  functions  and  all  gas  transport  and  supply 
functions.  In these circumstances, only a limited amount of regulation was considered to  be 
necessary to ensure the mait,tenance of  these objectives. However, as privatisation and market 
opening has taken place, governments have adopted systems of regulation, usually via sector 
specific· regulatory  authorities,  which lay  down  minimum  standards  of public  service  that 
must be respected. 
In the EU, a number of public  s'-~rvice ol1jectives or stfuidards are commonly pursued in the 
electricity and gas sectors. At the generation level, these concern obligations upon generators 
to  respect  minimum  environmental  standards,  to  generate  minimum  levels  of renewable 
sourced electricity or other environmental objectives, or,  occasionally~ to  respect minimum 
rules regarding the primary fuel  source to meet supgly security concerns. This aspect is also 
highlighted in the Green paper on security of supply 
8
. 
The key public service issues, however, exist at the transmission/distribution/supply level. In 
fact,  in  many  respects,  the  operation  of the  tr~smission and  distribution  systems  may 
themselves be considered public services; they represent a monopoly and an essential service 
for all citizens and industry. This is particularly the case in the context of liberalised markets, 
as  the  transmission  and  distribution  systems  represent  the  key  infrastructure  permitting 
competition to exist and develop. Thus, all  Member States impose minimum operational or 
public  service  conditions  on  grid  operators  - for  example  requiring  transmission  and 
distribution companies to  guarantee connection to the grid for  all  citizens under rt!asonable 
conditions.  In  addition to  this, Member States often,  and increasingly, require transmission 
and distribution companies to meet minimum service criteria - such as the time within which 
repairs must be eff~cted and connections made. 
Finally, at the supply level, Member States require  compan~es who wish to  operate on their 
domestic  market~~ to acquire a licence to do  so.  The licence requirements include mini:rr..um 
criteria that must be respected by an opeHttor, many of  which are public service in nature. For 
example,  some  countries require  uniform tariffs to  be  offered to  equivalent customers and 
spec.i.al  tariffs to low in';ome users, protection from  disconnection for vulnerable customers 
and,  for  certain  countries,  requirements  as  to  service  standards,  including  conditions  of 
contracts, transparency of  information and complaint handling mechanisms. 
18  See footnote 8. 
18 The attainment of the highest possible standards of public service in these areas is a primary 
objective  of Community energy policy.  This  reflects  a basic  Community policy objective 
regarding services of  general interest, as underlined by the European Council at Nice on 7 and 
8 December 2000, on the basis of the Commission's Communication on services of generaL 
interest
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• It is essential that the gradual completion of the internal market contributes to this 
objective and thus to the maintenance and increase of  public service standards. In particular, it 
is vital that all Community citizens have a universal right to be supplied at reasonable prices 
and  that a minimum set of consumer protection standards  is  maintained.  In this  light,  the 
Directives contain a number of provisions, notably Article 3
20  to ensure that Member States 
retain the necessary tools in this respect. 
These provisions ensure that the measures taken by Member States to pursue legitimate public 
.service objectives remain compatible with the Directives, providing the measures taken are 
reasonable and proportionate to the objectives pursued. To date, none of the measures taken 
by  Member  States  have  raised  substantive  questions  as  to  their  compatibility  with  the 
Directives. Indeed, no Member State has found it necessary to derogate from any provision of 
the Directive in order to meet their public service objectives. 
The  choice  of the  public  service  measures  or  standards  adopted  by  Member  States  is  in 
principle a matter of subsidiarity. However, the Commission, in the light of the fact that the 
maintenance and increase of such standards overall throughout the Community is an integral 
part of Commllllity energy policy, has commenced a benchmarking exercise to compare the 
public service measures pursued in the Member States, the methods chosen to achieve them, 
and  their  success  in  meeting  high  standards.  The  results  will  assist  Member  States  in 
maintaining and increasing standards~ 
The  first  part of this exercise, the completion of detailed questionnaires by Member State 
administrations and regulatory authorities, is now finished. On this basis the Commission will 
prepare  a  detailed  Communication.  However  on  the  basis  of information  received,  it is 
already clear that market opening, including the introduction of full  competition, has in no 
way  prevented  Member  States  from  pursuing  a  successful  policy  of maintaining  high 
standards of public service. Indeed as  market opening progresses, increasing public service 
levels  have  been  attained  through  the  imposition  of licence  requirements  or  conditions. 
National regulators monitor the respect of these conditions, and impose penalties in the event 
of non-compliance
21
.  This approach has enabled Member States, by continually raising and 
improving standards, particularly at the transmission, distribution and supply level, to increase 
public service standards gradually and continually in a liberalised ~arket. 
Almost all  correspondents at the public hearing  stressed the  importance of this  issue.  The 
overwhelming majority of those commenting on this issue confirmed that experience clearly 
demonstrates  that  public  service  standards  - particularly  with  respect  to  issues  such  as 
ensuring  universal  service  and  consumer  protection  - can  not  only  be  maintained  in  a 
competitive market place, but increased. 
19 
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21 
Communication of20 September, OJ C 17,  19.1.2001, p. 4. 
But also  Article  9(2)  of the  Gas  Directive  (obligation  to  supply  a  given  area),  Article  17  of both 
Directives (refusal of  access), Article 20 of  the Gas Directive and Article 21  of  the Electricity Directive 
(authorisation to  build direct lines)  and Article 23  of the  Electricity Directive and  Article  24  of the 
Gas Directive (safeguards in the event of  a sudden crisis). 
Including, where appropriate withdrawal ofthe licence. 
19 In  conclusion,  experience  clearly  demonstrates  that  the  creation  of liberalised  gas  and 
electricity  markets  has  not  resulted  in  any  decrease  in  public  service  standards.  On  the 
contrary, with appropriate regulatory control, liberalisation has in fact focused attention on the 
importance  of the  level  of service provided,  leading  to  improvements.  The  be-nchmarking 
•  exercise  currently  underway will  permit all  Member States to  profit from  such experience 
resulting  in the  attainment of the  highest  possible  standards  of public  service  throughout 
the Community. 
Notwithstanding this, the Commission's experience to date concerning the implementation of 
electricity and Gas Directive indicates that it would be appropriate to take further measures to 
re-enforce existing provisions. First, the Commission considers that one basic public service 
objective - the right for  household consumers to  be  supplied with electricity on reasonable 
conditions- must be viewed as  an underlying objective of the internal market and therefore 
the Directive. It is thus proposed to require Member States to take the necessary measures to 
ensure that this is  achieved.  Secondly, it is  appropriate to  oblige Member States .to  take the 
appropriate measures to ensure that a number of essential public service objectives are  met. 
They  should  therefore  be  required,  both  with  respect  to  electricity  and  gas,  to  introduce 
appropriate  provision~  to  ensure  the  attainment  of  essential  public  service  objectives 
and notably: 
•  the protection of vulnerable customers; Member States will, for  example, need to ensure 
appropriate  protection  from  unjustified  disconnection  of,  inter  alia,  the  elderly,  the 
un~mployed, the handicapped, etc.; 
•  the  protection  of final  customers;  Member  States  will,  for  example,  need  to  ensure  a 
minimum set of  conditions of  contracts, transparency of  information, and the availability of 
low-cost and transparent dispute settlement mechanisms; 
•  Social  and  economic  cohesion;  beyond  ensuring  universal  service,  where  necessary, 
Member States will need to take appropriate measures to ensure supplies and connection at 
appropriate prices to, for example, peripheral areas; 
-•  environmental  protection;  e.g.  demand  side  management  obligations  and  measures  to 
promote renewables and cogeneration; and 
•  security  of supply;  notably  through  ensuring  appropriate  levels  of maintenance  and 
development of  infrastructure, and in particular interconnections. 
It is  vital that the monitoring and benchmarking exercise mentioned above is completed and 
continues  on  a  regular  basis.  Articles  3(2)  of both  Directives  require  at  present  that 
Member States notify public service obligations to  the Commission: This applies, however, 
only  to  measures  that  require  a  derogation  from  the  Directives.  As  mentioned  above, 
Member States have not needed to  derogate  from  the  Directives  to  achieve public  service 
objectives.  To  assist  the  benchmarking  and  monitoring  process,  it  would  be  a  significant 
improvement if  Member States were required to notify the Commission of  all measures taken. 
•  The Commission would issue a bi-annual report on the basis of this information and, where 
appropriate, issue recommendations of measures that Member States should take to  ensure 
high public service standards. 
20 2.6.  Security of supply 
The  recent  Commission  Green  Paper  "Towards  a  European  strategy  for  the  security  of 
energy supply" (COM/2000/769) examines in some detail the question of security of supply· 
and its relation to the establishment of the internal market for electricity and gas.  On these 
issues, it concludes that the "integration of energy markets contributes to security of supply, 
provided that these markets are truly integrated". In reaching this conclusion, the Green Paper 
notes, in particular, the vital importance that security of supply is recognised as  an essential 
public  service  obligation.  It further  examines  the  provisions  contained  in  the  Gas  and 
Electricity Directives that ensure that in an open and competitive market, security of supply 
can be met, both at national and Community level. 
In essence, the Directives contain provisions that ensure that all-the safeguards available to 
Member States to guarantee security of  energy supplies remain unchanged by the introduction 
of competition.  For example,  Member States  are  obliged to  provide for  the  possibility to 
launch tenders for additional generation capacity backed-up by purchasing agreements. They 
also retain the possibility, where necessary, to limit gas purchases from a single source. The 
creation of  the internal market will mean a greater degree of  interconnection of  electricity and 
gas  markets and  an increasing number of suppliers.  Subject to  proper monitoring  at both 
Community" and national level and, where necessary, action under the relevant provisions of 
the  Directives,- the  completion of the  internal  market for  electricity  and  gas  can therefore 
contribute to security of  the Community's energy supplies. 
It should be noted that these safeguards, properly implemented by Member States, guarantee 
that the  situation  that  has  developed  in  California,  of a  lack  of supply  and  (artificially) 
escalating prices, will be avoided in the EU. In California, a combination of  factors led to the 
present precarious  and  unacceptable  situation  in  terms  of security of supply;  notably  the 
existence of an obligatory pool leading to anti-competitive, oligopolistic pricing practices and 
the  impossibility  to  offset  risk  through  long-term  supply  agreements,  rapidly  increasing 
demand due  largely to the internet explosion, a lack of new generation capacity due to  an 
uncertain  regulatory  environment  and  extremely  strict  planning  restrictions,  retail  price 
freezes, a lack of a possibility for the TSO itself to launch tenders for the ·construction of new 
capacity combined with power purchase agreements, a lack of interconnection capacity and 
supply arrangements with neighbouring states,  and a lack of appropriate intra-state trading 
arrangements. The provisions mentioned above, notably the possibility for Member States to 
launch  tenders  where  demand  threatens  to  exceed  supply,  together  with  significant  and 
increasing interconnection capacity between Member States, effective trading arrangements 
and careful monitoring at both Community and national level, means that the development of 
the "Californian experience" can be excluded in the EU. 
However, given the vital importance of  this issue - continued secure supplies of electricity is 
probably the  most important public  service  objective - it  is  appropriate  to  reinforce  the 
existing safeguards contained in the Electricity Directive on this point. In particular, it would 
be appropriate for Member States to be required to carefully monitor the state of  the domestic 
electricity market, and in particular the existing demand/supply balance, the level of'  expected 
future demand, envisaged additional capacity under planning or construction, and the level of 
competition_ existing on the market. On an annual basis the Member States should be required 
to publish a report outlining their findings, and indicating any measures envisaged to ensure 
supply security.  Furthermore, given that due to the highly interconnected nature of the EU 
electricity network, the relationship between demand and supply at the Community level is of 
vital  importance for  overall system security, the Commission,  on the  basis of the national 
21 
• 
• reports and its own monitoring work, should publish a similar Communication covering the 
Community as a whole. 
2.  7,.  Environmental consequences of energy market opening 
The creation of an internal market for electricity and gas has been shown, in many respects, to 
have  had  positive  environmental  impacts  due  to  the  improvements  in  generating  plants, 
increased operational efficiency and a switch to  cleaner fuels  in power production.  On the 
other  hand  falling  energy  prices  might  not  be  conducive  to  the  development  of energy 
efficiency and renewables. 
For example, between 1990 and 1998, the use of natural gas for power production increased 
·by 128% while solid fuels  decreased by  18o/o.  In the  same  period, the  average  conversion 
efficiency  of thermal  power  stations  has  increased  by  6%  and  the  carbon  intensity 
(C02/GWh) has been reduced by more than 15o/o. The trend towards cleaner power generation 
plants  can  be  expected  to  accelerate  as  market  opening  progresses.  For  example,  in  the 
United Kingdom,  which  was  the  first  Member  State  to  liberalise  the  electricity  and  gas 
sectors, the development towards  a cleaner energy  sector has  been particularly significant. 
Here the share of natural gas  increased from  0.5% in 1990 to  38.5% in  1999. The average 
conversion efficiency increased by 9.5% between 1990 and 1998. C02 emissions from power 
generation  decreased  by  27% in  UK compared  to  only  3% in average  in  the  EU  in  the 
same period. 
However,  the  environmental  consequences  of  market  opening  must  be  continuously 
monitored22. With market opening,  electricity prices  may  decline  and  this  gives  rise  to  a 
number of environmental challenges that must be addressed. If  the market price for electricity 
reduces, demand may increase, partly at least due to  less intensive efforts in energy savings 
and  energy  efficiency.  In the  Green  Paper on  Security of Su~ply projections  suggest that 
demand may increase by  20o/o  due  to  lower electricity prices2 . Similarly,  full  competition 
may mean that electricity from new and less developed energy sources (e.g. renewables and 
combined  heat  and  power)  becomes  less  attractive.  This  could  reduce  the  development 
towards a cleaner fuel mix in the electricity production. 
Both the Electricity and Gas Directives provide Member States with the possibility to address 
these issues: 
22 
23 
Article 3 in both the Electricity Directive and the Gas Directive provide Member States 
with  the  possibility,  in  the  general  economic  interest,  to .  introduce  public  service 
obligations  which  may  inter  alia  relate  to  environmental  protection.  For  example, 
reductions in overall electricity bills do not preclude the adoption of tariff structures to 
encourage  energy  efficiency.  These  could  be  implemented  through  cuts  to  fixed 
charges, leaving price signals on the variable use of electricity unchanged. Appropriate· 
regulatory incentives would need to be in place in order  J to encourage such innovative 
tariff structures to emerge. 
The Commission has launched a study with the  aim of assessing the environmental implications of a 
market opening up to 2010. 
See footnote 8. 
22 Articles 8(3) and 11(3) in the Electricity Directive allow Member States to require the 
operators of the transmission and the distribution system, when dispatching generating 
installations, to give priority to  generating facilities using renewable energy sources or 
waste or producing combined heat and power. 
A number of  Member States have adopted such measures and have taken additional actions to 
ensure that high environmental standards are respected in gas and electricity production and 
supply. Community competition rules, and notably those concerning state aid, normally apply 
to such schemes. However, as  seen in the treatment of such cases, these mechanisms are in 
principle compatible with the state aid rules providing their effects in terms of restriction of 
competition are not disproportionate to the pursued environmental objective, and the objective 
of increasing the EU'  s security of supply situation
24
• Furthermore recent guidelines have been 
adopted highly favourable to support mechanisms for renewable sourced electricity. 
To  complement the measures taken at national level, the Commission has itself launched a 
number of  initiatives: 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
Renew·able energy sources. The Commission has presented a proposal for a Directive
25 
on the  promotion of renewable energy sources in the internal electricity market.  The 
aim is to ensure that the development of electricity from renewables will be in line with 
the overall EU indicative target of doubling the share of renewables in the gross inland 
energy consumption by  2010.  On  5  December 2000,  the  Energy  Council  reached  a 
political agreement on the proposal, which is likely to be adopted later this year. 
Combined  Heat  and  Power  (CHP).  A  strate?y  for  further  developing  CHP  was 
outlined  in the  1997  Communication  on  CHP
2 
,  which  also  proposed  an  indicative 
target  of doublin¥  the  share  of CHP  in  EU  by  2010.  The  recent  Action  Plan  on 
Energy Efficiency 
7 reaffirmed this target and it listed a range of measures to  promote 
CHP. The proposal for a revised large Combustion Plants Directive also promotes the 
use of co-generation.  In the  framework of the European Climate Change Programme 
CHP has been identified as a promising area for achieving emissions reductions. 
Emission  standards.  Emissions  from  po\ver  plants  are  regulated  through  the 
Large Combustion  Plants  Directive  (88/609/EEC)  and  the  Directive  on  Integrated 
Pollution  Prevention  and  Control
28
.  On  22  June  2000,  the  Council  (Environment) 
unanimously  adopted  a  common  position  on  the  proposal  for  revising  the 
Large Combustion  Plants  Directive.  This  increases  the  scope  of the  Directive  and 
provides for more stringent limits for emissions from new plants. 
See footnote 8. 
COM(2000)  279  final,  10.5.2000,  "Proposal  for  a  Directive  on  electricity  from  renewable  energy 
sources and the internal market for electricity". 
COM(97) 514 fmal,  15.10.1997 
COM(2000)  247  fmal,  26.4.2000,  "Action  Plan  to  Improve  Energy  Efficiency  in  the 
European Community". 
Council  Directive  96/61/EC  of 24  September  1996  concerning  integration  pollutio11:  prevention 
and control. 
23 Energy efficiency  and  energy  saving.  In April 2000, the Commission presented its 
Action  Plan  on  Energy  Efficiency,  which  calls  for  a  1%  improvement  of energy 
intensity per year compared to  a  business  as  usual,  scenario.  On 30 May 2000,  the 
Council  invited  the  Commission  to  come  forward  with  detailed  proposals  for  the 
implementation of the  Action  Plan.  It is  essential  that efforts  continue  in  this  area 
immediately and in parallel to the market opening process. A fully opened market needs 
an internalisation of external costs to ensure a fair level playing field. The Commission 
will therefore promote initiatives in this sense, e.g.  an EU-wide energy/C02 tax, strict 
rules  on  State  aid,  demand  side  management  measures,  measures  to  promote 
cogeneration and renewables which have a competitive disadvantage as long as external 
costs are not fully integrated. For example, the Commission will propose the following 
legislative measures in this field in 2001: 
Proposal for a Directive concerning energy efficiency in buildings; 
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Directive on the environmental 
aspects of  electric and electronic equipments; 
· Proposal  for  a  European  Parliament  and  Council  Decision  on  a  multiannual 
programme  aimed  at  the  promotion  of renewable  energy  and  energy  savtng 
(2003-2006) (follow-up to the SAVE and ALTENER programmes). 
Furthermore, it intends to prepare, in 2002, proposals with respect to combined heat and 
power (CHP). 
Energy  taxation.  The  Commission has  proposed the extension of the  present 
Mineral Oil Directive to  also  cover other competing energy sources,  including 
electricity,  gas,  coal,  lignite,  etc.  Furthermore,  several  Member  States  have 
introduced energy/environmental taxes to reduce energy consumption. 
Potential future actions. A  number of additional and complementary measures 
are at present being examined at Community and national level. This includes, for 
example, the  issue of green house  gas  emission trading.  The  Commission has 
launched  a  discussion  on  the  issue  in  a  Green  Paper
29  in  line  with  the 
Kyoto Protocol.  The various  working  groups of the  European Climate Change 
Programme  which  bring  together  stakeholders,  Member  States  and  the 
Commission are in the process of identifying possible policies and measures that 
could  be  recommended to  the  Commission with a  view to  meeting  the  EU'  s 
climate change objectives. 
Conclusion 
In  many  respects,  market  opening  could  be  beneficial  in  meeting  the  Community's 
environmental objectives in energy terms. Notably, the introduction of competitive pressures 
has been seen to  lead to the more rapid introduction of more efficient and cleaner thermal 
generating  units  than  has  been the  case  under  monopoly  conditions.  However,  with  the 
potentially lower prices resulting from market opening, a n_umber of complementary policies 
become increasingly important, as presented above. 
' 
29  COM(2000)  87  fmal,  8.3.2000,  "Green  Paper  on  greenhouse  gas  emissions  trading  within  the 
European Union". 
24 The Commission is currently undertaking a study that will assess the overall environmental 
impact of liberalisation in the energy markets  on the  environment.  The  Commission will 
monitor the  situation closely and,  if necessary,  propose further  measures to  safeguard the 
environment that, at the same time, complies with the internal market rules. 
2.8.  The effects of competition on employment 
Though intervening with some delay, the creation of  the internal energy market forms part of 
the 1992 objective to create a fully operational internal market in the European Union, with a 
view to  foster  growth and  employment opportunities to  the  benefit of the  citizens of the 
Union.  Increased  efficiency  and  lower  energy  prices  as  well  as  opportunities  for  new · 
technologies resulting from the introduction of competition in the energy sector will, at least 
in the medium and long term, boost employment in the European industry as a whole. 
The European Council  at  Lisbon in March 2000,  when calling for  the  completion of the 
internal energy market, stressed the role of  the _internal market as a key element of  the strategy 
of the European Union to "regain the conditions for full employment", in order "to. become 
the  most  ~ompetitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world with more and 
better jobs and greater social cohesion". Likewise, the European Parliament, in its ·Resolution 
on liberalisation of  energy markets of  July 2000, said that "competition is having a substantial 
effect on economies and consumers as  a whole, such as  . . . increased opportunities for new 
employment, and is having a positive mediutn-term impact on the labour market in general 
economic terms". 
However, as regards short-term developments in the energy sector alone, the introduction of 
competition is  likely to  lead to  a reduction in  the  workforce,  as  a  result of the  necessary 
adaptation  of the  national  ex-monopoly  companies  to  competition  through  appropriate 
restructuring measures at company level. 
It is important to ensure that such job losses occurring in the transitory period during which 
companies  in  the  energy  sector  are  adapting  to  the  new  competitive  environment  are 
recognised and appropriately taken care of  by national and Community policies. 
Against this background and in order to ·deepen its understanding of  the employment situation 
in the energy sector, both with regard to experience made so far and possible future trends, the 
Commission laun~hed a study. This study was designed and completed in close collaboration 
with representatives of the social partners.  Based on available statistics on the quantitative 
developments of  the workforce in the energy sector, it <.lescribes and analyses in particular the 
qualitative aspects of the employment development in the electricity and gas industry in the 
context of  market opening. 
As regards developments in the size of  the workforce in the two industries concerned, statistics 
show that the number of  people employed in the electricity and gas sectors decreased between 
1990 and  1998
30
.  Major reasons for this reduction,  which in many Member States clearly 
started  before  market  opening,  have  been  technological  ·progress  and  a  tendency  to 
"outsource" certain functions. However, market opening has played a role in accelerating the 
process, particularly in the electricity sector. 
30  On the basis of the available European and national statistics,  it has  been estimated that more than 
250 000 jobs could have been lost in the sector between 1990 and 1998. However, statistics often only 
show  employment  developQients  in  utilities  as  a  whole  and  do  not  - in  case  of multi-utilities  -
differentiate between the different services provided, e.g. gas, electricity and water supply. 
25 The reduction of the workforce was coupled with a change of  the skill profile required by the 
industry.  In fact,  technical  occupations  for  semi-skilled  and  skilled  employees  as  well  as 
middle management and associated clerical professions have been reduced over time.  New 
job opportunities have been created in areas  such  as  marketing,  customer services,  IT  and 
business  services.  In  addition,  the  emergence  of new  business  activities,  such  as  energy 
trading, has brought about new jobs. 
As regards the  manner in which staff  reductions were effected, the 10 companies in the UK, 
Ireland,  Sweden,  Italy and  Germany,  which were  covered by the  case  studies  undertaken, 
have  managed  to  effect  restructuring  in  a  sociably  consensual  manner,  for  instance  by 
applying voluntary early retirement schemes. In addition, a significant number of the larger 
companies  surveyed had  instituted re-training  and redeployment  programmes.  Under  such 
schemes retraining was offered, either to allow members of staff to remain \vith the company 
in a new position or tofacilitate finding a job outside the company. 
Mru;ket opening has thus had both a quantitative and a qualitative impact on the employment 
situation  of the  electricity  and  gas  industry.  Traditional  skills  have  become  less  relevant 
whereas new job opportunities have emerged for  skills that are  important in a competitive 
environment, such as marketing and customer service; 
Thus  far,  the reduction of staff numbers,  where  considered inevitable, has  been done  in  a 
socially  responsible  manner,  through  early  retirement  coupled  with  retraining  schemes. 
However, as market opening is moving ahead and restructuring continues, it is necessary that 
alternative measures  at company level  intended to  accompany the restructuring process be 
further explored and reinforced.Such measures are, for instance,working time reductions and 
increased  retraining,  in  line  with  the  European  Employment  Strategy  under  which,  in 
principle,  priority  should  be  given  to  retraining  and  redeployment  over  early  retirement. 
Developing alternative measures is particularly important if  the possibilities for companies to 
handle  restructuring through early retirement become  more  limited over time,  due  to  staff 
becoming younger on average.  Best practice in this respect should be  exchanged between 
companies  and  the  social  partners.  The  Commission will  encourage  such  an  exchange  of 
· experience, for instance in the framework of  the sectoral dialogue committee "electricity"
31
. 
The  Joint  Declaration  by  the  social  partners  in  the  electricity  industry,  published  on 
27 November  2000,  is  an  encouraging  first  step  in  this  context
32
.  In this  declaration,  the 
European electricity industry and trade unions representing employees in the sector launched 
a common effort to explore ways by which both businesses and their staff could benefit from 
changes  linked  to  the  development  of the  internal  market  and  to  reduce  the  ·social 
consequences of  restructuring as far as possible. 
The opportunities offered under the European employment strategy should also be taken into 
account.  The strategy provides the proper framework for  dealing With  both the quantitative 
and  qualitative  aspects  of management  of  change,  in  particular  the  adaptability  and 
employability  pillars  of the  strategy.  Adaptability  refers  to  the  adaptation  of the  work 
organisation of companies as a consequence of the new industrial context. The objective of 
the employability pillar is to  increase employees'  skills to  cope with change,  and  includes 
strategies of life  long learning.  Actions  under these  employment policy pillars require the 
31 
32 
The  Committee  was  set  up  on  the  basis  of the  Commission  Decision  of 20  May  1998  on  the 
establishment of  sectoral committees promoting the dialogue between social partners at EU level. 
Available at www.cmcef.org, www.epsu.org, www.eurelectric.org 
26 establishment of a strong partnership between public and private actors at different levels and 
can  be  financed  through the  European  Social  fund  in the  context of programmes  agreed 
between the Commission and the Member States. 
Special attention must be given in this context to developments in the candidate countries. It 
is important to assist energy companies and governments in these countries in the process of 
restructuring the energy sector in a socially responsible manner, for instance through sharing 
with  candidate  countries  the  experience  made  in  the  Community  in  this  respect.  Further 
monitoring will be undertaken by the Commission in this respect and the countries concerned 
will  be  encouraged to  strengthen this  aspect under the  PHARE programme.  However,  the 
employment effects of market opening in the energy sector might well make their impact felt 
most strongly in the candidate countries when they will have been integrated in the internal 
market and the PHARE programme no longer applies to them. The Commission shall ensure 
that this aspect of market opening· in the candidate countries will receive continued attention 
and  support,  also  when  the  candidate  countries  will  have  become  members  of  the 
European Union. 
In conclusion, it can be said that it has been possible so far to effect restructuring in a socially 
responsible manner. However, the situation needs to  be closely monitored and, if necessary, 
additional measures taken, as market opening and restructuring of the industry moves ahead. 
All relevant players must contribute in order to find solutions that will minimise any negative 
social consequences of  the restructuring of  the European electricity and gas industry. 
2.9.  Trade with third countries 
Electricity has been exchanged between the EU and neighbouring non-EU countries for many 
years, for example between the EU and Nordel member countries. Prior to  market opening 
such exchanges were carried out by the former utilities in the framework of their monopoly 
position.  However,  the  amount  of electricity  exchanged  was  relatively  limited,  due  to 
technical  limitations such as  low capacity of interconnections between national  systems  as 
well as differing operating standards. 
In the liberalised internal market, trade in electricity with third countries is likely to become 
more attractive. Companies are already increasingly negotiating with third countries on future 
deliveries  of electricity.  Furthermore,  the  situation with regard  to  technical  limitations  of 
interconnections is gradually improving. There are a number of projects aimed at improving 
connections  between  Eastern  and  Central  European  countries,  including  the  Ukraine  and 
Russia, to the electricity grids of  the Commuriity. 
A  potential  intensification  of trade  in  electricity  with  neighbouring  countries  would,  in 
principle,  be  a positive development.  It  would increase competition,  resulting in increased 
efficiency  and  possibly  provide  new  investment  opportunities·  for  EU  companies  in 
neighbouring countries. However, it must be ensured that such an extension of the market is 
. made  on  the  basis  of a  level  playing  field  for  all  economic  operators.  A  fundamental 
precondition for the introduction of Community-wide competition in the electricity market is 
the existence of  comparable framework conditions in all countries concerned. 
In view of the potential for increased trade in electricity and the  need to make  such trade 
subject to  certain conditions,  clear legal  rules  need to  be  agreed  and  compliance must be 
ensured.  The  enlargement  process  and  the  intention  to  accelerate  market  opening  have 
accentuated  the  need  for  such  a  framework.  The  Community  needs  to  be  aware  of,  and 
prepared for, the consequences of a further opening of the internal market with regard to its 
27 trade relations with third countries. As regards electricity undertakings in third countries, they 
need to have a clear perspective allowing them to develop an effective and coherent strategy 
with regard to their participation in the internal electricity market. 
With regard to  gas,  it is  clear that the external dimension of the internal market is  equally 
important.  In  view  of growing  import  dependency,  however,  the  issues  are  different.  A 
reciprocal opening of upstream and downstream markets based on free trade and integration 
of  EU  and  non-EU  markets  and  closer  and  strengthened  cooperation  are  important. 
Depending on developments, the Commission may consider whether specific initiatives are 
required in order to ensure external reciprocity. 
2.9.1:  Creation of  a reliable legal framework for electricity trade with non-EU countries 
It is necessary to create a reliable legal framework for such trade activities. As already spelled 
out  in  principle  in  the  Commission  Communication  "Recent  progress  with  building  the 
internal electricity market" adopted in May 2000
33
,  such a framework could be established 
through the conclusion of regional  or bilateral  agreements  with third countries  concerned, 
where  appropriate  in  the  context  of existing  framework  arrangements,  for  instance  the 
Association Agreements concluded with candidate countries.  It appears appropriate to  look 
into  the  possibility  of asking  for  commitments,  on  the  basis  of reciprocity,  to  address 
environmental and nuclear safety standards, in particular in order to prevent potential danger 
to  the  environment  in  the  Community.  Such  arrangements  would  constitute  a 
reciprocity-based frame,Nork for trade with third countries, thus ensuring equivalent access to 
the Community market and third country markets and the respect of basic environmental and 
nuclear safety standards. In the absence of any specific arrangements, existing international 
trade rules apply. 
The Action Plan providing for technical assistance for the preparation of candidate countries 
to  the  internal  energy  market  set  up  by  the  Commission  in  1998  will  facilitate  the 
achievement  of this  objective.  It puts  the  emphasis  on  the  real  need  for  assistance  on 
regulatory  issues,  drafting  legislation,  operation  of the  market  and  transmission  system, 
establishment of national regulatory authorities, etc. Tailor-made action is being organised to 
smoothen the transition process. In view of the proposed acceleration of the opening of the 
market in the European Union, the Commission will strengthen the Action Plan for technical 
assistance and its other efforts to assist the candidate countries in adapting their energy sector 
to meet EU requirements. 
2.9.2.  Next steps 
The Commission shall identify - through the analysis of available information and bilateral 
contacts  - countries,  potential  candidates  for  entering  into  a  bilateral  or  regional 
agreement/understanding  with  the  Community.  In  principle,  such  countries  must  have 
an  electricity  market  organised  in  compliance  with  the  basic  principles  of  the 
EU Electricity Directive,  both in quantitative and qualitative terms  (i.e.  with regard to  the 
degree of market opening, third party access and unbundling) and must be prepared to grant 
access  to  the  market  for  EU  companies.  Furthermore,  the  situation  with  regard  to 
environmental st~dards applicable to electricity production and nuclear safety standards must 
be satisfactory. 
33  COM(2000) 297 fmal. 
28 As  regards  the  accession  countries  any  such  agreements  must  be  fully  1n  line  with  the 
accession negotiations and future stipulations of  the Accession Treaties. 
Once potential candidate countries are identified, the Commission would request the Council 
for a negotiation mandate on the basis of  the procedure of Article 228 of the Treaty and enter 
into the negotiations. It is expected that first mandates could be requested in 2001. 
Furthermore, it is necessary to monitor the effects in practice of the concluded agreements. It 
appears therefore appropriate to require Member States to report regularly to the Commission 
on  past quantities  and  origins  of imports  under  new  bilateral  or  regional  agreements  or 
existing arrangements.  The  Commission would then produce  a  report on experience made 
and, if  necessary, propose additional measures at the Community level. 
3.  CONCLUSIONS 
Important progress has been tnade with the development of the electricity and gas markets, in 
both  quantitative  (percentage  market  opening)  and  qualitative  (structural  choices  on 
unbundling,  network access,  etc.)  terms.  This  has  led  to  important price reductions,  most 
significant in those countries with a high degree of  quantitative market opening. 
As regards public service standards, experience demonstrates that market opening, including 
full opening, has not resulted in any decline in public service standards. On the contrary, full 
market  opening  combined  with  effective  regulation  has  led  to  increasing  awareness  and 
standards of public service. The Commission feels it is of the utmost importance that public 
service  standards  should  not  decline.  Although  all  the  evidence  points  to  public  service 
standards  going  up,  the  Commission feels  it  is  important to  stipulate  at  least  that  in  all 
Member States universal service in electricity should be ensured, meaning the supply of high 
quality electricity for  all households  at  affordable prices  and that a  minimum set of final 
customer protection standards are adopted. 
Market opening has  also  proved compatible with the  Community's objectives  in tetms of 
security  of supply  and  environmental protection,  provided  the  necessary  complementary 
policies are pursued. Appropriate measures are in place or under preparation, at national and 
community level, to ensure that the progressive completion of  the internal n1arket contributes 
positively to the Community's objectives in these respects. 
Measures can and are being .taken to ensure that the necessary restructuring of energy industry 
takes place in a socially consensual manner compatible with the Community's objectives in 
terms of  employment policy. 
Neighbouring countries  are  already participating or will  participate in the internal market, 
subject however to  considerations  of reciprocity  and  environmental  protection compatible 
with the trade rules and necessary to ensure a level playing field.  Bilateral agreements could 
lay the foundation for progress in this respect. 
These developments are encouraging. However, the ultimate objective of a fully integrated 
market  has  not  yet  been  achieved.  Experience  has  shown  that  the  provisions  of the 
Electricity and Gas Directives regarding two key issues must be reviewed and strengthened in 
order to complete the internal market. 
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As regards the level of  market opening, most Member States have gone further than requested 
by  the  Electricity  and  Gas  Directives.  However,  the  degree  of market  opening  differs 
considerably between Member States. This situation, if maintained over a longer period, will 
prevent  a  real  level  playing  field  from  developing  within  the  internal  market.  Such  a 
development was not anticipated at the time the Gas and Electricity Directives were agreed. 
At that time,  it was not expected that an overwhelming majority of Member States would 
open their markets more than legally required,  and certainly not to  commit to full  opening 
within a short fixed time scale. Thus the distortion of competition - both between electricity 
and gas companies, and between electricity and  gas  users - that presently exists, was not 
expected. Furthermore, the reciprocity provisions of the Directive do not provide an adequate 
solution to this distortion. 
Market  opening  is  important,  but to  be  effective  in  practice fair  and non-discriminatory 
access to the network must be guaranteed. Though important progress has been achieved in 
this respect, in particular in electricity, there is still a need for further improvement. Also, the 
standards differ between Member States, a situation that is likely to accentuate distortions of 
the market.  The number of respondents that stressed the  fundamental  importance of these 
issues at the Public Hearing, both in order to create effective competition and a level playing 
field shows the importance of  this issue. 
The  Commission believes that the  conditions are  right ·for a  significant further  step in the 
market opening process, leading to the rapid completion of  the internal markets for electricity 
and gas. As mentioned above, an overwhelming majority of  respondents at the Public Hearing 
confirmed  the  need to  complete  the  internal  electricity  and  gas  market more  rapidly.  As 
underlined by these companies, consumer representatives and organisations, the benefits of a 
fully liberalised market are numerous. 
Full  opening of gas  and  electricity  markets  would  provide  a  level  playing field  between 
Member States and for all market players in the internal market, which cannot be expected 
through the implementation of  the current directives, as has been demonstrated above. 
As regards the price of electricity in particular, the level of competition that has already been 
achieved in this area has led to important price reductions. These will maintain and enhance 
the general competitiveness of EU industry. Market opening is now moving forward quickly 
in most of  the countries with which EU undertakings principally compete. The completion of 
the single market is vital to keep up with developments of  the markets of  our trading partners. 
Also, competition will lead to  a greater homogeneity of prices throughout the  Community 
thereby providing a level playing field for both industrial and private energy users. This is of 
particular importance for small and medium sized enterprises which at the moment are often 
disadvantaged  compared  to  large  industrial  customers,  in  particular  if they  are  captive 
customers. In this respect, it is notable that a number of  respondents underlined that it cannot 
be justified to  continue to  give a competitive advantage to large EU companies over small 
ones in terms of access to comparative electricity and gas prices.  Given the importance of 
small  and  medium  sized  enterprises  for  the  Community,  such  a  situation  can  only  be 
prejudicial in terms of  competitiveness, innovation and employment. 
Full  market  opening  will  also  encourage  innovation  and  the  market  penetration  of new 
technologies.  In  fact,  many  new  technological  developments  are  taking  place  in  power 
generation,  notably  with  respect  to  micropower  technology  and  renewable  energies. 
Microturbines are increasingly presenting alternatives to customers, and fuel-cell technology 
is  now  being  introduced.  These  technologies  have  considerable  advantages  for  many 
30 customers  in  terms  of reliability,  environmental  impact  and  often  cost.  Furthermore,  for 
peripheral areas, such technologies are particularly attractive. The completion of the internal 
market will provide a level playing field for all competitive technologies in terms of access to 
customers and will there  tore accelerate the introduction of  these new technologies. 
Further market opening is also likely to increase service levels for customers, particularly at 
the final consumer level. The quality of service offered, for example in terms of repairs, new 
services and billing arrangements, are some of  the areas on which undertakings compete. This 
has already been seen in countries where full market opening has taken place. 
Finally,  the  development of "gas-to-gas"  competition  would  be  further  facilitated  by  the· 
completion of the internal energy market.  At present, the price of natural gas in continental 
Europe is closely linked to  the oil price parity.  In Germany,  for  example, light heating oil 
prices increased by 50% between July 1999 and July 2000. Gas wholesale prices increased by 
42%  during  the  same  period.  The  average  December  2000  border price  for  German  gas 
imports was up nearly 90% on the previous year. It is clearly in the Community's interest that 
gas-to-gas competition continually develops, de-coupling the oil/gas price relationship since 
this will i-mprove the diversity of the supply of energy to the EU. The Gas Directive already 
envisages  the  development of gas-to-gas  competition  through the  right to  get  third  party 
access  by eligible  customers  right  up  to  the  wellhead.  As  increasing  numbers  of eligible 
customers  source  competitively,  this  will  require  gas  producers  to  increasingly  compete 
between one another in terms of  price.  · 
The  development of effective  gas-to-gas  competition  in  Europe  may be  hampered by  the 
extent of long-term contracts in European gas supply and transportation. An effective way of 
opening  up  the  European gas  market and  developing  gas-to-gas  competition would  be  to 
introduce gas release programmes by  opening existing long-term exclusive supply contracts 
to  third  parties.  A  few  Member  States  have  introduced  such  programmes  and  other 
Member States should be encouraged to  consider such programmes, which would increase 
liquidity in the gas market. 
In order to  achieve full  market opening, both quantitative and qualitative elements must be 
addressed. It is  necessary to fix  a deadline for Member States to permit all customers, both 
industrial and  domestic,  to  purchase  electricity  and  gas  from  the  supplier of their  choice 
throughout the Community. This will ensure that an internal market develops rapidly and to 
the  benefit of all Community citizens, but also to provide a real  level playing field  for  all 
EU companies. 
Second, it is necessary to ensure an effective system of market access - ensuring that eligible 
customers  and  generators  are  able  to  have  effective  and  non-discriminatory access  to  the 
transmission and distribution grid and other essential infrastructure. Experience indicates that 
the achievement of the ultimate goal of non-discriminatory access· to the network cannot be 
fully achieved on the basis of the current rules of the Directive regarding third party access 
and  the  level  of unbundling.  In  this  context,  independent  national  regulatory  authorities 
should  be  established  in  all  Member  States,  as  they  play  a  pivotal  role  in  ensuring 
non-discriminatory terms for access to the network. They should at least have the power to fix 
or approve transmission and distribution tariffs. 
High standards must be assured with respect to both the conditions of thlrd party access and 
unbundling,  ensuring a  high degree  of independence - and  thus  impartiality - of system 
operators. Such standards should in principle be comparable in quality in all Member States in 
order to provide for a level playing field and avoid trade distortions. 
31 The Commission has therefore concluded that proposals meeting these requirements should 
now be put forward to the European Council and Parliament. Furthermore, such proposals can 
reinforce  the  existing  provisions  regarding  public  service  objectives.  These  qualitative 
proposals have  already been identified in the  Green Paper on security of supply that was 
adopted by the Commission in November 2000
34
. 
While it is true that such proposals follow relatively quickly after the implementation of the 
existing Electricity and Gas  Directives,  strong  grounds  exist for  proposing new measures. 
First, market opening has proceeded far more quickly than expected in most Member States, 
resulting in more  important market distortions  than expected.  Second,  existing experience 
demonstrates that if effective competition is to develop, and a level playing field is to result, 
equivalent and robust minimum standards must be set regarding unbundling and third party 
·access. 
However,  it is  important that the completion of the internal market does not endanger but 
contributes  to  the  attainment of the  Community's goals  in other important areas,  such as 
consumer protection and the  protection of the  environment,  security  of supply  and  other 
public  service  issues.  Therefore,  as  market  opening  accelerates,  it  must  continue  to ·he 
accompanied by appropriate measures in these areas, both at the national and the Community 
level.  The  Commission  will  closely  monitor  developments  in  this  regard  and  make 
appropriate proposals when necessary. 
It should also be underlined, that this next legislative stage is only one of the elements that 
will need to be undertaken to achieve an effective internal market. Whilst, for example, much 
has been achieved in the context of the Florence and Madrid electricity and gas fora, further 
progress is  essential, particularly with respect, for  example, to the cross-bo,rder tarification 
mechanism  and  congestion  management  in  the  electricity  sector.  The  Commission  will 
formalise  the  progress  that has  been  achieved  so  far  in the  framework  of the  electricity 
regulatory forum with legislative measures. 
In  particular for  electricity,  it  is  now necessary  to  provide  for  a  formal  legal  framework 
building on the results of  the regulatory F  arum relating to cross border access to transmission 
networks. This will allow the adoption of Decisions on the matter that are directly applicable. 
The Commission has therefore decided that a proposition fulfilling this requirement should be 
presented to the European Parliament and Council. 
Furthermore, continued progress will need to be made in adopting existing proposals in the 
environmental and taxation areas. To ensure that continued high levels of public service are 
maintained and increased, the Commission will continue its ongoing benchmarking exercise, 
and  will  adopt  a  Communic.ation  on  this  issue  during  2001.  The  Commission  will  also 
continue work on security of supply issues.  The  Commission on 29  November 2000  has 
adopted a Green Paper (COM(2000) 769) on this issue, and continu.ed work on this area will· 
be  important.  All of these issues will  continue to  be priority areas  for  the Commission in 
parallel  to  the  adoption  of further  legislative  measures  aimed  at  completing  the  internal 
markets for gas and electricity. 
34  COM(2000) 769, pp. 71  and 72. 
32 EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
REVISION OF THE ELECTRICITY AND GAS DIRECTIVES 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
The European Council in Lisbon of 23-24 March 2000 called for "rapid work" to  complete 
the internal market and asked "the Commission, the Council and the Member States,  eac~ in 
accordance with their respective powers  ... to  speed up  liberalisation in areas  such as  gas, 
electricity  . . . The aim is  to  achieve  a fully  functional  operational internal market in these 
areas; the European Council will assess progress achieved when it meets next Spring on the 
basis of a Commission report and appropriate proposals". The European Parliament equally 
requested the  Commission to  adopt a detailed timetable  for  the  achievement of accurately 
defined objectives with a view to gradually by completely liberalising the energy markets 
1
. 
The Energy Council of 30 May 2000 stressed "the importance and urgency of  the conclusions 
reached  at  the  Lisbon European Council"  and  invited the  Commission  "to  present timely 
proposals for further action". 
In  the  Commission  Communication  "Completing  the  Internal  Energy  Market"
2
,  the 
. conclusion  is  reached  that  proposals  aimed  at  completing  the  internal  gas  and  electricity 
markets can now be made to the Parliament and Council, which would not only achieve this 
primary objective  but also  be  compatible  with,  and  contribute  to,  the  Community's  other 
relevap.t policies in this area. 
The  attached  proposal  to  amend  Directives  96/92/EC  and  98/30/EC  therefore  meets  the 
request of  the European Council and the Energy Council; it follows the recent Green Paper on 
Security of Supply  which highlighted the links between the acceleration of the integration of 
energy markets within Europe and the need to ensure security of  supply. 
2.  OBJECTIVES PURSUED 
As explained in the abovementioned Communication, if  the Community is to create a real and 
effective internal market for electricity and gas, any proposal must contain both quantitative 
and qualitative elements: 
The  progressive freeing  of all  electricity and gas consumers to  choose their supplier 
("quantitative proposal"). There are three reasons for pursuing. an ambitious program in 
this  respect.  First,  to  ensure  that  all  EU  companies  receive  the  benefits  of 
competition  in terms  of increased  efficiency  and  lower prices,  leading  to  increased 
EU competitiveness and employment.  Secondly, to  ensure that EU consumers receive 
the full  benefits of market opening in terms of lower domestic bills for electricity and 
gas. Thirdly, to ensure a level playing field between Member States in terms of market 
opening  and hence to  fully  integrate the  15  national markets into  one true  and  fully 
operational single market. 
Resolution 'Liberalisation of  energy markets' A5-0180/2000 of6 July 2000. 
OJC 
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("qualitative proposals"). Experience in market opening, not only in the Community but 
also  in  other  countries,  has  clearly  demonstrated  that  certain  approaches  to  market 
opening are  far  more likely to  bring  a~out the development of effective competition. 
The clear majority of Member States have adopted such an approach for electricity and 
a large number of  Member States have also done so for gas. 
As  the  internal  market develops,  particularly  in  terms  of the  abovementioned  quantitative 
acceleration, it is  therefore essential that methods by which market opening is  implemented 
gradually converge between Member States if a real internal market is to develop on the basis 
of undistorted  competition.  This  is  equally  necessary if all  the  possible  benefits  from  the 
creation of the  internal markets  for  electricity  and  gas  are  to  be  exploited  and  passed  on 
to consumers. 
It  i_s  generally  acknowledged  that  third  party  access  based  on  pubiished  and 
non-discriminatory  tariffs,  and  a  high  level  of unbundling,  are  not  only  conducive  but 
necessary to ensure effective competition. To complete the internal market, it is not sufficient 
therefore  to  fully  liberalise  demand,  but  effective  market  structures  must  also  exist.  In 
addition to the need to ensure that the maximum benefits of competition develop to the profit 
of Community ·citizens,  such  measures  are  necessary  to  guarantee  a  level  playing  field 
between Member States and to  ensure  non-discrimination,  notably in  relation to  vertically 
integrated companies enjoying a dominant position. Indeed, it has become increasingly clear 
that this issue is just as, if not more, important as the level of quantitative market opening if 
real reciprocity is to be attained between Member States. 
In addition, it is appropriate that this proposal updates the Directives: certain provisions and 
options  in  the  Directives  have  either  become  redundant,  or  have  not  been  selected  by 
Member States. This concerns the tendering procedure for liberalising generation (except as a 
back-up measure that can be taken for  reasons of security of supply)  and the  single buyer 
model  for  network  access.  These  can  therefore  be  deleted  from  the  Directive.  This 
clarification is particularly important in terms of providing for a level playing field in terms of 
market structures of the gas  and electricity markets in the  countries that are  candidates for 
accession· to  the  Community.  In  addition,  a  number  of administrative  issues  have  been 
simplified 'in order to reduce red tape. This concerns obligations in the Directives that, in the 
light of  experience, can be alleviated. Furthermore, a clarification has been made with respect 
to the provisions of  both Directives with respect to the accounting unbundling requirements. 
It also appears appropriate to repeal Council Directives 90/547/EEC and 91/296/EEC on the 
transit of electricity and natural gas in order to ensure homogeneous and non-discriminatory 
access regimes for transmission including when this  involves  cross-border transport in  the 
Communi-ty. In order to ensure consistency and avoid confusion related to access regimes and 
terms; it is proposed to incorporate and streamline the rules of the transit directives into the 
proposal for a new directive on the completion of  the internal energy market thereby allowing 
transmission system operators access, if necessary, to  the grid of other transmission system 
operators on conditions that are non-discriminatory. 
Finally,  it  is  appropriate  to  improve  the  existing  provisions  regarding  public  service 
objectives, to permit an effective and continual benchmarking exercise, and to ensure that all 
citizens  enjoy the  right to  be  supplied with electricity at  affordable  and  reasonable  prices 
(universal service) and that they enjoy a minimum set of  consumer protection rights. 
34 These  improvements  to  the  Directives  and  the  removal  of redundant provisions  will  also 
provide more clarity and  guidance to  the  candidate countries in the adoption of reforms of 
their electricity and gas sectors. 
3.  THE PROPOSALS 
3.1.  Quantitative proposals - making all  consumers  progressively  free  to  choose 
their supplier 
It  is  proposed  that  Member  States  make  all  non-domestic  electricity  customers 
(i.e. all industrial  and  commercial  properties)  free  to  choose  their  electricity  supplier  by 
1 January 2003,  and that this be  extended to  all  customers  (i.e.  100%  market opening)  by 
1 January 2005. 
As the opening of gas markets is still behind electricity (Member States had to implement the 
Gas  Directive  18  months after the  Electricity Directive),  and  gas  companies have  had less 
time to prepare, it is proposed that all  non-domestic gas customers be eligible by 1 January 
2004, i.e.  one year later than for electricity. The same deadline is however proposed as  that 
for  electricity for the introduction of full  market opening:  1 January 2005,  as  this period is 
sufficiently long to permit the EU gas industry to  fully prepare for full competition, and will 
then ensure that both internal markets are operating in parallel. This is particularly important 
due to the increasing convergence between the two sectors. 
These proposals are  made  taking  into  account the  experience of those  countries that have 
already successfully introduced full competition, and the time that has been necessary to make 
all the necessary preparations, both administrative, technical and legal/regulatory, to  ensure 
consumer protection and the respect of necessary public service objectives.  In particular, it 
takes account of the fact that the eligibility of domestic consumers, unlike the industrial and 
commercial sector, often requires important preparation in terms of billing arrangements and 
the development of customer load profiling 
4
•  It  also takes  into  account the  intentions of a 
majority of Member States to introduce full competition under a timetable similar to the one 
proposed. The Commission Communication on completing the internal  ~nergy market clearly 
demonstrates that the main objectives of the Community in this area, notably high standards 
of public service and consumer protection, environmental protection, security of supply and 
socially consensual market opening, can be fully met in the context of  such progress. 
3.2.  Qualitative proposals 
Two  proposals  are  made  in  this  respect,  concerning  unbundling  and  network  access 
methodology. Almost all those that have commented in the context of the public hearing on 
the  completion  of  the  internal  energy  market,  which  the  Commission  organised  in 
September 2000, stressed that high standards and clear measures With  respect to  both these 
issues are essential if effective competition is  to  be  ensured throughout the  internal market, 
and effective reciprocity is to exist between Member States and companies. 
4  Under a standardised load profile, an assumption on the consumption of electricity of a type of small 
consumer is made, in volume and timing of  demand. Any discrepancies with the profile are settled after 
periodic readings of  the existing meter, eliminating the need for expensive minute-to-minute reading of 
the consumer's actual consumption and off-setting that against his/her contracted volume. 
35 Unbundling: In order to ensure a common minimum standard of unbundling throughout the 
internal  market  for  electricity  and  gas,  it  is  proposed  that  Member  States  ensure,  as  a 
minimum,  that transmission  be  carried  out  via  a  subsidiary  company  that  is  legally  and 
functionally separate vis-a-vis its day to day operations from generation and sales activities of 
its  parent  company  (an  independent  transmission  system  operator - TSO).  A  number· of 
measures  are  specified that  must  be  respected  to  ensure  that  the  transmission  subsidiary 
company  is  able  to  operate  in  functional  terms  independently  of the  other  commercial 
interests of the group to which it belongs. The minimum requirements in tem1s of functional 
separation -are the following: 
those responsible for the management of the transmission system may not participate in 
company structures responsible, directly or indirectly, for the day-to-day running of the 
generation/production, and supply functi.ons of  the integrated group; 
appropriate  measures  must  be  taken  to  ensure  that  the  personal  interests  of the 
management of the transmission system company are taken into account in a manner 
that ensures th~t they are capable of  acting independently; 
the transmission system operator must exercise full control over all assets necessary to 
operate, maintain and develop the network; 
the transmission system operator must establish a compliance programme, which sets 
out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory conduct is excluded. The programme 
must set out the specific obligations of employees to  meet this  objective.  It  must be. 
drawn up and its respect monitored by a compliance officer appointed by and reporting 
to the President/Chief Executive of the integrated company to which the transmission 
system operator belongs.  An annual  report,  setting out the  measures  taken,  must be 
submitted by the compliance officer to the national regulatory authority and published. 
Many  respondents  at  the  public  hearing  further  argued  that  distribution  should  also  be 
unbundled in a  similar manner, requiring legal  separation
5
,  and stressed the importance of 
non-discriminatory access to distribution as vital
6
•  • 
Further  opening  of the  market  will  render  independent  distribution  system  operation  as 
impo~ant as  independent transmission system operation.  For this. reason,  the Commission 
proposes a  legal separation of electricity distribution system operators by 2003  and of gas 
distribution system operators by 2004 on largely the same conditions as those described above 
for  the transmission system operator.  However,  Member States may decide  to introduce a 
de minimis  threshold,  because  it  might  not  be  proportional  to  impose  this  unbundling 
obligation on small local distribution companies. 
It should be noted that this modification represents a greater development with respect to gas 
than to electricity. In the Gas Directive, only internal accounting unbundling of transmission, 
together with measures to ensure the non-disclosure of commercially sensitive information is 
required.  However,  six  Member  States  have  in  fact  moved  to  ·ownership,  legal,  or 
management unbundling, or are preparing to do so. In addition, it is worth noting that several 
6 
The Gas  and Electricity Directives require  only  accounting unbundling at  distribution level  together 
with measures to ensure the non-disclosure of  commercially sensitive information. 
Distribution costs are relatively significant. For gas, total investments in gas distribution will typically 
be twice as high as in transmission. In a country without gas production, gas distribution investment can 
account for 70% to 80% of  total investment in the supply chain to the end user. 
36 integrated  gas  undertakings  are  pursuing  similar  policies  of separating  management  and 
operation of transportation functions from the gas supply function.  It is  generally accepted 
that such a development will lead to  a more effective and equivalent competitive structure 
throughout the internal market and will permit more market entry, as potential entrants will be· 
confident of  non-discriminatory access. Moreover, within integrated companies it will provide 
clearer cost signals and incentives to  the different business functions.  The adoption of this 
measure will thus lead to  a more rapid and equitable development of an effective internal 
market for gas. 
These provisions  were  the  ones underlined  as  important by an overwhelming majority of 
those commenting during the hearing. In the light of experience in implementing the existing 
Directives, they have also proven to be the most important in ensuring effective functional 
independence. 
Many respondents at the  hearing argued that storage and LNG facilities  for  gas  should be 
further  unbundled  and subject to  regulated access.  Many  also  argued that  full  ownership 
unbundling for transmission should take place. It is clear that measures such as these would 
result  in  more  effective  guarantees  of  non-discriminatory  access.  Furthermore,  the 
Commission fully recognises the fundamental role that access to gas  storage and other key 
ancillary  facilities  must  play  if a  competitive  market  is  to  develop 
7
•  In  this  light,  the 
Commission has decided to  propose a clarification of the importance of access to  storage, 
other ancillary services and flexibility instruments; strengthening the method of third party 
access  regarding  distribution  and  LNG  facilities  (see  below);  and  to  require  that  gas 
companies be obliged to  identify and create separate operators responsible for storage and 
LNG  activities  (storage  and  LNG  operators);  thus  increasing  transparency  for  those 
requesting access to these key facilities. The Commission expects that these measures will be 
sufficient to ensure effective ·and non-discriminatory access to the gas and electricity systems. 
It  has decided not to  require, at least at present, unbundling requirements additional to this 
·with respect to storage and LNG (i.e. not to require separate legal entities for these activities). 
Furthermore  it  is  proposed  to  include  a  provision  on  non-discriminatory  provision  of 
balancing services for both gas and electricity  . 
• 
However,  the  Commission  will  continue  to  monitor  carefully  whether  effective  and 
non-discriminatory  access  develops  for  transmission  (including  upstream  pipelines), 
distribution,  LNG,  storage  and  other key ancillary  facilities.  In order to  ensure  continued 
examination of these issues by all Community institutions, it is proposed that the Directives 
be  revised to  require the  Commission to  submit a  report to  the  European Parliament and 
Council, inter alia on these issues before the end of  the second and fourth years following the 
entry into force of this revision (Articles  1 and 2), together, if necessary, with appropriate 
proposals for further action. 
Gas offtake varies for  all customers greatly, both within a single day and between seasons during the 
year. Gas supply, however, is more constant as gas producers wish to maximise the capacity usage of 
their pipeline infrastructure. Non-discriminatory access to  flexibility  instruments such as  storage may 
therefore be crucial for an efficient access to the overall gas  system and for  ensuring a level playing 
field between incumbent utilities having significant storage facilities at their disposal and new entrants 
and customers without such facilities. 
37 Third party access: As mentioned above, effective third party access was also identified by 
all respondents at the hearing as vital to ensure the development of effective competition. It is 
almost  universally  considered  that  the  mtntmum  system  necessary  to  ensure 
non-discrimination  and  the  necessary  transparency  and  predictability  to  create  effective 
competition  to  develop  is  published  and  regulated  tariffs,  which  are  applied  under 
non-discriminatory terms and conditions to all system users, be they customers or companies, 
including those belonging to the group to which the TSO belongs. Such tariffs may be divided 
into objective classes of customers, providing that this does not result in discrimination. This 
system has been adopted by  almost all  Member_ States  with respect to  electricity,  but not 
concerning gas
8
. It is therefore proposed that a published and regulated tariff structure be the 
minimum norm for  transmission and distribution tariffs in both markets.  It  is  important to 
.ensure that future accession countries also implement structures compatible with the approach 
pursued by Member States. 
Iri order to ensure that non-discrimination is effective in practice, Member States and national 
regulatory authorities will have to  carefully monitor the behaviour of the  legally separated 
transmission and distribution system operators. Thus, Member States and national regulatory 
authorities will need, inter alia, to ensure that transmission and distribution operators reply to 
access requests within a reasonable period of time. In the Commission's view a period of two 
weeks  should,  in  principle,  not  be  exceeded.  They  will  equally  need  to  ensure  that 
tra.t?-smission and distribution system operators do not ask questions to companies requesting 
access to the network, which relate to the source of the energy, the destination or the onward 
transport route that are not necessary for the carrying out of their responsibilities in relation to 
the operation of  the network. 
Regulation:  Independent  national  regulatory  authorities  play  a  pivotal  role  in  ensuring 
non-discriminatory  access  to  the  network,  as  they  have  the  power  to  fix  or  approve 
transmission and distribution tariffs prior to their entry into force. Competition authorities can 
only act on competition distortions ex-post, while regulators have an active ex-ante function. 
These authorities also play a major role in issues relating to cross border trade, in the creation 
of a truly internal market. They also bring about regulatory continuity and transparency to the 
market.  The proposed Directive therefore requires Member States  to  establish independent 
regulatory  authorities  with  the  competence,  inter  alia,  to  set  and/or  approve  tariffs  and 
conditions for access to gas and electricity transmission and distribution networks. Thus, the 
regulatory authority must approve the transmission and distribution tariffs prior to their entry 
into force.  This approval may be on the basis of a proposal by thetransmission/distribution 
system operator(s), or on the basis of a proposal agreed between the transmission/distribution 
system operator(  s)  and the users of the  network.  Indeed,  it is  in any  event appropriate  for 
transmission/distribution  system  operators  to  consult  closely  with  all  categories  of their 
network users prior to proposingtariffs to their regulatory authority.  Although independent, 
these  organisations  will  need  to  work  closely  with  other  government  bodies  such  as -
competition authorities where these still retain the responsibility for  settling other types  of 
disputes relating to TPA, for example, questions of  discrimination in individual cases. 
For  gas,  the  following  Member  States  have  either  a  system  of negotiated  access,  or  a  hybrid 
published/negotiated system: Austria, Belgium (who, however, recently decided to change to regulated 
TPA), Denmark, France, Germany and The Netherlands. 
38 Trade with non-EU countries: In a liberalised market the~e may be increased opportunities 
for EU businesses to trade with suppliers and customers outside the EU.  Significant benefits 
could arise fron1 such trade as in other industries. However, there must be agreement between 
the EU and third countries on reciprocal access to markets and on environmental and safety 
standards to  prevent potential danger to the environment in the Community, particularly for 
the electricity market. A framework for bilateral or regional agreements could be envisaged to 
cover these matters. However, some Member States may already have separate arrangements 
with non-EU countries to exchange electricity. These agreements need to be monitored so· that 
they are  compatible with the Community objectives on,  for example, nuclear power safety. 
Hence, the Directive requires Member States to  infom1  the  Commission of the  imports of 
electricity from those countries to which the Electricity Directive does not apply. 
3.3.  Updating provisions 
To  reflect  the  fact  that  a  number  of options  in  the  present  Electricity  Directive  are 
implemented by no Member State, and are generally accepted to be less likely to lead to the 
development  of competitive  markets  than  those  actually  implemented,  it  is  proposed  that 
these are deleted from the Directive. This is important in ensuring a continued level playing 
field with potential accession countries. Thus, it is proposed that the tendering procedure with 
respect to generation be deleted. However, Member States are required to make provision for 
the  launch ·of tenders for  new capacity that might be  used  as  an exceptional  measure  for 
reasons of security of supply. The "Single buyer" option with respect to TP A for electricity is 
also deleted. 
An administrative improvement is also proposed to remove a procedural requirement that, in 
the  light  of experience,  has  been  shown  to  be  unnecessary,  and  can  be  deleted  without 
reducing the effectiveness of the Directive. This concerns the requirement that in the event of 
a refusal to  grant authorisation to  construct new generating capacity, a copy of the relevant 
decision  is  forwarded  to  the  Commission.  It  has  become  evident  that  this  procedure  is 
unnecessarily onerous as many such refusals take place for small facilities on simple planning 
grounds  (Article  5(3) of Directive  96/92/EC).  The benefits of this  procedure are  therefore 
outweighed by the administrative burdens it imposes, particularly on local authorities.  This 
requirement is therefore dropped. Companies that are refused authorisations retain the right, 
however, to refer any' case they may wish to the Commission. 
Article 14(3) of  the Electricity Directive and 13(3) of  the Gas Directive require that integrated 
undertakings  maintain  separate  accounts  for  their  different  activities.  According  to  the 
definitions contained in Article 2(5) and (6) of the Electricity Directive and 2(3) and (5) of 
the Gas  Directive  both transmission  and  distribution  mean  the  transport  of electricity/gas 
"with a view to  its  delivery to  final  consumers".  Certain companies have  argued that this 
means  that  it  is  unnecessary  to  maintain  separate  accounts  fot  distribution  and  supply 
activities. The Commission believes this to be  incorrect and incompatible with the wording 
and  objective  of this  provision,  notably  to  create  transparency  and  effective  regulation. 
Nonetheless to ensure full clarity on this issue, the draft Directive proposes a modification of 
Article 14(3) of  the Electricity Directive and 13(3) ofthe Gas Directive. 
With respect to the reciprocity provision, contained in Article 19 of both Directives, it is now 
possible to fix a final date at which this provision shall cease to be valid. As it is proposed that 
all Member States must designate all consumers to be eligible by 1 January 2005, the clause 
becomes invalid on that date. 
39 Finally,  it  is  proposed  to  repeal  the  Gas  and  Electricity  Transit  Directives 
(Council Directives 90/547/EEC  and  91/296/EEC)  to  avoid  different  regimes,  publication 
requirements, dispute settlement systems, etc. for access to the network. Transmission system 
operators shall, if necessary and for the purpose of carrying out their functions including in 
relation to transit, have access to the network of other transmission system operators based on 
non-discriminatory terms and conditions. 
3.4.  Public service objectives 
As  mentioned in the  Communication on completing the internal market, the  attainment of 
public service objectives is one of  the most fundamental objectives of  the Commission in this 
area.  Whilst existing provisions of the Gas and Electricity Directives have operated well to 
date, room for improvement exists, in particular in the context of full market opening. First, in 
order to ensure that universal service in electricity is ensured as market opening progresses, 
the  Commission  feels  it  is  important  to  include  a  provision  in  the  proposal  stating  that 
Member States should ensure universal service, meaning supply of high quality electricity to 
all  customers  in  their  territory  (Article  3(3)).  Equally,  and  as  a  complement  to  this, 
requirements (Article 3  (3) and (  4)) are introduced upon Member States, both for  electricity 
and gas,  to  introduce appropriate provisions to  ensure the  attainment of the  public service 
objectives and notably: 
•  The  protection  of vulnerable  customers:  Member  States  will,  for  example,  need  to 
ensure appropriate protection from unjustified disconnection of,  inter alia, the elderly, 
the unemployed, the handicapped, etc.; 
•  The protection of final customers' basic rights: Member States will, for example, need 
to ensure a minimum set of conditions for contracts, transparency of information, and 
the availability of  low-cost and transparent dispute settlement mechanisms
9
; 
•  Social  and  economic  cohesion:  beyond  universal  service,  where  necessary, 
Member States will need to take appropriate measures to ensure supplies at appropriate 
prices to, for example, peripheral areas; 
•  Environmental protection; and 
•  Security of supply;  notably through  ensuring  appropriate  levels  of maintenance  and 
development of  infrastructure, and in particular interconnections. 
Furthermore, and again as a complement to the above, in order to ensure that it is clear that 
Member States have  available all necessary instruments to  guarantee network maintenance 
and  development,  it  is  proposed  that  a  new  Article  be  inserted  in  the  Gas  and 
Electricity Directives  (Article  8(5)  of the  Electricity  Directive  and  Article  7(5)  of the 
. Gas Directive),  which  states  that  "Member States  may  require  Transmission  System 
Operators to meet minimum levels of investment for the maintenance and development of the 
transmission system, including interconnection capacity". 
Appropriate  provisions  to  ensure  these  basic  rights  can  be  found  in  Article  17  of the  Commission 
proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on universal service and users' 
rights relating to electronic communications networks and services, COM(2000) 392 of 12 July 2000. 
40 Finally, given the vital importance of  continued secure supplies of electricity as highlighted in 
the Green Paper of  Energy Supply-.Probably the most important public service objective- it 
is necessary to take a number of additional complementary measures to reinforce the existing 
safeguards contained in the Electricity and Gas Directives on this point. In particular, and in 
addition to  the  requirements  on Member  States  to  provide for  the  possibility of launching 
tenders for  new capacity when necessary, it would be  appropriate for  Member States to  be 
required to  carefully monitor the  state  of the  domestic  electricity and  gas  markets,  and  in 
particular the existing demand/supply balance, the level of  expected future demand, envisaged 
additional capacity under planning or construction, and the level of competition existing on 
the market.  On  an annual basis, the Member States  should be  required to  publish a report  . 
outlining their finclings,  and indicating  any  measures  envisaged to  ensure  supply  security. 
Furthermore, given that due to the highly interconnected nature of the EU electricity and gas 
network,  the  relationship  between demand  and  supply  at the  Community  level  is  of vital 
importance for overall system security, the Commission, on the basis of the national reports, 
and  its  own  monitoring  work,  should  publish  a  similar  Communication  covering  the 
Community  as  a  whole.  For  this  reason,  it  is  proposed  to  include  these  provi.sions  in 
Article 6( ?) of  the revised Electricity Directive and in Article 4a of  the revised Gas Directive. 
Article  3(2)  of the  existing  Directives  requires  Member  States  to  notify  public  service 
objectives to  the Commission.  However,  as  no  Member State has adopted such objectives, 
which require a derogation from either Directive, no  such notifications have been made.  In 
order  to  permit  an  effective  benchmarking  exercise  by  the  Commission,  enabling 
Member States  to  ensure  that  they  maintain  the  highest  levels  of public  service,  it  is 
appropriate to amend this provision to ensure that Member States notify, every two years, all 
measures taken to  achieve public service objectives,  irrespective of whether they require  a 
derogation from the Directive and notably the new requirements mentioned above.  On this 
basis, the Commission should be  obliged to publish a report every two years analysing the 
different measures adopted, and, if necessary, make recommendations as to  measures to be 
taken to achieve high public service standards. 
Finally,  a fully  opened market needs  an  internalisation of external  costs to  ensure  a true 
level  playing  field.  The  Commission  will  therefore  promote  initiatives  in  this  sense, 
e.g. an EU-wide energy/C02 tax, strict rules on State aid, demand-side management measures, 
measures to promote cogeneration and renewables which have a competitive disadvantage as 
long as external costs are not fully integrated. 
4.  CONCLUSION 
All  the  evidence available to the  Commission on the basis of the  operation of the gas  and 
Electricity  Directives  demonstrates  that  all  the  basic  objectives  pursued  by  the  internal 
market; lower prices, increased competitiveness, high standards of public service, security of 
supply,  and  environmental  protection,  are  being  achieved;  and  in  a  socially  consensual. 
context.  Experience in countries that have moved to  full  market opening demonstrates that 
these objectives can be and are met under conditions of full  competition, and can indeed be 
better pursued under such circumstances. The overwhelming view of  those commenting in the 
context of the  public hearing  on  completing the  internal  gas  and  electricity markets,  and 
comments received in writing, support this approach. 
41 The rapid completion of the internal market in this area represents, therefore, an important 
step in meeting the Community's objectives set out at the  European Council at Lisbon in 
spring 2000. The adoption of these proposals can be expected to  bring important benefits in 
terms  of competitiveness  and  employment,  and  provide  competitive  prices  and  higher 
standards of service to Community citizens for gas and electricity. 
42 2001/0077 (COD) 
Proposal for a 
DIRECTIVE OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
amending Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning common rules for the internal 
markets in electricity and natural gas 
(Text with EEA relevance) 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community,  and  in  particular 
Article 47(2), Article 55 and Article 95 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission 
1
, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the Economic and Social Committee
2
, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the Committee of  the Regions
3
, 
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 251  of  the Treaty
4
, 
Whereas: 
(  1)  Directive  96/92/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 
19 December 1996 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity
5 and 
Directive 98/30/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 22 June  1998 
concerning  common rules  for  the  internal  market  in  natural  gas
6  have  made  very 
important contributions towards the creation of  internal markets for electricity and gas. 
(2)  Experience in implementing those Directives demonstrates the important benefits that 
have  begun to  result  from  the  internal  markets  in  electricity  and  gas,  in  terms  of 
efficiency  gains,  price  reductions,  higher  standards  of  service  and  increased 
competitiveness. However, important shortcomings and possibilities for improving the 
functioning of  the markets remain. 
(3)  At its meeting in Lisbon on 23  and 24 March 2000, the European Council called for 
rapid work to be undertaken to complete the internal market in both electricity and gas 
sectors and to speed up liberalisation in these sectors with a view to achieving a fully 
operational internal market. The European. Parliament, in its Resolution of 6 July 2000 
on the Commission's second report on the state of liberalisation of energy markets, 
requested  the  Commission  ~o  adopt  a  detailed  timetable  for  the  achievement  of 
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43 accurately defined objectives with a view to  gradually but completely liberalising the 
energy market. 
(  4)  The  main obstacles  in arriving  at  a fully  operational  internal  market are  related to 
issues  of access  to  the  network  and  different  degrees  of market  opening  between 
Member States. 
(5)  In order to achieve non-discriminatory access to the network, the independence of the 
transmission  system  operator  is  of  paramount  importance.  The  provisions  on 
unbundling should therefore be  strengthened.  In  order to  ensure  non-discriminatory 
access  to  the  distribution  network,  unbundling  requirements  for  the  distribution 
system  operator  should  be  introduced  for  both  electricity  and  gas  distribution 
system operators. 
(6)  To  avoid imposing a disproportionate  financial  and  administrative burden on small 
· distribution companies, Member  States  should be  able,  where  necessary,  to  exempt 
such companies from the unbundling requirements. 
(7)  Further  measures  should  be  taken  in  order .to  ensure  transparent,  predictable  and 
non-discriminatory  tariffs  for  access  to  essential  transportation  and  related 
infrastructure, including storage and other ancillary facilities. Those tariffs should be 
applicable to all system users on a non-discriminatory basis. 
(8)  In  the  light  of  the  experience  gained  with  the  operation  .of  Council 
Directive 90/547/EEC  of 29  October  1990  on  the  transit  of electricity  through 
transmission grids
7 and Council Directive 91/296/EEC of 31  May 1991  on the transit 
of natural gas through grids
8
,  measures should be taken to ensure homogeneous and 
non-discriminatory access regimes for transmission, including across borders between 
Member States. 
(9)  The presence of independent national regulatory authorities, is an important feature in 
guaranteeing non-discriminatory  access  to  the  network.  Those  authorities  should  at. 
least have the competence to  fix  or approve transmission and distribution tariffs and 
tariffs  for  access  to  liquefied  natural  gas  (LNG)  facilities,  prior  to  their  entry 
into force. 
( 1  0)  National  regulatory  authorities  should be  able  to  approve  tariffs  on  the  basis  of a 
proposal  by  the transmission  system  operator  or  distribution  system  operator(  s)  or 
LNG system operator, or on the basis of a proposal agreed between these operator(s) 
and the users of  the network. 
(11)  The benefits resulting from the internal market should be available to  all Community 
industry  and  commerce,  iticludl.ng  small  and  medium-sized  enterprises  and  to  all 
Community  citizens  as  quickly  as  possible  for  reasons  of competitiveness  and 
employment. 
OJ L 313, 13.11.1990, p. 30; Directive as last amended by Commission Directive 98/75/EC (OJ L 276, 
13.10.1998, p. 9). 
OJ L  147, 12.6.1991, p.  37; Directive as last amended by Commission Directive 95/49/EC (OJ L 233, 
30.9.1995, p. 86). 
44 (12)  Gas  and  electricity  customers  should  be  able  to  choose  their  supplier  freely. 
Nonetheless a phased approach to  completing the internal market for  electricity and 
gas should be taken to enable industry to adjust and ensure that adequate measures and 
systems are in place to protect the interests of customers and ensure they have a real 
and effective right to choose supplier. 
(13)  Progressive  market  opening  towards  full  competition  will  gradually  remove 
differences between Member States: Transparency and certainty in the implementation 
of  this Directive should be ensured. 
(14)  Directive 98/30/EC provides for access to storage as part of  the gas system. In the light 
of the  experience  gained  in implementing the  internal  market,  additional  measures 
should  be  taken  to  clarify  the  provisions  for  access  to  storage  and  other  ancillary 
services  and  to  reinforce  the  separation  of the  operation  of transmission  and 
distribution systems, and gas st-orage and LNG facilities. 
(15)  Nearly  all  Member  States  have  chosen  to  ensure  competition  in  the  electricity 
generation  market  through  a  transparent  authorisation  procedure.  However, 
Member States should have the possibility to  ensure  security of supply through the 
launching of a tendering procedure in the event that sufficient electricity generation 
capacity is not built on the basis of  the authorisation procedure. 
(16)  In  the  interest  of security  of supply,  the  supply/demand  balance  in  individual 
Member States should be monitored and appropriate action taken if security of supply 
is compromised. 
(17)  Member States should ensure that all  customers enjoy the right to  be  supplied with 
electricity of  a specified quality at affordable and reasonable prices. In order to ensure 
the maintenance of the highest possible standards of  public service in the Community, 
all measures taken by Member States to achieve the objectives of  this Directive should 
be regularly notified to the Commission. The Commission should regularly publish a 
report anitlysing measures taken at national level to achieve public service objectives 
and comparing their effectiveness, with a view to making recommendations as regards 
measures to be taken at national level to achieve high public service standards. 
( 18)  The requirement to  notify the  Commission of any  refusal  to  grant authorisation to 
construct new generation  capacity  has  proven to  be  an  unnecessary  administrative 
burden and should therefore be dispensed with. 
(19)  Di~ectives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC should therefore be amended accordingly. 
(20)  In  accordance  with the  principles  of subsidiarity  and  prop·ortionality  as  set  out  in 
Article 5 of the Treaty, the objectives of the proposed action, namely the creation of 
fully  operational  internal  electricity  and  gas  markets,  in  which  fair  competition 
prevails, cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by 
reason of the scale and effects of the action, be better achieved by the Community. 
This  Directive  confines  itself to  the  minimum  required  in  order  to  achieve  those 
objectives and does not go beyond what is necessary for that purpose. 
(21)  To ensure homogeneity in the treatment of access to the electricity and gas networks, 
also in the case of  transit,. Directives 90/54 7  /EEC and 91/296/EEC should be repealed, 
45 HAVE ADOPTED THIS DIRECTIVE: 
Article 1 
Amendments to Directive 96/92/EC 
Directive 96/92/EC is amended as follows: 
(1)  Article 2 is amended as follows: 
(a)  point (9) is replaced by the following: 
"9.  'final  customer'  shall  mean  a  consumer  buying  electricity  for  his 
own use." 
· (b)  point (22) is replaced by the following: 
"22.  . 'non-domestic customer' shall mean a consumer purchasing electricity 
which is not for  his  own household use  and  shall  include producers, 
transmission and distribution undertakings and wholesale customers." 
(2)  Article 3 is replaced by the following: 
"Article 3 
1.  Member States shall ensure, on the basis of their institutional organisation and 
with  due  regard  for  the  principle  of subsidiarity,  that,  without prejudice  to 
paragraph  2,  electricity  undertakings  are  operated  in  accordance  with  the 
principles of this Directive, with a view to achieving a competitive market in 
electricity. Member Statesshall not discriminate between these undertakings as 
regards either rights or obligations. 
2.  Having regard to the relevant provisions of  the Treaty, in particular Article 86, 
Member States may impose on undertakings operating in the electricity sector, 
in the general economic interest, public service obligations which may relate to 
security, including security of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies 
and  to  environmental  protection.  Such  obligations  shall  be  clearly  defined, 
transparent,  non-discriminatory  and  verifiable.  As  a  means  of carrying  out 
public service obligations in relation to security of supply, Member States may 
introduce the  implementation of long-term planning, taking into account the 
possibility of  third parties seeking access to the system. 
3.  Member States shall ensure that all customers enjoy universal service, that is 
the  right  to  be  supplied  with  electricity  of a  specified  quality  within their 
territory  at  affordable  and  reasonable  prices.  They  shall  take  appropriate 
measures  to  protect final  customers  and  to  ensure  high  levels  of consumer 
protection,  particularly  with  respect  to  transparency  regarding  contractual 
terms and conditions, general information and dispute settlement mechanisms. 
These measures shall include, in particular, those set out in the Annex. 
46 4.  Member States shall implement appropriate measures to achieve the objectives 
of social  and  economic  cohesion,  environmental  protection  and  security  of 
supply,  notably  through  the  maintenance  and  construction  of  necessary 
network infrastructure including interconnection capacity. 
5.  Memb~r States may  decide  not to  apply  the  provisions  of Articles  5,  6,  16 
and 21  in so far as their application would obstruct the performance, in  law or 
in fact,  of the obligations imposed on electricity undertakings in th'e  general 
economic  interest  and  in  so  far  as  the  development of trade  would  not  be 
affected  to  such  an  extent  as  would  be  contrary  to  the  interests  of the 
Community. The interests of the  Community include, inter alia,  competition 
with  regard  to  eligible  customers  in  accordance  with  this  Directive  and 
Article 86 of  the Treaty." 
(3)  The following Article 3a is inserted: 
"Article 3a 
1.  Member States shall, every two years, notify the Commission of all  measures 
adopted to fulfill universal service and public service obligations, whether or 
not such measures require a derogation from the provisions of this Directive. 
This notification shall relate, inier alia, to the requirements of Article 3(  4) and 
the maintenance of service standards. 
2.  The Commission shall publish, every two years, a report analysing the different 
measures taken in the  Member States to  meet high public  service  standards, 
together with an examination of  the effectiveness of  those measures. 
Where  appropriate,  the  Commission  shall  make  recommendations  as  to 
measures to be taken at national level to achieve high public service standards." 
(  4)  Article 4 is deleted. 
(  5)  Article 5 is replaced by the following: 
"Article 5 
1.  For the construction of new generating capacity, Member States shall adopt an 
authorisation  procedure,  which  shall  be  conducted  in  accordance  with 
objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria. 
2.  Member States shall lay down the criteria for the grant of authorisations for 
the  construction of generating capacity in their territory.  These criteria may 
relate to: 
(a)  the  safety  and  security  of the  electricity  system,  installations  and 
associated equipment; 
(b)  protection of  public health and safety; 
(c)  protection of  the environment; 
(d)  land use and siting; 
47 (e)  use of  public ground; 
(f)  energy efficiency; 
(g)  the nature of  the primary sources; 
(h)  characteristics  particular to  the  applicant,  such  as  technical,  economic 
and financial capabilities; 
(i)  compliance with measures adopted pursttftnt to Article 3. 
3.  The authorisation procedures and criteria shc.ll be made public. 
4.  Applicants  shall  be  informed  of the  reasons  for  any  refusal  to  grant  an 
authorisation. The reasons must be objective, non-discriminatory, well founded 
and  duly  substantiated.  Appeal  procedures  shall  be  made  available  to  the 
applicant." 
(  6)  Article 6 is amended as follows: 
(a)  Paragraph 1 is replaced by the following: 
"1.  Member States shall ensure the possibility, in the interests of security 
of supply, to tender for new capacity on the basis of published criteria. 
A tendering procedure can, however, only be launched if on the basis 
of the authorisation procedure the capacity being built is not sufficient 
to ensure security of  supply." 
(b)  Paragraph 2 is deleted. 
(c)  Paragraph 6 is deleted. 
(7)  The following Article 6a is inserted: 
''Article 6a 
1.  Member  States  shall  designate  a  body,  which  may  be  the  independent 
regulatory authority referred to  in  Article  22,  to  monitor  security of supply 
issues.  This body shall monitor,  in particular, the  supply/demand balance on 
the  national  market,  the  level  of expected  future  demand  and  envisaged 
additional capacity planned or under construction, and the level of competition 
on the  market.  The  body shall publish,  by  31  July  each year at the latest a 
report outlining its fmdings on these issues, as well as any measures taken or 
envisaged  to  address  them  and  forward  this  report  to  the  Commission 
forthwith. 
2.  On the basis of the report referred to in paragraph 1 the Commission shall, on 
an annual basis, forward a Communication to the European Parliament and the 
Council examining issues  relating  to  security of supply of electricity  in the 
Community,  and  in  particular  the  existing  and.  projected  balance 
between  demand and supply.  Where appropriate, the Commission shall issue 
recommendations." 
48 (8)  In Article 7, paragraph 6 is replaced by the following: 
"6.  Unless the system operator is  already fully  independent from  other activities 
not  relating  to  the  transmission  system  in terms  of ownership,  the  system 
operator shall be  independent at least in terms of its legal form,  organisation 
and decision making from other activities not relating to transmission. 
In  order  to  ensure  the  independence  of the  system  operator,  the  following 
criteria shall ap¢y: 
(a)  those persons responsible for the management of the transmission system 
may  not participate  in  company  structures  of the  integrated  electricity 
undertaking  responsible,  directly  or  indirectly,  for  the  day-to-day 
operation of  the generation, distribution and supply of  electricity; 
(b)  .  appropriate measures must be taken to  ensure that the personal interests 
of the  persons  responsible  for  the  management  of the  transmission 
system  are  taken  into  account  in  a  manner  that  ensures  that  they  are 
capable of  acting independently; 
(c)  the system operator must exercise full control over all assets necessary to 
maintain and develop the network; 
(d)  the system operator must establish a compliance programme, which sets 
out measures  taken to  ensure  that discriminatory  conduct is  excluded. 
The  programme  must  set  out the  specific  obligations  of employees to 
meet this objective. It must be drawn up and its respect monitored by a 
compliance  officer  appointed  by  and  reporting  to  the  President/Chief 
Executive of the integrated electricity undertaking to  which the  system 
operator belongs. An annual report, setting out the measures taken, must 
be  submitted  by  the  compliance  officer  to  the  national  regulatory 
authority and published." 
(9)  The-following Article 7a is inserted: 
''Article 7  a 
Transmission system operators shall procure the energy they use for the carrying out 
of their  functions  according  to  transparent,  non-discriminatory  and  market  based 
procedures." 
(1 0)  In Article 8, the following paragraphs 5 and 6 are added: 
"5.  Member States may require transmission system operators to  meet minimum 
levels of investment for tlie maintenance and development of the transmission 
system, including interconnection capacity. 
49 6.  Rules adopted by transmission and distribution system operators for balancing, 
in real time, generation and consumption of  electricity, shall be transparent and 
non-discriminatory. Tariffs and terms and conditions for the provision of such 
services by system operators shall be established in a non-discriminatory way 
reflecting  prevailing  market  prices  and  shall  be  fixed  or  approved  by  the 
national regulatory authority prior to their entry into force." 
(11)  In Article 10, the following paragraph 4 is added: 
"4.  Unless the system operator is  already fully  independent from  other activities 
not  relating  to  the ·distribution  system  in  terms  of ownership,  the  system 
operator shall be  independent at least in terms of its legal form,  organisation 
and decision making from other activities not relating to distribution. 
In  order  to  ensure  the  independence  of the  system  operator,  the  following 
criteria shall apply: 
(a)  those persons responsible for the management of the distribution system 
may not participate  in company  structures  of the  integrated  electricity 
undertaking  responsible,  directly  or  indirectly,  for  the  day-to-day 
operation of  the generation, transmission and supply of  electricity; 
(b)  appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that the personal interests 
of the persons responsible for the management of the distribution system 
are taken into account in a manner that ensures that they are capable of 
acting independently; 
(c)  the system operator must exercise full control over all assets necessary to 
maintain and develop the network; 
(d)  the  system  operator  must  establish  a  compliance  programme,  which 
sets  out  measures  taken  to  ensure  that  discriminatory  conduct  is 
excluded.  The  programme  must  set  out  the  specific  obligations  of 
employees to  meet this  objective.  It must be drawn up  and  its  respect 
monitored  by  a  compliance  officer appointed  by and  reporting  to  the 
President/Chief Executive  of the  integrated  electricity  undertaking  to 
which  the  system  operator  belongs.  An annual  report,  setting  out  the 
measures  taken,  must  be  submitted  by  the  compliance  officer  to  the 
national regulatory authority and published. 
The  provisions  of the  first  and  second  subparagraphs  shall  apply  from 
1 January 2003.  Member States may decide not to apply those provisions to 
integrated  electricity  undertakings  serving  less  than  100  000  custom~rs at 
that date." 
• 
50 (12)  The following Article 12a is inserted: 
"Article 12a 
The  rules  in Articles  7  (  6)  and  1  0(  4)  do  not prevent the  operation of a  combined 
transmission and distribution system operator, which is fully independent in terms of 
its legal form, organisation and decision making from other activities not relating to 
transmission or distribution system operation and which meets the requirements of 
Article 7(6)." 
(13)  In Article 14, paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 
"3.  Integrated  electricity  undertakings  shall,  in  their  internal  accounting,  keep 
separate accounts for their generation, distribution and supply activities, and, 
where  appropriate,  consolidated accounts  for  other,  non-electricity  activities, 
as  they would be required to  do  if the activities in question were carried out 
by  separate  undertakings,  with  a  view  to  avoiding  discrimination, 
cross-subsidisation and distortion of competition.  The internal accounts shall 
include a balance sheet and a profit and loss account for each activity." 
( 14)  Article 15 is deleted. 
( 15)  Article 16 is replaced by the following: 
''Article 16 
1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  the  implementation  of a  system  of third  party 
access to the transmission and distribution systems based on published tariffs, 
applicable  to  all  eligible  customers  and  applied  objectively  and  without 
discrimination between system users.  These tariffs shall be  approved prior to 
their  entry  into  force  by  a  national  regulatory  authority  established  in 
conformity with Article 22. 
2.  The operator of a transmission or distribution system may refuse access where 
it lacks the necessary capacity.  Duly substantiated reasons must be  given for 
such refusal, in particular having regard to Article 3." 
· (16)  Articles 17 and 18 are deleted. 
( 17)  Article 19 is replaced by the following: 
''Article 19 
1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  all  non-domestic  customers  are  free  to 
purchase electricity from the supplier of their choice from  1 January 2003  at 
the latest. They shall ensure that all customers are free to choose their supplier 
from 1 January 2005 at the latest. 
2.  To avoid imbalance in the opening of  electricity markets: 
(a)  contracts  for  the  supply of electricity with an  eligible  customer in  the 
system of another Member State shall not be prohibited if  the customer is 
considered as eligible in both systems involved; 
51 (b)  in cases where transactions as described in subparagraph (a) are refused 
because of the customer being eligible only in one of the two  systems, 
the  Commission  may  oblige,  taking  into  account  the  situation  in  the 
market  and  the  common ·interest,  the  refusing  party  to  execute  the 
requested electricity supply at the request of the Member State where the 
eligible customer is located. 
11 
(18)  In Article 20, paragraph 4 is replaced by the following: 
114.  In the event of cross-border disputes, the dispute settlement authority shall be 
the dispute settlement authority covering the system operator which refuses use 
of, or access to, the system. 
11 
(19)  Article 22 is replaced by the following: 
"Article 22 
1.  Member States shall establish national regulatory authorities. These authorities 
shall be wholly independent of interests of the electricity industry. They shall 
at least have the sole responsibility: 
(a)  to  fix  or  approve  terms  and  conditions  for  connection  and  access  to 
national networks, including transmission and distribution tariffs; 
(b)  to fix or approve tariffs,_  or changes in tariffs at national level, to reflect 
costs or revenues related to cross border transmission of  electricity; 
(c)  to define the rules on the management and allocation of interconnection 
capacity,  in  conjunction  with  the  national  regulatory  authority  or 
authorities of  those Member States with which interconnection exists; 
(d)  to fix or approve any mechanisms to deal with congested capacity within 
the national electricity system; 
(e)  to ensure the respect of  the requirements set out in Article 3(3) and (4). 
2.  Member  States  shall  create  appropriate  and  efficient  mechanisms  for 
regulation,  control  and  transparency  so  as  to  avoid  any  abuse  of dominant 
position,  in  particular  to  the  detriment  of consumers,  and  any  predatory 
behaviour.  These  mechanisms  shall  take  account  of the  provisions  of the 
Treaty, and in particular Article 82 thereof. 
3.  Member States shall ensure that the appropriate measures be taken, including 
administrative action or criminal proceedings in conformity with their national 
law, against the natural or legal persons responsible where confidentiality. rules 
imposed by this Directive have not been respected.'' 
52 (20)  The following Article 23a is inserted: 
"Article 23a 
Member States shall inform the Commission by  31  March of each year at the 
latest  of imports  of electricity  that  have  taken  place  during  the  previous 
calendar year from third countries." 
(21)  Article 26 is replaced by the following: 
''Article 26 
The Commission shall review the application of  this Directive and submit a report to 
the  European Parliament and the Council, by  [indicate a date]  at the latest and by 
[indicate a date] at the latest, on the experience gained and progress made in creating 
a complete and fully operational internal market in electricity in order to allow the 
European Parliament and  the  Council  to  consider,  in due  time,  the  possibility of 
provisions for further improving the internal market in electricity. In particular, the 
report shall examine the extent to which the unbundling and tarification requirements 
of  this Directive have been successful in ensuring fair and non-discriminatory access 
to  the  Community's  electricity  system.  ·The  report  shall  also  examine 
possible  necessary harmonisation requirements that are not linked to the provisions 
of  this Directive." 
(22)  The Annex, the text of  which is set out in Annex I to this Directive, is added. 
Article 2 
Amendments to Directive 98/30/EC 
Directive 98/30/EC is amended as follows: 
(1)  Article 2 is amended as follows: 
(a)  the following point 12a is inserted: 
"12a.  'ancillary services' shall mean all services necessary for the operation of 
transmission  and/or  distribution  netw·orks  and/or  LNG  facilities, 
including storage facilities and equivalent flexibility instruments, load 
balancing and blending~  II 
(b)  the following point 20a is inserted: 
"20a.  'non-domestic customer' shall mean a consumer purchasing natural gas 
which  is  not  for  his  own  household  use  and  shall  include  power 
generators, natural gas undertakings and wholesale customers; 
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53 (2)  Article 3 is replaced by the following: 
"Article 3 
1.  Member States shall ensure, on the basis of their institutional organisation and 
with due  regard  for  the  principle  of subsidiarity,  that,  without prejudice  to 
paragraph 2,  natural  gas  undertakings  are  operated  in  accordance  with  the 
principles of this Directive with a view to achieving a competitive market in 
natural gas.  Member States shall not discriminate between such undertakings 
as regards either rights or obligations. 
2.  Having regard to the relevant provisions of the Treaty, in particular Article 86 
thereof, Member States may impose on natural gas undertakings, .in the general 
economic  interest,  public-service  obligations  which  may  relate  to  security, 
including security of supply, regularity,  quality and price of supplies, and to 
environmental  protection.  Such  obligations  shall  be  clearly  defined, 
transparent,  non-discriminatory  and  verifiable.  As  a  means  of carrying  out 
public-service obligations in relation to security of supply, Member States may 
introduce the  implementation of long-term planning, taking into account the 
possibility of  third parties seeking access to the system. 
3.  Member States shall take appropriate measures to protect final customers and 
to  ensure  high  levels  of consumer  protection,  particularly  with  respect  to 
transparency regarding contractual terms and conditions, general information 
and  dispute  settlement  mechanisms.  These  measures  shall  include,  in 
particular, those set out in the Annex. 
4.  Member States shall implement appropriate measures to achieve the objectives 
of social  and  economic  cohesion,  environmental  protection  and  security  of 
supply,  notably  through  the  maintenance  and  construction  of  necessary 
network infrastructure including interconnection capacity. 
5.  Member States may decide not to apply the provisions of  Article 4 with respect 
to distribution in so far as their application would obstruct, in law or in fact, the 
performance of the obligations  imposed  on natural  gas  undertakings  in  the 
general economic interest and in so far as the development of trade would not 
be  affected  to  such  an extent as  would  be  contrary to  the  interests  of the 
Community. The interests of the Community include, inter alia,  competition 
with  regard  to  eligible  customers  1n  accordance  with  this  Directive  and 
Article 86 of  the Treaty." 
(3)  The following Article 3a is inserted: 
"'Article Ja 
1.  Member States shall, every two years, notify the Commission of all measures 
adopted  to  fulfil  public  service  obligations,  whether  or not  such  measures 
require  a  derogation from  the provisions of this  Directive.  This  notification 
shall relate, inter alia, to measures regarding environmental protection, security 
of supply,  protection  of customers,  including  final  customers,  social  and 
regional cohesion, and the maintenance of  service standards. 
54 2.  .  The Commission shall publish, every two years, a report analysing the different 
measures taken in the  Member States to  meet high public service standards, 
together with an  examination of the effectiveness of those measures.  Where 
appropriate, the Commission shall make recommendations as to measures to be 
taken at national level to achieve high public service standards." 
(  4)  The following Article 4a is inserted: 
''Article 4a 
1.  Member  States  shall  designate  a  body,  which  may  be  the  independent 
regulatory  authority  referred  to  in Article  22,  to  monitor  security of supply 
issues.  This body shall monitor, in particular, the supply/demand balance on 
the  national  market,  the  level  of expected  future  demand  and  available 
supplies, and the level of  competition on the market. The body shall publish, by 
31  July each year at the latest, a report outlining its findings on these issues, as 
well as  any measures taken or envisaged to  address them,  and  shall forward 
this report to the Commission forthwith. 
2.  On the  basis of the  report referred to  in paragraph  1,  the  Commission shall 
forward  a Communication to the European Parliament and the Council each 
year  examining  issues  relating  to  security  of supply  of natural  gas  in  the 
Community,  and  in  particular  the  existing  and  projected  balance  between 
demand  and  supply.  Where  appropriate,  the  Commission  shall  issue 
recommendations." 
(5)  Article 7 is replaced by the following: 
"Article 7 
1.  Member  States  shall  designate  or  shall  require  undertakings  which  own 
transmission, storage or LNG facilities to designate, for a period of time, to be 
determined by Member States having .regard to considerations of  efficiency and 
economic  balance,  one  or  more  system  operators  to  be  responsible  for 
operating,  ensuring  the  maintenance  of,  and  developing  the  transmission, 
storage and LNG facilities in a given area and their interconnections with other 
systems,_ in order to guarantee security of supply. 
2.  Each transmission, storage and/or LNG system_ operator: 
'  (a)  shall operate, maintain and  develop under economic conditions secure, 
reliable  and  efficient transmission,  storage  and/or LNG facilities,  with 
due regard to the environment; 
(b)  shall not discriminate between system users or classes of system users, 
particularly in favour of  its related undertakings; 
(c)  shall  provide  any  other  transmission  undertaking, · any  other  storage 
undertaking,  any  other  LNG  undertaking  and/or  any  distribution 
undertaking,  sufficient  information  to  ensure  that  the  transport  and 
storage of natural  gas  may take place in a manner compatible with the 
secure and efficient operation of  the interconnected system. 
55 3.  Rules for balancing the  gas  system adopted by transmission and distribution 
system operators shall be transparent and non-discriminatory. Tariffs and terms 
and conditions for the provision of such services by system operators shall be 
established in a non-discriminatory way reflecting prevailing market prices and 
shall be  fixed  or approved by the national regulatory authority prior to  their 
entry into force." 
(6)  The following Articles 7a and 7b are inserted: 
''Article 7  a 
1.  Member States may require transmission system operators to  meet miriimum 
levels of investment for the maintenance and development of the transmission 
system, including interconnection capacity. 
2.  Unless  the  transmission  system  operator  is  already  fully  independent  from 
other activities not relating to  the transmission system in terms of ownership, 
the transmission system operator shall be  independent at least in terms of its 
legal form, organisation and decision making from other activities not relating 
to transmission. 
In order to  ensure the  independence of the transmission system operator, the 
following criteria shall apply: 
(a)  those persons responsible for the management of  the transmission system 
may not participate in company structures of the integrated natural gas 
undertaking  responsible,  directly  or  indirectly,  for  the  day-to-day 
operation of  the production, distribution and supply of gas; 
(b)  appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that the personal interests 
of persons responsible for the management of the  transmission system 
are taken into account in a manner that ensures that they are capable of 
acting independently;  -
(c)  the transmission system op~rator must exercise full control over all assets 
necessary to maintain and develop the network; 
(d)  the  transmission  system  operator  must  establish  a  compliance 
programme, which sets out measures taken to ensure that discriminatory 
conduct is excluded. The programme must set out the specific obligations 
of employees to meet this objective. It must be drawn up and its respect 
monitored  by  a  compliance  officer appointed· by  and  reporting  to  the 
President/Chief Executive  of the  integrated natural  gas  undertaking  to 
which  the  transmission  system  operator  belongs.  An  annual  report, 
setting  out the  measures  taken,  must  be  submitted by the  compliance 
officer to the national regulatory authority and published. 
56 Article 7b 
Transmission system operators  shall  procure the  energy they use  for  the  carrying 
out  of their  functions  according  to  transparent,  non-discriminatory  and  market 
based procedures." 
(7)  In Article 10, the following paragraph 4 is added: 
"4.  Unless the distribution system operator is already fully independent from other 
activities  not  relating  to  the  distribution  system  in terms  of ownership,  the 
distribution system operator shall be independent at .least in terms of its legal · 
form,  organisation and  decision making  from  other .activities  not relating to 
distribution. 
In order to  ensure the  independence of the  distribution system operator, the 
following criteria shall apply: 
(a)  those persons responsible for the management of the distribution system 
may not participate in company structures of the integrated natural  gas 
undertaking  responsible,  directly  or  indirectly,  for  the  day-to-day 
operation of  the producti~n, transmission and supply of gas; 
(b)  appropriate measures must be taken to ensure that the personal interests 
of persons responsible for the management of  the distribution system are 
taken  into  account  in  a manner that  ensures  that they  are  capable  of 
acting independently; 
(c)  the distribution system operator must exercise full control over all assets 
necessary to maintain and develop the network; 
(d)  the distribution. system operator must establish a compliance programme, 
which sets out measures taken to  ensure that discriminatory conduct is 
excluded.  The  programme  must  set  out  the  specific  obligations  of 
employees to  meet this objective.  It must be  drawn up  and its  respect 
monitored  by  a  compliance  officer appointed  by  and  reporting  to  the 
President/Chief Executive  of the  integrated  natural  gas  undertaking to 
which the distribution system operator belongs. An annual report, setting 
out the measures taken, must be submitted by the compliance officer to 
the national regulatory authority and published. 
The  provisions  of the  first  and  second  subparagraphs  shall  apply  from 
1 January 2004.  Member States may decide not to  apply those provisions to 
integrated  natural  gas  undertakings  serving  less  than  100  000  customers  at 
that date." 
57 (8)  The following Article 11 a is inserted: 
"Article 11 a 
The  rules  in  Article  7  a(2)  and  Article  1  0(  4)  do  not  prevent  the  operation  of a 
combined transmission and distribution system operator, which is fully independent 
in terms of its legal form, organisation and decision making from other activities not 
relating  to  transmission  or  distribution  system  operation  and  which  meets  the 
requirements of  Article 7a(2)." 
(9)  In Article 13, paragraph 3 is replaced by the following: 
"3.  Integrated  natural  gas  undertakings  shall,  in  their  internal  accounting,  keep 
separate accounts for their natural gas transmission, distribution, supply, LNG 
and  storage  activities,  and,  where  appropriate,  consolidated  accounts  for 
non-gas activities, as they would be required to do if the activities in question 
were  carried  out  by  separate  undertakings,  with  a  view  to  avoiding 
discrimination,  cross-subsidisation  and  distortion  of  competition.  The 
internal accounts shall include a balance sheet and a profit and loss account for 
each activity." 
(1 0)  Articles 14 and 15 are replaced by the following: 
"Article 14 
1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  the  implementation of a  system  of third  party 
access to the transmission and distribution system and LNG facilities based on 
published tariffs, applicable to  all  eligible customers and  applied objectively 
and  without  discrimination  between  system  users.  These  tariffs  shall  be 
approved  prior  to  their  entry  into  force  by  a  national  regulatory  authority 
established in conformity with Article 2?. 
2.  Transmission  system  operators  shall,  if necessary  and  for  the  purpose  of 
carrying out their functions including in relation to cross-border transmission, 
have access to the network of other transmission system operators based on the 
same conditions and principles as set out in paragraph 1. 
Article 15 
1.  For the organisation of access to storage and equivalent flexibility instruments 
when technically and/or economically necessary for providing efficient access 
to  the system for the supply of customers, as  well as  for the organisation of 
access to other ancillary services, Member States may choose either or both 
procedures referred to in paragraphs 2 and 3. These procedures shall operate in 
accordance with objective, transparent and non-discriminatory criteria 
2.  In  the  case  of negotiated  access,  Member  States  shall  take  the  necessary 
measures for natural gas undertakings and eligible customers either inside or 
outside  the  territory  covered  by  the  interconnected  system  to  be  able  to 
negotiate access to  the  system so  as  to  conclude supply contracts with each 
other on the  basis of voluntary commercial agreements.  The parties shall  be 
obliged to negotiate access to the system in good faith. 
58 Contracts for access to the system shall be negotiated with the relevant system 
operator or natural gas undertakings.  Member States shall require natural gas 
undertakings to  publish their main commercial conditions for  the  u~e of the 
system by [indicate date] at the latest and every year thereafter. 
3.  Member  States  opting  for  a  procedure  of regulated  access  shall  take  the 
necessary  measures  to  give  natural  gas  undertakings  and  eligible  customers 
either inside  or outside the  territory  covered by the  interconnected system a 
right of access  to  the  system,  on the basis  of published tariffs  and/or other 
terms and obligations for use of that system. This right of access for  eligible 
customers may be given by enabling them to enter into supply contracts with 
competing natural gas undertakings other than the owner and/or operator of the 
system or a related undertaking." 
( 11)  Article 16 is deleted. 
( 12)  Articles 18 and 19 are replaced by the following: 
''Article 18 
1.  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  all  non-domestic  customers  are  free  to 
purchase  gas  from  the  supplier of their  choice  and  shall  have  the  rights  of 
eligible customers for third party access in order to  execute such supplies in 
accordance with Articles 14 and 15 from 1 January 2004 at the latest. 
2.  Member States shall ensure that all customers are free to purchase gas from the 
supplier of  their choice and have the rights of eligible customers for third party 
access in order to execute such supplies in accordance with Articles 14 and 15 
from 1 January 2005 at the latest. 
Article 19 
1.  To avoid imbalance in the opening of gas markets: 
(a)  contracts for the supply of gas with an eligible customer in the system of 
another  Member  State  shall  not  be  prohibited  if the  customer  is 
considered as eligible in both systems involved; 
(b)  in cases where transactions as described in subparagraph (a)  are refused 
because  the  customer  is  eligible  in only  one  of the  two  systems,  the 
Commission may oblige, taking into account the situation in the market 
and the common interest, the refusing party to execute the requested gas 
supply, at the request of  the Member State where the eligible customer is 
located." 
(13)  Article 22 is replaced by the following: 
"Article 22 
1.  Member States shall establish national regulatory authorities. These authorities 
shall be wholly independent of the interests of the gas industry. They shall at 
least have the sole·responsibility: 
59 (a)  to·  fi~ or approve  terms  and  conditions  for  connection and  access  to 
national networks, including transmission and distribution tariffs, and 
terms, conditions and tariffs for access to LNG facilities; 
(b)  to define the rules on the management and allocation of interconnection 
capacity,  in  conjunction  with  the  national  regulatory  authority  or 
authorities of  those Member States with which interconnection exists; 
(c)  to  fix  or  approve  any  mechanisms  to  deal  with  congested  capacity 
within the national gas system; 
(d)  to ensure the respect of  the requirements set out in Article 3(3) and (4). 
2.  Member  States  shall  create  appropriate  and  efficient  mechanisms  for 
regulation,  control  and  transparency  so  as  to  avoid  any  abuse  of dominant 
position,  in  particular  to  the  detriment  of consumers,  and  any  predatory 
behaviour.  These  mechanisms  shall  take  account  of the  provisions  of the 
Treaty, and in particular Article 82 thereof. 
3.  Member States shall ensure that the appropriate measures be taken, including 
administrative action or criminal proceedings in conformity with their national 
law, against the natural or legal persons responsible where confidentiality rules 
imposed by this Directive have not been respected." 
(14)  Article 28 is replaced by the following: 
''Article 28 
The Commission shall review the application of  this Directive and submit a report to 
the  European Parliament and  the  Council,  by  [indicate  date]  at the  latest  and  by 
[indicate date] at the latest, on the experience gained and progress made _in creating a 
complete and fully operational internal market in natural  gas  in order to  allow the 
European Parliament and  the  Council  to  consider,  in due  time,  the  possibility of 
provisions for further improving the internal market in natural gas. In particular, the 
report shall examine the extent to which the unbundling and tarification requirements 
of  this Directive have been successful in ensuring fair and non-discriminatory access 
to  the  Community's gas  system The  report shall also  examine possible necessary 
harmonisation requirements which are not linked to the provisions of  this Directive." 
( 15)  The Annex, the text of  which is set out in Annex II to this Directive, is added. 
Article 3 
Directives 90/547/EEC and 91/296/EEC are repealed with effect from 1 January 2003. 
Article 4 
Member  States  shall  bring  into  force  the  laws,  regulations  and  administrative  provisions 
necessary  to  comply  with  this  Directive  by  31  December  2002  at  the  latest.  They  shall 
forthwith inform the Commission thereof. 
60 When Member States adopt those provisions, they shall contain a reference to this Directive 
or  be  accompanied  by  such  a  reference  on  the  occasion  of their  official  publication. 
Member States shall determine how such reference is to be made. 
Article 5 
This Directive shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of  the European Communities. 
Article 6 
This Directive is addressed to the Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the European Parliament  For the Council 
The President  The President 
61 ANNEX I 
"Annex 
(Article 3) 
Without  prejudice  · to  Community  rules  on  consumer 
Directive 97/7  /EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and 
Council Directive 93/13/EC2: 
protection,  in  particular 
of  the  Council
1  and 
(a)  Member States shall ensure that final  customers have a right to a contract with their 
electricity service provider that specifies:  · 
the identity and address of  the supplier; 
services provided, the service quality levels offered, as well as the time for the 
initial connection; 
the types of  maintenance service offered; 
the  means  by  which  up-to-date  information  on  all  applicable  tariffs  and 
maintenance charges may be obtained; 
the  duration  of the  contract,  the  conditions  for  renewal  and  termination  of 
services and of  the contract; 
Any  compensation  and  the  refund  arrangements  which  apply  if contracted 
service quality levels are not met; and 
The  method of initiating procedures  for  settlement of disputes  in accordance 
with point (f). 
(b)  Member States shall ensure that final customers shall be given adequate notice of any 
intention to modify contractual conditions and shall be free to withdraw from contracts 
if  they do not accept the new conditions. 
(c)  Member  States· shall  ensure  that  transparent  information  on applicable  prices  and 
tariffs,  and  on  standard  terms  and  conditions,  in respect of access  to  and  use  of 
·electricity services is available to the public, and particularly to final customers. 
(d)  Member States shall ensure that electricity suppliers specify in the bills sent to each 
final consumer, the composition of the fuel mix used to generate the electricity that is 
consumed by the final consumers they supply. The relative costs of  the different fuels 
used to generate a unit of electricity supplied to the final consumers shall be specified 
and the relative importance of each energy source with respect to the production of 
gre:enhouse gases. 
(e)  Member  States  shall  also  implement  appropriate  measures  to  protect  vulnerable 
customers. 
1 
2 
OJ L 144, 4.6.1997, p. 19. 
OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29. 
62 (f)  Member States shall ensure that transparent, simple and inexpensive procedures are 
available  for  dealing  with  final  customer  complaints.  Member  States  shall  adopt 
measures  to  ensure  that  such  procedures  enable  disputes  to  be  settled  fairly  and 
promptly  with  provision,  where  warranted,  for  a  system  of reimbursement  and/or 
compensation.  They  should  follow,  wherever  possible,  the  principles  set  out  in 
Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC
3
." 
OJL 115, 17.4.1998, p. 31. 
63 ANNEX II 
"Annex 
(Article 3) 
Without  prejudice  to  Community  rules  on  consumer 
Directive 97/7  /EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and 
Council Directive 93/13/EC
2
: 
protection,  in  particular 
of  the  Council
1  and 
(a)  Member States shall ensure that final customers have a right to a contract with their 
gas service provider that specifies: 
the identity and address of  the supplier; 
services provided, the service quality levels offered, as well as  the time for the 
initial connection; 
the types of  maintenance service offered; 
the  means  by  which  up-to-date  information  on  all  applicable  tariffs  and 
maintenance charges may be obtained; 
the  duration  of the  contract,  the  conditions  for  renewal  and  termination  of 
services and of  the contract; 
any compensation and the refund arrangements which apply if  contracted service 
quality levels are not met; and 
the method of  initiating procedures for settlement of  disputes in accordance with 
point (e). 
(b)  Member States shall ensure that final customers shall be given adequate notice of any 
intention to modify contractual conditions and shall be free to withdraw from contracts 
if  they do not accept the new conditions. 
(c)  Member  States  shall  ensure  that  transparent  information  on  applicable  prices  and 
tariffs, and on standard terms and conditions, in respect of access to  and use of gas 
services is available to the public, and particularly to final customers. 
(d)  Member  States  shall  also  implement  appropriate  measures  to  protect 
vulnerable customers. 
2 
OJ L 144, 4.6.1997, p.  19. 
OJ L 95, 21.4.1993, p. 29. 
64 (e)  Member States shall ensure that transparent, simples and in-expensive procedures are 
available  for  dealing  with  final  customers  complaints.  Member States  shall  adopt 
measures  to  ensure  that  such  procedures  enable  disputes  to  be  settled  fairly  and 
promptly  with  provision,  where  warranted,  for  a  system  of reimbursement  and/or 
compensation.  They  should  follow,  wherever  possible,  the  principles  set  out  in 
Commission Recommendation 98/257/EC
3
." 
OJ L 115, 17.4.1998, p. 31. 
65 REGULATION ON CONDITIONS FOR ACCESS TO THE NETWORK FOR 
CROSS-BORDER EXCHANGES IN ELECTRICITY 
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM 
I.  Introduction 
The ultimate objective of the Electricity Directive is  the creation of a real integrated single 
market, as opposed to a situation characterised by fifteen more or less liberalised but largely 
national markets. This objective has not yet been achieved. It is true that cross-border trade-
in terms of physical exchanges of electricity between countries - has been progressing over 
time and is currently equivalent to  around 8% of total electricity production. However, this 
figure is still relatively modest when compared to other sectors of  the economy. 
There  are  strong  indications  that  whilst  nearly  all  Member  States  have  implemented  the 
Directive and transmission capacity would be in most cases physically available,  for  many 
eligible  customers,  it  still .remains  organisationally  and  economically difficult to  choose  a 
supplier situated in another Member State. 
As  regards  tariffs,  each  transmission  system  operator  ("TSO")  concerned  will  require  a 
transmission  fee,  which  is  not  necessarily  coordinated  with  the  transmission  fees  already 
payable to other TSOs. As a consequence, due to differences in the structure of  the tarification 
system applied in Member States, the actual amount payable for cross-border access to the 
system can vary considerably, depending on the TSOs involved and without necessarily a link 
to  the costs actually incurred. Furthermore, in cases were several Member States have to  be 
transited,  this  situation can lead  to  "pancaking" of tariffs,  if in all  systems  concerned the 
operators charge a tariff. 
The second key aspect in this context is the limited capacity of the interconnections between 
national  transmission systems.  It is  expected  that  in  the  next  decade  congestion  at  the 
international  borders  will  remain  a major  limiting  factor  to  free  electricity trade  between 
certain regions of Europe. This will result not only from an increasing volume of flows  but 
also  from  a changing pattern of flows.  Therefore, the number of interconnections between 
systems and the capacity of  the existing installations need to be extended. 
Given the limitations of  interconnection capacities, the principles of allocation of  this capacity 
to  market  operators  will  be  important  in  determining  which  players  will  profit  from  the 
trading possibilities that the internal  market offers.  Discrimination between market players 
will occur if  no transparent, non-discriminatory rules are set. Incumbents might ward off new 
market entry,  in particular if substantial parts of this  capacity are  tied  up  under long-term 
contracts. This will hinder the development of  trade resulting in significantly less advantages 
from the internal market. 
In view of this  situation,  a harmonised  Community  framework  on tariffs  for  cross-border 
transactions and on the allocation of  available interconnection capacities is necessary. 
The  Electricity  Directive  does  not  contain  specific  rules  for  cross-border  transactions. 
However, this does not meari that this issue can be solved by relying exclusively on national 
measures. It was in the logic of a gradual approach to  implementing the internal electricity 
market that specific issues remain to be addressed after the principal strategic implementation 
choices have  been made by the  Member States.  Experience has  confirmed the  assessment 
66 made  by  the  Commission already  at  an early  stage ·that  the  issue  needs  to  be  addressed 
through joint action at the Community level. 
As  a  first  response,  the  Commission,  in  1998,  initiated  the  creation  of  the· 
European Regulatory  Forum  for  electricity,  the  so  called  "Florence  Forum".  The  Forum 
brings  together representatives of the  Commission,  of the  national  administrations,  of the 
European  Parliament,  of the  Council  of European  Regulators  and  of the  Association  of 
European Transmission System Operators (ETSO).  Producers,  consumers and operators  on  -
the market are also represented. Its objective has been to clarify and discuss possible solutions 
with all key players, in particular on cross-border tarification and congestion management. 
The Florence Forum has proven a highly effective tool in developing consensus on highly 
complicated, rapidly evolving and controversial  issues.  Whilst it  will  remain an  important 
instrument in this respect, in particular because it ensures the representation of industry and 
consumers, recent experience has  demonstrated that the process suffers  from  a number of 
disadvantages when it is necessary to reach concrete decisions on specific issues : 
•  the process is an informal one, based on bi-annual meetings lasting two days. As such it is 
inappropriate  to  take  concrete  decisions  on  very  detailed  issues  that  require  in-depth 
discussions; 
•  to make progress on any issue requires full consensus of  all parties; 
•  any decisions reached can only be  implemented if all parties respect them; there are  no 
procedures to ensure implementation; 
•  certain issues such as  the calculation of the correct level of inter-TSO payments require 
regular detailed decisions to  be  taken.  The  Forum is  not  able  to  appropriately  address 
such issues. 
In this light, the Commission has concluded that for making final progress on the issues of 
cross-border transmission tarification and congestion management on interconnections it is 
now necessary to adopt a legislative instrument for a clear decision-making process, building 
on the progress achieved at the Forum,. 
Against  this  background,  the  objective  of the  draft  Regulation  is  to  establish  a  robust 
framework for cross-border trade in electricity. The rules contained in the Regulation are as 
simple  as  possible  and  are  limited  to  what  is  necessary  to  regulate  in  EC  legislation,  in 
compliance  with the principle of subsidiarity.  The  main  objective  is  to  ensure  that costs 
actually  incurred by transmission system operators  are  accurately  reflected in charges  for 
access to the system, including interconnections, whilst at the same time excluding excessive 
transactions costs for cross-border operations.  · 
IL  Basic structure of  the draft Regulation 
With regard to tarification, the system envisaged is based on the principle of compensations 
between TSOs for transit flows of electricity that they cause one another, including for transit 
flows  commonly  denominated  as  "loop-flows"  or "parallel-flows".  The  draft  Regulation 
provides,  therefore,  for  compensation  payments  to  be  received  by  transmission  system 
operators hosting transit flows of electricity on their network, financed through contributions 
of those TSOs causing these transit flows. Furthermore, the Regulation provides for a certain 
degree  of  harmonisation  of  charges  for  access  to  national  systems,  as  far  as  such 
67 harmonisation  is  necessary  in  order  to  exclude  possible  distortive  effects  stemming  from 
different national approaches. 
As regards the allocation of available interconnection capacity, the Regulation lays down the 
main principles, which shall be respected when such allocation is made. In an Annex to  the 
Regulation, further technical details are outlined. 
In addition to the basic principles with regard to tarification and congestion management, the 
draft Regulation provides for the subsequent adoption of guidelines detailing further relevant 
principles  and  methodologies.  These  guidelines  can  be  adopted  and  amended  without 
changing the Regulation in order to allow rapid adaptation to changed circumstances. In fact, 
for instance, on issues such as cost calculation methodologies and the concrete identification 
and measurement of  physical flows, there has been continuous progress in the past and further 
refinements and improvements can be expected in future. 
The  Regulation empowers the  Commission with certain regulatory competencies,  as  far  as 
this  is  necessary  to  ensure  the  functioning  of the  internal  market.  Thus,  the  Commission 
adopts and atnends the  above mentioned guidelines and determines, on a regular basis, the 
level  of the  compensation  payments  to  be  made  between  TSOs.  Iri  order  to  ensure  the 
involvement of Member States' regulatory authorities in this process, the Commission would 
take  these  decisions  after  consultation  of a  committee  made  up  of representatives  of 
Member States,  created  in  accordance  with  Council  Decision  1999/468  laying  down  the 
procedures  for  the  exercise  of  implementing  powers  conferred  on  the  Commission 
("Comitologie").  For  the  purpose  of the  determination  of the  level  of the  compensation 
payments, the  draft Regulation foresees  an  advisory  committee 
1
,  to  allow rapid decisions, 
whereas for the purpose of  the adoption of  the guidelines, a regulatory committee
2 is foreseen. 
Regarqing the representation of Member States in the committee, it is important to note that 
Article 22  of the  Electricity Directive,  after its  amendment proposed by  the  Commission
3
, 
stipulates that national regulatory authorities shall, inter alia, have the sole responsibility at 
national level with respect to the definition of methodologies for cross-border transmission, 
including the setting of  tariffs. 
III.  Main contents of  the rules contained in the draft Regulation 
1.  Compensations for transit flows of  electricity 
Unlike  in other sectors  involving transport,  such  as  rail  and  road transport,  tariffs  for  the 
transmission of  electricity cannot be fixed with reference to the distance between the producer 
and the consumer of  the electricity. In fact, the physical flows of electricity do not necessarily 
coincide with the contractual relationship between the seller and the buyer: if a generator in 
northern Europe sells electricity to a consumer in southern Europe, this does not mean that the 
electrons produced by the generator will actually flow from north to south. It will rather mean 
a shift of  the power balance towards the south. 
2 
Before taking a decision, the Commission consults the committee, which delivers an opinion of which 
the Commission shall take utmost account. 
Unlike in case of an advisory committee, under a regulatory committee procedure the Commission can 
be forced to incorporate the committee's opinion in the intended decision. 
Proposal from the Commission for a Directive of  the European Parliament and of  the Council amending 
Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and 
natural gas.  ' 
68 However,  even  if not  clearly  attributable  to  individual  economic .  transactions,  trade  in 
electricity gives rise to physical flows within and between transmission systems. It implies in 
practice  that  a  certain  amount  of power  is  injected  into  the  transmission  system  of the 
exporting Member States while at the same time the same amount of power is extracted for  · 
consumption  from  the  transmission  system  of the  importing  Member  State.  It is  thus 
appropriate and generally accepted that exporters and/or importers pay the national network 
charges  applicable  to  generation  in  the  exporting  country  and/or  to  consumption  in  the 
importing country. 
However, in the  interconnected European electricity system,  exports of electricity not only 
affect  the  networks  of the  exporting  and  the  importing  countries.  Export transactions  are 
susceptible  to  cause  flows  of electricity  also  in countries  where  the  electricity  is  neither 
injected into the network nor taken out for consumption. This seems plausible in case of a 
transaction between non-neighbouring countries, i.e. where the "direct path" to the consumer 
necessarily leads through the transmission system of a third. In addition, however, due to the 
physical  laws  determining  the  "behaviour"  of  electricity  on  the  network,  export 
transactions often cause physical flows in countries which are not on the - theoretical - direct 
path of the  electricity
4
•  Such transit flows  are  commonly denominated  as  "loop-flows" or 
"parallel-flows". 
In a liberalised, competitive market, transmission system operators need to be  compensated 
for  costs  incurred  by  such  transit flows  of electricity.  Otherwise,  the  local  network  users 
would be burdened with those costs, despite the fact that the flows of  electricity concerned are 
entirely caused by market actors located in other transmission system areas. 
Against this background, the draft Regulation. contains a system based on three elements: 
First, it stipulates that transmission system operators shall  receive  compensations for  costs 
incurred by hosting transit flows of  electricity on their network (Article 3(1)). 
Secondly, it sets rules on the determination of  the costs incurred from transits. In fact, whilst a 
compensation for  such costs is  necessary,  it must be ensured that these compensations are 
indeed  cost-reflective.  The  costs  actually  incurred  by  such  flows  need  to  be  accurately 
determined, in order to avoid windfall profits and excessive transaction costs. 
The  draft  Regulation opts  in this  respect for  a model  under the  forward  looking long-run 
average incremental costs that a network bears from hosting transits are identified and taken 
into account, compared to a situation without transits. 
The reasoning underlying this approach is the prevention of "windfall contributions" by TSOs 
hosting transits, in practice to the benefit of TSOs of those Member States which are located 
in  the  centre of the  European electricity system and  at the  expense of those  in  peripheral 
countries. In fact,. the core horizontal network of every national network is constructed for the 
service  of domestic  customers.  This  core  network must be  constructed irrespective  of the 
existence of transits. On the  other hand,  TSOs may have  additional  costs  in taking specific 
measures  to  deal  with  transits.  This  may  involve,  for  example,  additional  administrative 
measures, additional operational requirements for the management of transits, arrangements 
4  In  a  simulation,  it  has  been  shown,  for  instance,  that  in  case  of a  transport  of 1 000  MW  from 
. Northern France  only  around  60%  of the  electricity  reaches  Italy  "directly",  i.e.  by  crossing  the 
French-Italian border or through Switzerland. The remainder reaches Italy "indirectly" causing flows on 
the network in Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany, Austria and Slovenia. 
69 regarding losses, and additional investment through new lines or the reinforcement of existing 
lines.  Such costs  are  clearly  specific costs incurred by  transits  and  TSOs must be  able to 
recover.  them.  It  will  be  necessary  to  ensure  adequate  return  on  investment  for  new 
installations needed to host transits, in order to provide appropriate incentives for operators to 
make such investment. Finally, in order to be cost-reflective, benefits stemming from transits 
should also be taken into account, for instance in case transit flows contribute to the overall 
stabilisation of a national network. 
Finally,  the  appropriate  way  of financing  the  compensations  must be  determined.  In  this 
context, it must be taken into account that transits are caused by export/import transactions. 
However,  apart  from  exceptional  cases,  it  is  technically  not  - yet - possible  to  identify 
whether  and  to  what extent an  individual exporter/importer causes transits.  Therefore,  the 
·draft Regulation does not foresee a mechanism whereby individual exporters or importers are 
directly  held  responsible  for  transit  flows.  Instead,  it  stipulates  that  the  operators  of 
transmission systems from which transits originate and/or the operators of the systems where 
these flows  end (exporting and/or importing TSOs)  shall - on a pro rata basis - pay the 
compensations- (Article 3(2)). 
In order to ensure accurate and rapid decisions on the level of the compensations to be made 
and received between TSOs, the draft Regulation stipulates that the Commission would make, 
on  a  regular  basis,  the  decisions  on  these  compensation  payments  (Article  3(3)). 
Member States' regulatory authprities would, however, be involved in this process through an 
advisory committee made up of representatives of Member States, created in accordance with 
Council Decision 1999/468/EC laying down the procedures for the exercise of implementing 
powers conferred on the Commission. ("Comitologie"), which the Commission would consult 
prior to making its final decision. 
It should be noted that the  Community budget will not be affected by these compensation 
payments since they would be made directly between TSOs concerned. 
In order to recuperate the payments made to finance the compensations, the TSOs are required 
to adapt their national tariff system accordingly (Article 4(3)). 
As regards the manner in which this adaptation is made, one possibility could be to  charge 
exporters  and/or  importers  with  these  costs,  on  the  grounds  that  this  is  the  fair  and 
cost-reflective solution since the exporters and/or importers cause the flows in question. 
However,  such a  solution would result in some  important disadvantages.  First,  as  already 
explained,  it is  in general  impossible to  determine  whether and to  what  extent  individual 
export transactions lead to physical transit and loop-flows.  Commercial export transactions 
may not lead to any physical flows, namely in case of  two cross-border transactions involving 
counterflows  between systems.  To  require  in  such  a  situation exporters  to  pay  a  specific-
charge could not be considered fair or cost-reflective. Also, participants of an internationally 
operating power exchange would not know the  exact amount of due  cross-border charges 
before the daily close of exchange, because only after that, the exchange could determine the 
traded energy per TSO area. This would lead to the unpredictability of transmission charges 
and, thus, prices of electricity. Finally, low transaction costs and the resulting potential for 
trade  benefit  all  consumers  and  generators  in  the  internal  market.  It leads  to  increased 
competition and a bigger market for  generators,  which is  particularly important in case of 
over-capacities at the national level. 
70 In  view of these  considerations,  the  draft  Regulation  stipulates  that  whilst  payments  and 
receipts resulting from the compensation mechanism shall be taken into account when setting 
network tariffs, this shall not lead to a specific tariff to be paid only by exporters or importers 
(Article 4(  4)). 
2.  Harmonisation of  national network charges 
As  explained,  exporters  and/or  importers  pay  the  national  network  charges  applicable.  to 
generation in the exporting country and/or to consumption in the importing country. If these 
charges, in particular those on generation,  differ considerably between Member States,  the 
market will  be  distorted.  In  fact,  since  generators  will  have  to  incorporate  in  their  power 
pricing the  costs  arising  from  the  network charges they have to  pay,  generators with low 
network charges will have a competitive advantage compared to those with high charges. 
The  levels  of the  network- charges  depend  on  the  general  structure  of the  national  tariff 
system, the cost calculation principles applied and, of course, the particularities of the national 
networks concerned. 
An important element of  the structure of  national tariff systems in the context of cross-border 
trade is therefore the ratio between the costs allocated to generation and the costs allocated to 
consumption. It is clear, for instance, that generators in a country where all network costs are 
paid by consumers are in a better position than a producer from a country where generators 
are charged a proportion of  these costs when competing in the internal market. Therefore, this 
ratio  and/or  the  absolute  level  of the  network charges  applied  to  generation  need  to  be 
harmonised in order to ensure competitive neutrality. 
In view of these considerations, the draft Regulation foresees  that the  network  costs  shall 
mainly be  recovered through charges imposed on consumption (Article 4(2)).  However,  a 
lower proportion of the total  costs  charged on network users  may be  recovered through a 
·charge on generation. This enables national regulatory authorities to include locational signals 
in the tariff structure, in order to send signals on the most appropriate and inappropriate zones 
to  locate new generation, e.g.  in view of local circumstances with regard to  network losses 
and  network  congestion.  The  draft  Regulation  stipulates  that,  where  appropriate,  charges 
should  contain  elements  providing  such  locational  signals.  Such  locational  signals,  for 
example, will need to  be in place as  an  integral part of the cross-border tarification system 
established by this Regulation, and in particular taking into account of  Article 4(4). 
Even if  a sufficient degree of  harmonisation of  the ratio between generation and consumption 
charges  and/or  of the  absolute  level  of the  charges  applied  to  generation  is  achieved, 
considerable  differences  in  the  level  will  persist  if  cost  accounting  principles  differ 
significantly. On the other hand, the specific circumstances prevailing in each national system 
need to be taken into account. Therefore, complete harmonisation of the level of the charges 
would not be appropriate However, basic principles should be identical in all Member States. 
Therefore,  the  draft  Regulation  stipulates  that  access  charges  shall  be  cost-reflective, 
transparent,  approximated  to  those  of an  efficient  network  operator  and  be  applied  in  a 
non-discriminatory  manner.  They  shall  also  not  be  related  to  the  distance  between  the 
generator and the consumer.  · 
As regards the payments and receipts resulting from the compensation mechanism for transits, 
the draft Regulation stipulates that they shall be taken into account when setting the charges. 
In fact,  in order to ensure a maximum of cost-reflectiveness of the charges actually applied 
and fixed in advance, i.e. before the precise result of the compensation mechanism is known, 
71 it  is  necessary  to  anticipate,  as  far  as  reasonably  possible,  the  likely  outcome  of the 
mechanism (Article 4(3)). 
3.  Guidelines on details with regard to principles and methodologies (Article 7) 
The  draft  Regulation  contains  in  Article  3  and  4  the  main  principles  with  regard  to 
cross-border tarification. 
However, in order to  ensure that these basic principles are  applied in a consistent manner 
throughout the  Community, it may prove necessary to  provide more detail  with regard to 
those principles. On the other hand, in particular with regard to technical details, such as cost 
calculation methodologies and technical possibilities to identify and measure physical·flows, 
there has been continuous progress in the past and further refinements and improvements can 
be expected in future.  · 
In view of  these considerations, the draft Regulation does not fix these details but provides for 
their determination in guidelines (Article 7). These guidelines must be in compliance with the 
principles  laid  down  in  the  Regulation.  They  would  be  adopted  and  amended  by  the 
Commission,  after  consultation  of a  regulatory  committee  made  up  of Member  States' 
experts, created in accordance with Council Decision 1999/468 laying down the procedures 
for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission ("Comitologie"), in 
order  to  ensure. involvement  of Member  States  regulatory  authorities  in  this  process,  in 
particular their National Regulator. 
The guidelines would be ·adopted, where appropriate, with regard to the following issues: 
(a)  With  regard  to  the  inter-transmission  system  operator  compensation  mechanism 
mentioned in Article 3 of  the Regulation: 
the precise details of  methodologies to determine the amount of  transits hosted 
and  exportsiimports  of electricity  made,  in  accordance  with  the  principles 
mentioned in Article 3  (  5) of  the Regulation; 
the  methodology  to  determine  the  costs  incurred  by  hosting  transits  of 
electricity, in accordance with the principles mentioned in Article 3(6) of the 
Regulation; 
details on the determination of  the TSOs which have to pay the compensations 
for transit flows, in accordance with Article 3(2) of  the Regulation; 
details  of the  payment  procedure  to  be  followed,  in  accordance  with  the 
principles  mentioned  in  Article  3(3)  of  the  R~gulation,  including  the 
determination  of the  first  period  of time  for  which  compensations  shall 
be made; 
details  on  the  participation  of national  systems  which  are  interconnected 
through  direct  current  lines  in  the  inter-transmission  system  operator 
compensation mechanism. 
72 (b)  With regard to national tariff systems mentioned in Article 4 of  the Regulation: 
details regarding the harmonisation of  the levels of tariffs applied to generators 
and  consumers  (load)  under national  tariff systems,  in accordance  with the 
principles mentioned in Article 4(2) of  the Regulation. · 
National regulatory authorities would ensure that national tariffs are set and applied in 
compliance  with  the  principles  laid  down  in  this  Regulation  and  the  guidelines 
adopted (Article 8). 
4.  Allocation of  interconnection capacity (Articles 5 and 6) 
Congestion in the sense of the  draft Regulation is  a  situation in which the  capacity of an 
interconnection between national  transmission  systems  is  insufficient to  accommodate  all 
transactions resu_lting  from international trade by market operators
5
• In such a situation, it is 
important that the  limited available capacity is  allocated to  undertakings under conditions 
compatible with the competitive circumstances that now prevail on the internal  electricity 
market. At· the same time, special measures need to be taken to ensure system security. 
The draft Regulation lays down the main principles, which shall be respected when meeting 
these requirements. In order to maintain the reliability of  the European network, information 
exchange  and  cooperation  between  transmission  system  operators  is  of  primordial 
importance, in particular in view of the changing patters of transactions and thus physical 
flows under the new circumstances of an open market. Transmission system operators have to 
know  in  advance  the  flows  that  they  can  expect  on their  network.  Therefore,  the  draft 
Regulation contains in Article 5(1) an obligation to implement coordination and information 
exchange mechanisms for  this purpose.  In order to  allow an optimal use  of the  available 
interconnection capacity, information regarding the capacity actually available must be made 
public to market parties. Currently, the transfer capacities on the interconnections in Europe 
are being published for winter and summer values. However, to  ensure an optimal use of the 
available  capacities,  its publication  must  be  more  regular  than  that,  i.e.  at  several  time 
intervals  before the  day of transport,  which  is  therefore  required  by the  draft  Regulation 
(Article  5(3)).  Furthermore,  it  contains  an  obligation  on  TSOs  to  publish  their  security 
standards and their operational and planning standards in open and public documents, in order 
to ensure full transparency of  the methodologies used by TSOs when establishing the amount 
of  available capacity (Article 5(2)).  · 
The draft Regulation also stipulates that the maximum capacity of the interconnections shall 
be  made  available  to  market operators,  that complies  with the. safety  standards of secure 
network operation, and that any allocated capacity that is not used by a market actor should be 
reattributed to the market. 
As regards the allocation of  interconnection capacity by TSOs in case of network congestion 
problems, the draft Regulation stipulates that market-based solution shall be applied which 
give  efficient  economic  signals  to  market  operators  and  transmission  system  operators 
involved (Article  6(1)).  There are  several  specific methodologies,  which comply with this 
requirement.  An examination  of the  current  state  of the  European  markets  leads  to  the 
conclusion that in Continental Europe the- in practice- most feasible methods seem to be for 
It should be noted that in  th~ technical jargon the term "congestion" is  often also used to  describe a 
situation of  lack of  capacity within a national transmission system. 
73 the  moment  implicit  and  explicit  auctions  combined  with  cross  border  coordinated 
redispatching.  Recent  experience,  however,  illustrates  the  significant  limitations  of this 
approach.  Thus,  further  improvements  in  this  respect  and  continued  re-examination  of 
alternative approaches are  necessary.  In particular, regarding the medium term,  it is  widely 
recognised  that  a  very  efficient  and  transparent  way  to  deal  with  scarce  interconnection 
capacity is the system of market splitting
6 currently operated in the Nordpool. Its introduction 
as  soon  as  possible  should  be  envisaged,  however  adapted  to  the  network  topology  and 
market ~ircumstances of  Continental Europe. 
As  regards  the  revenues  from  congestion management,  the  Regulation  stipulates  that· they 
shall be used to guarantee the reliability of  the allocated capacity, towards investment into the 
network  maintaining  or  increasing  the  capacity  of the  interconnection,  or  towards  the 
lowering of the network tariffs. In any event, the congestion revenues shall not constitute a 
source of  extra profit (Article 6(6)). 
Based  on the  above  rules  and  principle_s,  detailed  technical  provisions  and  requirements 
regarding  the  management  and  allocation  of  interconnection  capacities,  based  on  the 
guidelines  agreed  between the  Commission,  national  regulators  and  Member  States  at  the 
Florence Forum, are  contained in  an Annex to  the  draft Regulation.  In order to  allow that 
experience  which  is  constantly  being  developed  can  be  taken  into  account  in  a  flexible 
manner, for instance with regard to various allocation methods, the Commission would amend 
these guidelines, after consultation of the regulatory committee made up  of Member States' 
experts, which the draft regulation provides for (see above under point 3 and Article 7(2) of 
the draft regulation). 
National regulatory authorities would ensure that methodologies for congestion management 
are designed and applied in compliance with the principles laid down in the Regulation and 
the guidelines (Article 8). 
5.  Provision of information and confidentiality (Article 9) 
In  order to  adopt the  guidelines  and  decide  on the  compensations  to  be. made  for  transits. 
between TSOs, the Commission needs to  have access to  the relevant information and data. 
Consequently,  the  draft  Regulation  stipulates· that  this  information  shall  be  provided  by 
Member States and national regulatory authorities, on request. 
The Commission shall in turn ensure that this information is treated confidentially. 
In  addition,  the  Commission  may  obtain  all  necessary  information  directly  from  the 
undertakings concerned, where necessary to fulfil its tasks under the Regulation. 
6.  Conclusions 
The  adoption of this  draft  Regulation  is  an  important part of the  Community  strategy  to 
complete  the  internal  electricity  market.  Through  the  provision  of fair,  cost-reflective, 
transparent  and  directly  applicable  rules  with  regard  to  tarification  and  the  allocation  of 
available interconnection capacities - completing the provisions contained in the Electricity 
Directive,  it  will  ensure  efficient  access  to  transmission  systems  for  the  purpose  of 
cross-border transactions. 
6  Under a system of market splitting, the optimal use of  the interconnection is determined on the basis of 
a comparison of  market prices prevailing in the interconnected markets concerned. 
74 Its  entry into  force  at  this  time,  i.e.  together with the revision of the  Electricity Directive 
providing for complete market opening, will ensure that such market opening translates into 
effective cross-border trade in practice. The Regulation is thus a key  instrument to promote 
the  creation of a real internal electricity market,  as  opposed to  a situation characterised by 
fifteen more or less liberalised but largely national markets. 
The  financial  implications  of the  Regulation for  the  Community budget would  amount to 
around  EUR 850 000  per  year.  In  the  year  2002,  these  financial  needs  would  be  made 
available  under  the  Energy  Framework  Programme  (ETAP  programme).  As  regards  the 
subsequent  years,  a  proposal  for  a  new  Energy  Framework  Programme,  succeeding  the 
current  one  which  expires  in  2002,  will  be  made  in  2001,  in  accordance  with  the  work 
programme  of the  Commission  for  2001.  This  new  proposal  will  take  into  account  the 
financial needs for the action in the coming years. 
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Proposal for a 
REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
on conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity 
(Text with EEA relevance) 
THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, 
Having  regard  to  the  Treaty  establishing  the  European  Community,  and  in  particular 
Article 95 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission 
1
, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the Economic and Social Committee
2
, 
Having regard to the opinion of  the Committee of  the Regions3, 
Acting in accordance with the procedure laid dowriin Article.251 of  the Treaty
4
, 
Whereas: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
2 
4 
5 
Directive  96/92/EC  of  the  European  Parliament  and  of  the  Council  of 
19 December 1996  concerning  common rules  for  the  internal  market in electricity
5 
constituted an important step in the completion of  the internal market in electricity. 
At its meeting in Lisbon on 23  and 24 March 2000, the European Council called for 
rapid work to be undertaken to complete the internal market in both the electricity and 
gas sectors and to speed up liberalisation in these sectors with a view to achieving a 
fully operational internal market in these areas. 
The  creation  of a  real  internal  electricity  market  should  be  promoted  through  an 
intensification of trade in electricity, which is currently underdeveloped compared to 
other sectors of  the economy. 
Fair,  cost-reflective,  transparent  and  ·directly  applicable  rules,  completing  the 
provisions of Directive 96/92/EC, should be introduced with regard to  cross-border 
tarification  and  the  allocation  of  available  interconnection  capacities,  in  order 
to  ensure  effective  access  to  transmission  systems  for  the purpose of cross-border 
transactions. 
OJC 
OJC 
OJC 
OJC 
OJ L 27, 30.1.1997, p. 20; Directive as amended by Directive .. .1. .. /EC (OJ L ...  , ... , p ....  ). 
76 (5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
(9) 
(10) 
(11) 
(12) 
(13) 
(14) 
(15) 
In its  Conclusions,  the  Energy  Council  of 30  May 2000  invited  the  Commission, 
Member States and national regulatory authorities/administrations to ensure a rapid 
introduction of a  robust tarification  system  and methodology  to  allocate  available 
interconnection capacity for the longer term. 
The  European Parliament,  in its  Resolution of 6  July  2000 -on  the  Commission's 
second report on the state of liberalisation of energy markets, called for conditions for 
using networks in Member States that do not hamper cross-border trade in electricity 
and called on the Commission to  submit  specifi~ proposals geared to overcoming all 
the existing barriers to intra-Community tr~de. 
This  Regulation  should  lay  down  basic  principles  with  regard  to  tarification  and 
capacity allocation, whilst providing for the adoption of guidelines detailing further 
relevant principles and methodologies, in order to allow rapid adaptation to changed 
circumstances. 
In an open, competitive market, transmission system operators should be compensated 
for costs incurred as a result of  hosting transit flows of  electricity on their networks by 
the operators of the transmission systems from \Vhich transits originate or for which 
they are destined. 
Payments  and  receipts  resulting  from  compensation  between  transmission  system 
operators should be taken into account when setting national network tariffs. 
The  actual  amount  payable  for  cross-border  access  to  the  system  can  vary 
considerably, depending on the transmission system operators involved and as a result 
of differences in the structure of the tarification systems applied in Member States. A 
certain degree of harmonisation is therefore necessary in order to  avoid distortions 
of  trade. 
It would not be appropriate to apply distance-related tariffs, or a specific tariff to be 
paid only by exporters or importers. 
Competition on the  internal  market  can  only truly  develop  if access  to  the  lines 
interconnecting the different national systems is granted in a non-discriminatory and 
transparent way. The available capacities of these lines should be set at the maximum 
complying with the safety standards of secure network operation.Any discrimination 
in the allocation of  available capacities should be shown not to unreasonably distort or 
hinder the development of  trade. 
There  should  be  transparency  for  market  actors  concerning  available  transfer 
capacities and the security, planning and operational standards that affect the available· 
transfer capacities. 
Any revenues flowing from congestion-management procedures should not constitute 
a source of  extra profit for the transmission system operators. 
It should be possible to deal with congestion problems in various ways as long as the 
methods used provide correct economic signals to transmission system operators and 
market parties and are based on market mechanisms. 
77 ( 16)  To ensure the smooth functioning of  the internal market, provision should be made for 
procedures  which  allow  the  adoption  of decisions  and  guidelines  with  regard  to 
tarification  and  capacity  allocation  by  the  Commission · whilst  ensuring  the 
involvement of  Member States' regulatory authorities in this process. 
(17)  National  authorities  should  be  required  to  provide  relevant  information  to  the 
Commission.  Such information should be treated confidentially by the Commission. 
Where  necessary,  the  Commission  should  have  the  possibility  to  request  relevant 
information ·directly from undertakings concerned. 
(18)  National regulatory authorities should ensure compliance with the rules contained in 
this Regulation and the guidelines adopted on the basis of  this Regulation.  · 
( 19)  Member States should lay down rules on penalties applicable to infringements of the 
provisions of this Regulation and ensure that they are implemented. Those penalties 
must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive: 
(20)  In accordance  with  the  principles  of s~bsidiarity and  proportionality  as  set  out  in 
Article 5 of the Treaty, the objectives of the proposed action, namely the provision of 
a harmonised framework for cross-border exchanges of  electricity, cannot be achieved 
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of  the scale and effect of  the action, 
be better achieved by the Community. This Regulation confines itself to the minimum 
required in order to achieve those objectives and does not go beyond what is necessary 
for that purpose. 
(21)  In accordance with Article 2 of  Council Decision 1999/468/EC of  28 June 1999 laying 
down  the  procedures  for  the  exercise  of implementing  powers  conferred  on  the 
Commission
6
,  measures for the implementation of this Regulation should be adopted 
by use of  the regulatory procedure provided for in Article 5 of Decision 1999/468/EC, 
or  by  use  of the  advisory  procedure  provided  for  in  Article  3  of that  Decision, 
according to the nature of  the measures to be adopted, 
HAVE ADOPTED THIS REGULATION: 
Article 1 
Subject-matter and scope 
This  Regulation  aims  at  'stimulating  cross-border  exchanges  in  electricity  and  thus 
competition  within  the  internal  electricity  market,  through  the  establishment  of  a 
compensation  mechanism  for  transit  flows  of electricity  and  the  setting  of harmonised 
principles on cross-border transmission charges and the allocation of available capacities of 
interconnections between national transmission systems. 
Article 2 
Definitions 
1.  For  the  purpose  of this  Regulation,  the  definitions- contained  in  Article  2  of 
Directive 96/92/EC shall apply. 
OJ L 184, 17.7.1999, p. 23. 
78 2.  The following definitions shall also apply: 
(a)  "transit"  means  a  physical  flow  of electricity  hosted  on the  transmission 
system of a Member State, which was neither produced nor is  destined for 
consumption  in  t~at  Member  State,  including  transit  flows  which  are 
commonly denominated as "loop-flows"or "parallel-flows"; 
(b)  "congestion" means a situation in which an interconnection linking national 
transmission networks  cannot accommodate  all  transactions  resulting  from 
international trade by market operators due to a lack of capacity. 
Article 3 
Inter transmission system operator compensation mechanism 
1.  Transmission system operators shall  receive  compensation for  costs  incurred as  a 
result of  hosting transit flows of  electricity on their network. 
2.  The  compensation  referred  to  in  paragraph  1  shall  be  paid  by  the  operators  of 
national transmission systems from which transit flows originate and/or the systems 
where those flo\VS end. 
3.  Compensation payments shall  be made  on a  regular basis with regard to  a  given 
period of time in the past. Ex-post adjustments of compensation paid shall be made 
where necessary to reflect actual costs incurred. 
The first period of time with regard to which compensation payments shall be made 
shall be determined in the guidelines referred to in Article 7. 
4.  Acting in accordance with the procedure referred to in Article 13(2), the Commission 
shall decide on the amounts of  compensation payments payable. 
5.  The amounts of transit hosted and the amounts of transit flows  originating and/or 
ending  in  national  transmission  systems  shall  be  determined  on the  basis  of the 
physical flows of  electricity actually measured in a given period of  time. 
6.  The costs incurred as a result of  hosting transit flows shall be established on the basis 
of the  forward  looking  long-run  average  incremental  costs  (reflecting  costs  and 
benefits that a network bears from  hosting transit flows  compared to  the  costs  it 
would bear in the absence of  such flows). 
Article 4 
Charges for access to networks 
1.  Charges applied by national network  -operators for access to national networks shall 
reflect actual costs incurred, and shall be transparent, approximated to those of an 
efficient network operator and applied in a non-discriminatory manner.  They shall 
not be distance-related. 
79 2.  Generators and consumers (load) may be  charged for  access to  national networks. 
The proportion of the total amount of the network charges borne by generators shall 
be lower than the proportion borne by consumers. Where appropriate, the level of  the · 
tariffs applied to  generators and/or consumers shall provide locational signals,  and 
take into account the amount of  network losses and congestion caused. 
3.  Payments  and  receipts  resulting  from  the  inter-transmission  system  operator 
compensation mechanism shall be taken into  account when setting the charges for 
network access.  Actual payments made and received as  well as payments expected 
for future periods of time, estimated on the basis of past periods, shall be taken into 
account. 
· 4.  Subject to paragraph 2, charges for access to national networks applied to generators 
and  consumers  shall  be  applied  independently  of the  country  of destination  and 
respectively  origin  of the  electricity,  as  specified  in  the  underlying  commercial 
arrangement.  Exporters  and  importers  shall  not be charged any  specific  charge  in 
addition to the general charge for access to national networks. 
5.  There shall be no  specific network charge on individual transactions for  transits of 
electricity  covered  by  the  inter-transmission  system  operator  compensation 
mechanism. 
Article 5 
Provision of information on interconnection capacities 
1.  Coordination  and  information  exchange  mechanisms  shall  be  put  in  place  by 
transmission system operators to ensure the security of  the networks in the context of 
congestion management. 
2.  The  safety,  operational  and  planning  standards  used  by  transmission  system 
operators shall be made public. This publication shall include a general scheme for 
the calculation of the total transfer capacity and the transmission reliability margin 
based upon the electrical and physical features of  the network. Such schemes shall be 
subject to the approval of  the national regulatory authority. 
3.  Transmission system operators shall publish estimates of available transfer capacity 
for  each  day,  indicating  any  available  transfer  capacity  already  reserved.  These 
publications shall be made at specified time intervals before the day of transport and 
shall include, in any case, week-ahead and month-ahead estimates. 
The data published 'shall include a quantitative indication of the expected reliability 
of  the available capacity. 
Article 6 
General principles on congestion management 
1.  Network  congestion problems  shall  be  addressed  with  non-discriminatory  market 
based solutions which give efficient economic signals to the market participants and 
transmission system operators involved. 
80 2.  Transaction curtailment procedures shall only be used in emergency situations where 
the  transmission  system  operator  must  act  in  an  expeditious  manner  and 
redispatching or countertrading is not possible. 
Market participants who have been allocated capacity shall be compensated for any 
curtailment of  this capacity. 
3.  The  maximum  capacity  of  the  interconnections  shall  be  made  available  to 
marketparticipants, complying with safety standards of secure network operation. · 
4.  Any allocated capacity that will not be used shall be reattributed to the market. 
5.  Transmission system operators shall, as  far as technically possible, net the capacity 
requirements  of  any  power  flows  in  opposite  direction  over  the  congested 
interconnection line in order to  use this line to its maximum capacity. In any event, 
transactions that relieve the congestion shall never be denied. 
6.  Any rents resulting from the allocation of interconnection capacities shall be used for 
one or more of  the following purposes: 
(a)  guaranteeing the actual availability of  the allocated capacity; 
(b)  network investments maintaining or increasing interconnection capacities; 
(c)  reduction of  network charges. 
These rents may be put into a fund that is managed by transmission system operators. 
They  shall  not  constitute  a  source  of extra  profit  for  the  transmission  system 
operators. 
Article 7 
Guidelines 
1.  Where appropriate, the Commission shall, acting in accordance with the procedure 
referred to in Article 12 (2), adopt and amend guidelines on the following issues with 
regard to the inter-transmission system operator compensation mechanism: 
(a)  details of  the determination of  the transmission system operators liable to pay 
compensations for transit flows, in accordance with Article 3(2); 
(b)  ·  details of the payment procedure to be followed, including the determination 
of the  first  period  of time  for  which  compensations  are  to  be  paid,  in 
accordance with the second subparagraph of  Article 3(3); 
(c)  details  of methodologies  to  determine  the  amount  of transits  hosted  and 
exports/!mport.s of  electricity made, in accordance with Article 3(5); 
(d)  details  of the  methodology  to  determine  the  costs  incurred  as  a result of 
hosting transits of  electricity, in accordance with Article 3(6); 
(e)  the participation of national systems which are interconnected through direct 
current lines, in accordance with Article 3. 
81 2.  The  guidelines  shall  also  determine  details  of the  harmonisation  of the  charges 
applied  to  generators  and  consumers  (load)  under  national  tariff  systems,  in 
accordance with the principles set out in Article 4(2). 
3.  Where appropriate, the Commission shall, acting in accordance with the  procedure 
referred to in Article 12(2), amend the guidelines on the management and allocation 
of  available transfer capacity of interconnections between national systems set out in 
the  Annex,  in  accordanc-e  with the  principles  set  out in  Articles  5 and  6.  Where 
appropriate,  in the  course of such amendments common rules  on minimum safety 
and operational standards for the use and operation of the network, as referred to in 
-Article 5(2) shall be set. 
Article 8 
- National regulatory authorities 
National  regulatory  authorities  shall  ensure  that  national  tariffs  and  methodologies  for 
congestion  management  are  set  and  applied  in  accordance  With  this  Regulation  and  the 
guidelines adopted pursuant to -Article 7. 
Article 9 
Provision of information and confidentiality 
1.  Member States and national regulatory authorities shall, on request, provide to  the 
Commission all information necessary for the purpose of  Articles 3(4) and 7. 
In particular, for  the  purpose of Article  3(  4),  national  regulatory authorities  shall 
provide on a regular basis, costs actually incurred by national transmission system 
operators associated with hosting transit flows as well as the amount of exports and 
imports  made  in  a  given  period.  They  shall  also  provide  the  relevant  data  and 
information used for the calculation of  those figures. 
2.  Member States shall ensure that national regulatory authorities and administrations 
are able and entitled to provide the information required pursuant to paragraph 1. 
3.  The  Commission may  also  request  all  information  necessary  for  the  purpose  of 
Article  3(4)  and  Article  7  directly  from  undertakings  and  associations  of 
undertakings. 
When  sending  a  request  for  information  to  an  undertaking  or  an  association  of 
undertakings, the Commission shall at the same time forward a copy of  the request to. 
the regulatory authority, established pursuant to Article 2i of Directive 96/92/EC of 
the Member State in whose territory the seat of the undertaking or the association of 
undertakings is situated. 
4.  In  its  request  for  information,  the  Commission  shall  state  the  legal  basis  of the 
request, the time-limit within which the information is to be provided, the purpose of 
the  request,  and  also  the  penalties  provided  for  in  Article  11 (2)  for  supplying 
incorrect, incomplete and misleading information. 
82 5.  The  owners of the undertakings  or their representatives  and,  in the case of legal 
persons,  companies  of firms,  or  of associations  having  no  legal  personality,  the 
persons authorised to represent them by law or by their constitution, shall supply the 
information requested. Lawyers duly authorised to act may supply the information on 
behalf of their clients, in which case the client shall remain fully responsible if the 
information supplied is incomplete, incorrect or misleading. 
6.  Where  an  undertaking  or  association  of  undertakings  does  not  provide  the 
information requested  within the time-limit fixed  by the  Commission or supplies 
incomplete information, the Commission shall by decision require the information to 
be  provided.  The  decision  shall  specify  what information  is  required  and  fix·  an 
appropriate time-limit within which it is to be supplied. It shall indicate the penalties 
provided for  in Article  11 (2).  It  shall  also  indicate the right to  have the decision 
reviewed by the Court of  Justice of  the European Communities. 
The Commission shall at the same time send a copy of its decision to the regulatory 
authority referred to in the second subparagraph of paragraph 3 of the Member State 
within the territory of  which the residence of  the person or the seat of  the undertaking 
or the association of  undertakings is situated. 
7.  Information collected pursuant to this Regulation shall be used only for the purposes 
of  Articles 3.(4) and 7. 
The Commission shall not disclose information acquired pursuant to this Regulation 
of  the kind covered by the obligation of  professional secrecy. 
Article 10 
Right of  Member States to provide for more detailed measures 
This Regulation is without prejudice to the rights of Membe:r States to maintain or introduce 
measures that contain more detailed provisions than those set out in this Regulation and the 
guidelines referred to in Article 7. 
Article 11 
Penalties 
1.  The Member States shall lay down the rules on penalties applicable to infringements 
of the provisions of this Regulation and shall take all measures necessary to ensure 
that  they  are  implemented.  The  penalties  provided  for  must  be  effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive. The Member States shall notify those provisions to the 
Commission by [indicate date]  at the latest and shall notify it without delay of any 
subsequent amendment affecting them. 
2.  The  Commission  may  by  decision  impose ·on  undertakings  or  associations  of 
undertakings fines not exceeding 1% of the total turnover in the preceding business 
year  where,  intentionally  or  negligently,  they  supply  incorrect,  incomplete  or 
misleading information in response to a request made pursuant to Article 9(3) or fail 
to supply information 'Yithin the time-limit fixed by a decision adopted pursuant to 
the first subparagraph of  Article 9(6). 
83 In setting the amount of a fine,  regard shall be had both to  the gravity and to  the 
duration of  the infringement. 
3.  Penalties  provided  for  pursuant  to  paragraph  1  and  decisions  taken  pursuant  to 
paragraph 2 shall not be of cdminallaw nature. 
Article 12 
Regulatory committee 
1.  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee composed of  the representatives of 
the Member States and chaired by the representative of  the Commission. 
2.  Where reference is made to  this paragraph, the regulatory procedure laid down in 
Article 5 of Decision  1999/468/EC shall  apply,  in compliance with Article 7 and 
Article 8 thereof. 
3.  The  period  provided  for  1n  Article  5(6)  of  Decision  1999/468/EC  shall  be 
two months. 
Article 13 
Advisory committee 
1.  The Commission shall be assisted by a committee composed of  the representatives of 
the Member States and chaired by the representative of  the Commission.  · 
2.  Where  reference  is  made to  this  paragraph,  the  advisory procedure  laid  down  in 
Article 3 of Decision 1999/468/EC shall  apply,  in compliance with Article ? and 
Article 8 thereof. 
Article 14 
Entry into force 
This Regulation shall enter into force on the twentieth day following that of its publication in 
the Official Journal of  the European Communities. 
It shall apply from [indicate date]. 
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States. 
Done at Brussels, 
For the European Parliament  For the Council 
The President  The President 
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Guidelines on the management and allocation of available transfer capacity of 
interconnections between national systems 
General 
1.  Congestion management method(  s) implemented by Member States should deal with 
short-run  congestion  in  an  economically  efficient  manner  whilst  simultaneously 
providing signals or incentives for efficient network and generation investment in the 
right locations. 
2.  In order to minimise the negative impact of congestion on trade, the current network 
should be used at the maximum capacity that complies with the safety standards of 
secure network operation. 
3.  The  TSOs  should  provide  non-discriminatory  and  transparent  standards,  which 
'  describe  which  congestion  management  methods  they  will  apply  under  which 
circumstances.  These  standards,  together  with  the  security  standards,  should  be 
described in open and publicly available documents. 
4.  Different treatment of the different types of cross-border transactions, whether they 
are physical bilateral contracts or bids into foreign organised markets, should be kept 
to  a  minimum  when  designing  the  rules  of specific  methods  for  congestion 
management.  The  method  for  allocating  scarce  transmission  capacity  must  be 
transparent. Any differences in how transactions are  treated must be shown not to 
distort or hinder the development of  competition. 
5.  Price signals that result from congestion management systems should be directional. 
6.  Every effort should be made to net the capacity requirements of any power flows in 
opposite direction over the congested tie line in order to use the congested tie line to 
its maximum capacity. In any adopted congestion management scheme, transactions 
that relieve the congestion should never be denied. 
7.  Any  unused capacity must become  available  to  other  agents  (the  use-it-or-lose-it 
principle). This may be implemented by devising notification procedures. 
8.  Any rents resulting from the allocation of interconnection capacities may be used for 
redispatching or counter trading in order to comply with the firmness of  the capacity 
that was allocated to market parties. In principle, any remaining rents should be spent 
on network investments for relieving the congestion or on reducing the total network 
tariff. TSOs may manage these funds, but cannot retain them. 
9.  TSOs  should· offer transmission  capacity  to  the  market  as  'finn'  as  possible.  A 
reasonable fraction of the capacity may be offered to the market under condition of 
decreased  firmness,  but  at  all  times  the  exact  conditions  for  transport  over 
cross-border lines should be made known to market parties. 
85 10.  Considering  the  fact  that the  European  continental  network  is  a  highly  meshed 
network and that the use of  interconnection lines has an effect on the power flows on 
at  least  two  sides  of a  national  border,  national  Regulators  shall  ensure  that no 
congestion management procedure with significant effects on power flows in other 
networks, be devised unilaterally. 
Position of long-term contracts 
1.  ,----Priority  access rights to  an  interconnection capacity can not be  assigned to those 
contracts which violate Articles 81  and 82 of  the EC Treaty. 
2.  Existing long-term contracts shall have no pre-emption rights when they come up 
for renewal. 
Provision of information 
1.  TSOs  should  implement  appropriate  coordination  and  information  exchange 
mechanisms to gu~antee  security of  the network. 
2.  TSOs  should  publish  all  relevant  data  concerning  the  cross-border  total  transfer 
capacities. In addition to the winter and summer A  TC values, estimates of transfer 
capacity for  each day  should be published by the  TSOs at  several time intervals 
before the day of transport. At least accurate week-ahead estimates should be made 
available to the market and the TSOs should also endeavour to provide month-ahead 
information. A description of  the firmness of  the data should be included. 
3.  The  TSOs  should  publish  a  general  scheme  for  calculation  of the  total  transfer 
capacity  and  the  transmission  reliability  margin  based  upon  the  electrical  and 
physical realities of  the network. Such a scheme should be subject to approval by the 
regulators of the involved Member States concerned. The safety standards and the 
operational and planning standards should form an integral part of the information 
that TSOs should publish in open and public documents. 
Preferred methods for congestion management 
I.  Network congestion problems should in principle be addressed with market-based 
solutions. More specifically, congestion management solutions are preferred  whic~ 
give appropriate price signals to the market parties and the TSOs involved. 
2.  Network congestion problems should preferentially be solved with non-transaction 
based methods, i.e. methods that do not involve a selection between the contracts of 
individual market parties.  · 
3.  The system of market  splitting,  as  used  in the  Nordpool  area,  is  the  congestion 
management procedure that, in principle, best meets this requirement.  · 
4.  In  the  short  term,  however,  methods  for  congestion  management  in 
Continental  Europe  that  may  be  used  are  implicit  and  explicit  auctions  and 
cross-border coordinated redispatching. 
86 5.  Cross-border coordinated redispatching or counter trading may be used Jointly by the 
concerned TSOs.  The costs  that TSOs  incur in counter-trading and redispatching 
must, however, be at an efficient level. 
6.  Transaction curtailment, following pre-established priority rules, should be left only 
for  emergency situations where the TSOs must act in an expeditious manner and 
redispatching is not possible. 
7.  The possible merits of a  combination of market splitting for  solving  'permanent' 
congestion  and  counter  trading  for  solving  temporary  congestion  should  be 
immediately explored as a more permanent approach to congestion management. 
Guidelines for explicit auctions 
1.  The auction system must be .  designed in such a way that all  available capacity is 
being offered to the market. This may be done by organising a composite auction in 
which  capacities  are  auctioned  for  differing  duration  and  with  different 
characteristics (e.g. with respect to the expected reliability of the available capacity 
in question). 
2.  Total interconnection capacity should be offered in a series of auctions, which, for 
instance,  might be held on a yearly, monthly, weekly,  daily and intra-daily basis, 
according  to  the  needs  of the  markets  involved.  Each  of these  auctions  should 
allocate a prescribed fraction of the available transfer capacity plus any remaining 
capacity that was not allocated in previous auctions. 
3.  The explicit auction procedures should be prepared in close collaboration between 
the national regulatory authority and the TSO concerned and designed in such a way 
as to allow bidders to participate also in the daily sessions of any organised market 
(i.e. power exchange) in the countries involved. 
4.  The power flows in both directions over congested tie lines should in principle be 
netted in order to maximise the transport capacity in the direction of  the congestion. 
However, the procedure for netting of flows  should comply with safe operation of 
the power system. 
5.  In order to  offer as  much capacity to  the  market as  possible,  the  financial  risks 
related to the netting of flows,  should be  attributed to those parties causing those 
risks to materialise. 
6.  ·Any auction procedure adopted should be capable of  sending directional price signals 
to market participants. Transports in a direction opposite the dominant power flow 
relieve the congestion and should therefore  result in additional transport capacity 
over the congested tie line. 
7.  In order not to risk creating or aggravating problems related to any dominant position 
of  market  player(s),  capping  of  the  amount  of  capacity  that  can  be 
bought/possessed/used by any single market player in an auction should be seriously 
considered  by  the  competent  regulatory  authorities  in  the  design  of an  auction 
mechanisms. 
8.  To promote the creation of liquid electricity markets, capacity bought at an auction 
should be freely tradeable before the moment of  notification. 
87 LEGISLATIVE FINANCIAL STATEMENT 
Policy area(s): Energy and Transport 
Activity(ies): Energy Industry and Internal Market 
Title of action:  Regulation of  the European Parliament and of the Council on conditions for 
access to' the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity 
1.  BUDGET LINE(S) + HEADING(S) 
In 2002: Chapter B4-l  0, Article B4-l 040 (ETAP) 
2.  OVERALL FIGURES 
2.1.  Total allocation for action (Part B): EUR 5 million (1998-2002) 
2.2.  Period of application: 
2002
1 
2.3.  Overall multiannual estimate on expenditure: 
(a)  Schedule  of commitment  appropriations/payment  appropriations 
(financial intervention) (see point 6.1.1) 
EUR million (to 3rd decimal place) 
2 
1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total 
Commitments  1.449  0.869  1.635  0.5  0.6  5.053 
Payments  1.144
2  1.160  1.207  1.2  0.5  s.21e 
In  accordance  with  the  work  programme  of the  Commission  for  2001,  a  proposal  for  a  new 
Energy Framework programme succeeding the current one, which expires in 2002, will be made this 
year. This new proposal will include the fmancial needs for the action in the coming years. 
Including payments for commitments made prior to 1998.  -
88 (b)  Technical  and  administrative  assistance  and  support  expenditure 
(see point 6.1.2) 
Non-Applicable 
I  Commitments 
Payments 
Subtotal a+b 
Commitments  1.449  0.869  1.635  0.5  0.6  5.053 
Payments  1.144
2  f.160  1.207  1.2  0.5  5.211
2 
(c)  Overall  financial  impact  of  human  resources  and  other  administrative 
expenditure (see points 7.2 and 7.3) 
I  Commitments/ 
payments 
TOTAL a+b+c 
Commitments 
Payments 
1.449  1  0.869  1.635 
1.144
2 
11.160  1.207 
I 
I  0.258 
0.5  1  0.858  5.311 
1.2  1  0.75.8  5.469
2 
2.4.  Compatibility with the financial programming and the financial perspective 
1:&1  Proposal compatible with the existing financial programming 
1:&1  This  proposal  will  entail  reprogramming  of the  relevant  heading  1n  the 
financial perspective 
D  This  may  entail  application  of  the  provisions  of  the 
Interinstitutional Agreement. 
89 2.5.  Financial impact on revenue
3
: 
~  No financial implications (involves technical aspects regarding implementation 
of  a measure) 
or 
D  Financial impact-the effect on revenue is as follows: 
EUR million (to 1 decimal place) 
Prior to  Situation following action 
action 
Budget line  Revenue 
(Year  n-1) 
Year  n+l  n+2  n+3  n+4  n+5 
n 
(a)  Revenue  in  absolute 
terms 
(b)  Change in Revenue  L\ 
3.  BUDGET CHARACTERISTICS 
Type of expenditure  New  EFTA  Participation applicant  Heading 
participation  countries  Financial 
P~rspective 
Comp/N  on-comp  DifflNon-diff  YES/NO  YES/NO  YES/NO  No3 
Non-Comp  Diff  Yes  Yes  No 
4.  LEGAL BASIS 
The Treaty establishing the European Community, in particular Article 95. 
Council  Decision  1999/21/EC,  Euratom  of  14  December  1998  adopting  a 
multiannual framework programme for actions in the energy sector (1998 to  2002) 
and connected measures (OJ L 7, 13.1.1999, p. 16). 
Council  Decision  1999/22/EC  of  14  December  1998  adopting  a  multiannual 
programme of studies, analyses, forecasts and other related .work in the energy sector 
(1998 to 2002) (OJ L 7,  13.1.1999, p. 20). 
For further information, see a separate guidance paper. 
90 5.  DESCRIPTION AND GROUNDS 
5.1.  Need for Community intervention
4 
5.1.1.  Objectives pursued 
The  Electricity  Directive  progressively  opens  up  national  electricity  markets  to 
competition. However, in order to  create. a real integrated internal market, effective 
trading  rules  are  necessary,  and  notably  a  harmonised  approach  on  cross-border 
tarification  for  transmission  tariffs  and  commonly  implemented  mechanisms  for 
dealing  with  congestion  at  borders.  In  order  to  deal  with  this,  the  Commission. 
launched the  "Florence process", a Forum composed of the  Commission,  national 
Regulators, Member States and industry. Much progress has been made, but no final 
agreement  has  been  reached  or mechanisms  put  in  place.  To  deal  with  this  the 
Commission will  propose,  on  7 March 2001,  a Regulation which (a)  sets  out the 
basic  principles  according  to  which  cross-border  tarification  and  congestion 
management must be dealt with (b) permits the Commission, subject to a comitology 
procedure, to adopt binding guidelines on the precise mechanism according to which 
the  harmonised  rules  on  tarification  and  congestion  will  enter  into  force,  and 
(c)  calculate and implement, on the basis of data provided by national regulators, 
cross-border tariffs.  Thus, the Commission takes  on new executive responsabilites, 
acting in many respects  as  a European regulator regarding  cross-border electricity 
trade. 
The objectives pursued by the Regulation are, therefore, the rapid entry into force of 
cost-reflective  mechanisms  on  tariffs  and  congestion permitting trade  to  function 
freely. It is expected that the Regulation may enter into force in late 2001/early 2002. 
A  new  tarification  system  through  guidelines  should  therefore  be  in  place  by 
september 2002. Tariffs should then be adopted by end 2002. Finally, common rules 
on congestion management will  ent~r into force on the adoption of  the Regulation, as 
they are contained in Annex to  the legislative text. These will need to be reviewed 
and,  if necessary,  amended by end 2002.  The objectives pursued by this financial 
action is  to  provide the  Commission with the means to  effectively carry out these 
new responsibilities. 
5.1. 2.  Measures taken in connection with ex ante evaluation 
4 
To  prepare the  adoption of the  proposed Regulation,  the  Commission  set  up  the 
Florence Forum. This has now met five times. Equally, the results of  the Forum have 
been discussed on four  occasions by the energy Council which has underlined the 
importance of the rapid introduction of such measures.  OJ! the basis of the work at 
the  Forum,  the  Commission  adopted  on  16  May  2000  a  Communication  on 
"recent progress  with  building  the  internal  electricity  market".  Furthermore,  this 
issue  was  addressed  at  a  Public  Hearing  organised  by  the  Commission  on 
14 September 2000.  Furthermore,  this  issue was  examined in  the  Green Paper on 
securtity of  supply (COM(2000) 769). 
For further information, see a separate guidance paper  . 
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The discussions at the Florence Forum and at Council, as well as the reaction to the 
Commission's Communication on this  subject,  has  shown that the  introduction of 
effective  rules  on  cross-border  tarification  and  congestion  management  is  a 
fundamental requirement for the creation of a real internal market for electricity. It 
has  also  shown  that  the  developtnent  of  such  rules  is  technically  extremely 
complex,  and  controversial.  Furthermore,  once  a  robust  methodology  is 
determined, calculation of costs relating to  cross-border trade will be difficult and 
time-consuming. In this light, a Regulation has been viewed as necessary to deal with 
the issues effectively. 
5.1. 3.  Measures taken following ex post evaluation 
It is believed that a detailed review of  the effectiveness of the approach set out in the 
Regulation in developing common rules, as well as the effectiveness of the financial 
actions taken by the Commission to support this effort, should take place two years 
after the entry into force of  the Regulation. 
5.2.  Actions envisaged and arrangements for budget intervention 
The  adoption  of  common  rules  on  cross-border  tarification  and  congestion 
management would lead to increased competition throughout the EU and thus lower 
electricity prices, thus benefiting all consumers, both domestic and industrial.  The 
financial actions envisaged are to prepare the entry into force of such rules, and are 
thus highly technical and specific in nature, and would thus be of interest to national 
regulators, Member States, the European Parliament and relevant industry. 
the specific objectives set for the programming period 
The specific objectives of the Regulation are the entry into force, by end 2002 of a 
harmonised system for cross-border transmission tarification based on principles of 
simplicity, cost-reflectiveness and non-discrimination.  Also they are the  entry into 
force of common rules on congestion management at the adoption pf  the Regulation 
and, if necessary in the light of experience, their revision by end 2002. The specific 
objectives  of the  financial  actions  are  thus  to  (i)  complete the  studies  leading to 
the  entry  into  force  of a  detailed  guidelines  on  tarification  by  september  2002, 
(ii) the  fixing and entry into  force  of actual tariffs through the verification of data 
submitted by national Regulators by end 2002 and (iii) the entry into force  of any 
revision of the  guidelines  on congestion management,  on the  basis  of necessary 
study,  by  end 2002.  Thereafter,  the  specific  objective  is  the  revision  of these 
guidelines, if  necessary, on the basis of additional studies on an annual basis, and the 
recalculation and re-adoption of  tariffs.  · 
the concrete measures to be taken to implement the action 
First, the launch of studies leading to the adoption and agreement of guidelines on 
cross-border tarification (to  September 2002);  secondly, the adoption of a decision 
on actual  tariffs  (end  2002)  on the  basis  of figures  submitted by  Regulators  and 
received by the Commission, thirdly, the re-examination of guidelines on congestion 
management  contained  in  the  Regulation  on the  basis  of necessary  study  work 
(end 2002). 
92 To achieve these objectives, two financial actions are envisaged: 
Action 1  : In order to develop the  detail~d guidelines with respect to tarification upon 
which the new system will  be  based,  considerable preparatory work is  necessary, 
often technical (engineering) and financial (accounting) in nature.  This also applies 
to  the  question  whether  and  how  the  guidelines  contained  in  the  Regulation  on 
congestion management are amended.  To achieve this, it is cost effective to prepare 
the guidelines thiough expert studies. 
Action  2:  Once  the  guidelines  on  cross-border  tarification  have  been  adopted, 
national Regulators will forward calculations on the costs/benefits to their network 
resulting  from  electricity  trade.  The  Commission  must  determine  whether  these 
figures  are correctly calculated, and on the  basis of these,  calculate the  individual 
payments  between  systerns  to  compensate  for  trade.  This  will  require  very 
specialised auditing skills, for  a limited period every year.  The most cost-effective 
manner of carrying out much of  this verification work is therefore to engage outside 
expertise. 
the immediate outputs of  each action, and their contribution to 
The  expected  outcome  is  the  entry  into  force,  and  subsequent  maintenance  and 
refinement  of a  system  of cross-border  tarification  and  congestion  management 
permitting electricity trade to function effectively. 
the expected outcomes solving needs or problems 
1.  The Commission should adopt and amend guidelines which further detail the 
basic  principles  with  regard  to  tarification  and  congestion  management 
contained  in  the  draft  Regulation  These  guidelines  can  be  adopted  and 
amended without changing the Regulation in order to allow rapid adaptation to 
changed circumstances. This is necessary since issues, such as cost calculation 
methodologies  and  the  concrete  identification and measurement of physical 
flows,  develop  continuously  and,  therefore,  it  must  be  possible  to  make 
refinements and improvements in future. 
2.  The Commission determines,  on a  regular  basis,  the  level  of compensation 
payments to be made between transmission system operators for transit flows 
of electricity  hosted.  The  main  objective  of this  action  is  to  ensure  that 
transmission system operators are accurately compensated for costs incurred, 
in  particular  with  a  view to  exclude  overcompensation  and  thus  excessive 
transaction costs. 
Member States alone cannot resolve this issue:  to develop an effective tarification 
system a harmonised approach is  imperative and cannot be  developed at  national 
level. As demonstrated above, an informal collaborative approach will not lead to the 
implementation of an appropriate system with necessary procedural and democratic 
safeguards. Such a proposal is therefore wholly in line with the subsidiarity principle, 
and indeed is made necessary by it.  ~.._ 
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However, Member States' regulatory authorities need to be involved in this process. 
The  Commission  would  therefore  take  these  decisions  after  consultation  of a 
committee made up of representatives of Member States, created in accordance with 
Council  Decision  1999/468  laying  down  the  procedures  for  the  exercise  of 
implementing powers conferred on the Commission ("Comitologie"). 
5.3.  Methods of implementation 
The financial actions seek to provide the Con1mission with the resources necessary to 
effectively carry out the new executive functions accorded to  it by the adoption of 
the proposed Regulation on cross-border tarification and congestion. The Regulation 
provides three new tasks: the adoption via a comitology committee of detailed rules 
on  cross-border  tarification,  the  fixing  and  imposition  of those  tariffs,  and  the 
amendment,  through  a  comitology  procedure,  of  guidelines  contail)ed  in  the 
Regulation on congestion management. 
Much of this work will be  carried out internally by the Commission, preparing the 
final  text of guidelines, ensuring their adoption through the comitology procedure, 
and adopting decisions on actual tariff levels.  However, in preparing this wo~k: 
Action I:  In developing and improving the  guidelines, it will be necessary to have 
recourse to external studies providing economic, accounting and technical expertise. 
Action  2:  once  the  methodology  is  established  and  guidelines  adopted,  the 
Commission will have to calculate exact tariff levels. This \Vill be done on the basis 
of data provided by national regulators, calculated in accordance with the guidelines. 
The Commission has the role of  verifying the data provided at national level.  As this 
is highly specialised audit work, needed for a relatively short period each year, it is 
cost efficient that this verification is carried out by external expertise. 
6.  FINANCIAL IMP  ACT 
6.1.  Total financial impact on Part B ~  (over the entire programming period) 
6.1.1.  ·Financial intervention 
Commitments in EUR million (to 3rd decimal place) 
Breakdown  1998  1999  2000  2001  2002  Total 
Action 1  :  Studies to prepare  0.234 
guidelines 
Action 2:  Verification of  0.370 
financial data 
Etc. 
TOTAL  0.604 
94 6.1.2.  Technical  and  administrative  assistance,  support  expenditure  and  IT  expenditure 
(Commitment appropriations) 
Non-Applicable 
YearN  N+ 1  N+2  N+3  N+4  N + 5 and  Total 
subs. 
Years 
1.  Technical and 
administrative assistance 
(a)  Technical assistance 
offices 
(b)  Other technical and 
administrative assistance: 
- intra muros: 
- extra muros: 
ofwhichfor 
construction and 
maintenance of 
computerised 
management systems 
Subtotal! 
2.  Support expenditure . 
(a)  Studies 
(b)  Meetings of  experts 
(c)  Information and 
publications 
Subtotal2 
TOTAL 
95 { 
-
6.2.  Calculation  of  costs  by  measure  envisaged  in  -Part  B  (over  the  entire 
programming period)
5 
Commitments in EUR million (to 3rd decimal place) 
Breakdown  Type  Number of  Average unit  Total cost 
of  outputs  outputs  cost 
(total for years 
(projects, files) 
(total for years  l.  .. n) 
l.  .. n) 
1  2  3  4 = (2 X 3) 
Action 1 
Studies to prepare guidelines  Studies  2  0.117  0.234 
Action 2 
Verification of  financial data  Studies/analysis  1  0.370  0.370 
Etc. 
TOTAL COST  0.604 
If  necessary, explain the method of  calculation 
Explanation of  the method of  calculation: 
Action  1:  Studies to assist the Commission in preparing guidelines on cross-border 
tarification and congestion manage_ment, 
Two  studies  per  year  are  necessary  in  order  to  prepare  the  adoption  and/or 
amendment of the guidelines: per study 130 man/days at EUR 900 (average rate of 
auditors and other experts)= 2 x 117 000 = EUR 234 000 
Action 2:  Verification of cost-calculations regarding the costs of  transits incurred by 
national transmission system operators. 
verification  of  documents  submitted  and  benchmarking  exercise:  Cost 
per Member State:  20 man/days at EUR 1 000  (average  rate of  auditors) 
EUR 300 000 
For further information, see a separate guidance paper. 
96 following  the  benchmarking  exercise:  On-spot  verification  with  regard  to 
seven  Member  States  (estimate).  Cost  per  Member  State:  10  man/days 
per Member State at EUR 1 000 =  EUR 70 000 
Since  the ·above  calculations  are  based  on  estimates,  an  indicative  amount  of 
EUR 600 000 needs to be foreseen. 
7.  IMPACT ON STAFF AND ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE 
7.1.  Impact on human resources 
Staff to be assigned to management of  the  Description of tasks deriving from 
action using existing and/or additional  the action 
Types of  post  resources  Total 
Number of  Number of 
permanent posts  temporary posts 
2 
A  1  Preparation of  guidelines on 
Permanent  cross-border tarification and 
officials or  B  congestion management 
Temporary staff 
c  2.  Preparation of  decisions on the 
level of  compensation payments 
for transit 
Other human resources 
Total  2 
7.2.  Overall financial impact of human resources 
Type of  human resources  Amount (EUR)  Method of  calculation * 
Officials  216 000  2 x EUR 108 000 
Temporary staff 
Other human resources 
(give budget line) 
Total  216 000 
The amounts are total expenditure for twelve months. 
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7  .3~  Other administrative expenditure deriving from the action 
Budget line  . 
Amount (EUR)  Method of  calculation 
(number and heading) 
Overall allocation (Title A 7) 
A070 1 - Missions 
A07030 - Meetings 
· A07031-Compulsory committees(!)  42 000  4 meetings of the committee per year x 
15 experts x EUR 700 
A07032 -Non-compulsory committees<
1
> 
A07040 -.Conferences 
A0705 - Studies and consultations 
Other expenditure (state which) 
Information systems (A-5001/A-4300) 
Other expenditure-Part A (state which) 
Total  42 000 
The amounts are total expenditure for twelve months. 
(l)  Specify the type of  committee and the group to which it belongs. 
I.  Annual total (7 .2 + 7.3)  EUR258 000 
II.  Duration of  action  not limited 
III.  Total cost of  action (I x II)  EUR 25 8 000/year 
The requirements in terms of  human and other administrative resources are to be met 
within the resources made available to  DG TREN in the framework of the annual 
allocation process. 
8. 
8.1. 
FOLLOW-UP AND EVALUATION 
Follow-up arrangements 
The .result of the measures foreseen in the draft Regulation will be assessed in the 
light of the  future  development of intra-Community trade  in electricity,  as  of the 
relevant Eurostat Statistics. 
98 8.2.  Arrangements and schedule for the planned evaluation 
Two years following the entry into force of  the Regulation it is intended to carry out 
an internal evaluation of the success in adopting the necessary guidelines and rules 
permitting a tarifiaction and harmonised congestion management system to enter into 
force.  The success of this system will be evaluated in terms of its  ability to reduce 
transaction  costs  for  electricity  consumers.  The  use  and  value  of the  study  work 
carried out in achieving this  will  also  be  evaluated as  well  as  the accuracy of ·the 
audit  work.  carried  out  on  calculations  of  individual  country  tariffs  and  the 
cost-effectiveness of  the approach. 
9.  ANTI-FRAUD MEASURES 
Reimbursement of experts and payment of experts  for  studies  carried out will  be 
made in compliance with applicable financial rules. 
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IMP  ACT ASSESSMENT FORM 
THE IMP  ACT OF THE PROPOSAL ON BUSINESS WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE 
TO SMALL AND MEDIUM-SIZED ENTERPRISES (SMEs) 
TITLE OF PROPOSAL 
Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European  Parli~ment: 
Completing the internal energy market 
Proposal  for  a Directive  of the  European Parliament and of the  Council  amending 
Directives 96/92/EC and 98/30/EC concerning common rules for the inernal market in 
electricity and natural gas 
Proposal  for  a  Regulation  of the  European  Parliament  and  of the  Council  on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity 
DOCUMENT REFERENCE NUMBER 
COM(2001) 125 of ..... 
THE PROPOSAL 
1.  Taking account of the principle of subsidiarity, why is  Community legislation · 
necessary in this area and what are its main aims? 
The  creation of the  internal  energy market forms  part of the objective  of creating a fully 
operational  internal  market  in  the  European  Union,  with  a  view  to  encouraging  the 
possibilities of  growth and of  employment to the benefit of  the citizens of  the Union. 
The main goals of  the proposals are: 
the complete opening of the markets of electricity and of gas in 2005, accompanied 
with  guarantees  on  non-discriminatory  access  to  the  tranmission  and  distribution 
networks; 
additional  guarantees  for  the  European  citizens  as  regards  energy  supply  and 
public service; 
the  guarantee  of a  genuine  European  market,  and  not  15  open  national  markets, 
thanks, in particular, to a regulation on the cross-border tarification of electricity and 
management of  congestions. 
These objectives cannot be carried out, or be achieved adequately by the Member States and 
can,  owing to  the  dimensions  and  owing to  the  effects  of the  envisaged action,  better be 
achieved at the Community level. 
100 THE IMPACT ON BUSINESS 
2.  What areas of business will be affected by the proposal? 
General competitiveness of  the European companies 
With regard to the electricity price, the degree of competition already reached in this sector 
made  it  possible  to  lower  the  prices  considerably.  The  proposed  measures  will  make  it 
possible to maintain and improve the general competitiveness of the European companies. At 
the time when the opening of the markets progresses quickly in the majority of the countries 
where the principal competitors of  the European companies are situated, the completion of  the 
internal market is essential in order not to fall behind on this point. 
Reduction of  the inequalities between the industrial and private energy users 
All the companies will have the possibility of choosing their electricity suppliers as from 2003 
and as from 2004 also their gas supplier. This aspect is particularly important for sinall and 
medium-slzed enterprises which for the moment are often handicapped in relation to the large 
industrial consumers, in particular if they are still  captive customers in their Member State. 
This denies them the benefit that competition is creating for eligible custqmers, in terms of 
competitive prices and of  tailor-made energy services. Moreover, the opening of  the market in 
all  the companies will end the distortions of competition induced by the. eligibility of the 
distributors in certain Member States, while they are not eligible in others. 
Innovation and development of  new technologies  . 
The total opening of the market also  encourages innovation and the development of  new 
technologies. The techniques of energy production are in full development, in particular with 
reg~d  to the renewables and micro-power stations and to fuel cell technology. 
Improvement of  the quality of  services 
The  increasing  opening  of the  markets  should  also  improve  the  quality  of the  services 
rendered to the consumers, especially to the final consumers. The quality of services offered 
concerns, for example, repairs, new services and billing arrangements, which constitute some 
of the  sectors  where  companies  are  exposed to  competition.  This  development is  already 
observed in the countries where markets are completely open. 
Facilitate the introduction of  competition within the gas sector itself 
The completion of  the internal market would make it possible to facilitate the introduction of 
competition within the gas sector (gas-to-gas competition). At the present time, the natural 
gas price in mainland Europe is linked to the oil price. It will be beneficial therefore for the 
EU companies to continue developing competition inside the gas sector, so  as to gradually 
eliminate the link between oil prices and gas prices, because that will improve the diversity of 
energy supply in the EU and increase the competitiveness of  the. supplies as well. 
Which sectors of  companies are affected? 
All  the  European  companies  consuming  electricity  and  gas,  as  well  as  the  electric  and 
gas sectors. 
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Are  there  in the  Community  individual  geographical  areas  where  these  companies 
are established? 
3.  What measures will companies have to take to conform to the proposal? 
Aspects relating to legal unbundling of distribution activities of electricity and gas companies 
in particular. 
4.  Which economic effects is the proposal likely to have: 
on employment 
The energy price reduction,  as  well as  the new outlets for  new technologies following the 
introduction  of competition  into  the  energy  sector  will  bring  increased  employment  in 
European industry as a whole. 
Nevertheless, with regard to the short-term development, the introduction of competition is 
likely to result in a reduction of manpower following the adaptation to competition of  the old 
national  monopolistic  companies.  Until  now,  however1  no  forced  redundancies  have  been 
made by energy companies due to the introduction of  competition. 
During the last years, the technical jobs for semi-skilled and skilled employees, as well as the 
use  of junior staff and  the  related  administrative jobs were  reduced  gradually.  New job 
profiles appeared in fields such as  marketing, services to  customers, information technology 
and services for the companies. Moreover, the appearance of new economic activities, such as 
the exchanges in the field of  energy, created new jobs. 
5.  Does  the  proposal  contain  measures  aiming  to  take  account  of the  specific 
situation  of  small  and·  medium-sized  enterprises  (reduced  or  different 
requirements, etc.)? 
The  draft  proposal  for  a  Directive  envisages  legal  unbundling  for  electricity  and  gas 
distribution network operators. Insofar as distribution is often ensured by communal services 
having  small structures,  the  unbundling requirement could prove to  be disproportionate  in 
relation to their size. This is why, the proposal for a Directive enables the Member States to 
exonerate from this obligation the companies having less than 1  00 000 consumers. 
CONSULTATION 
6.  List of the organisations which were consulted on the p:r:-oposal and statement of 
the essential elements of their position 
A  public  hearing  on  the  completion  of the  internal  energy  market  was  organised  on 
14 September 2000,  in which almost  120  professional organisations and undertakings took 
part (social partners, undertakings of distribution and of supply, traders,  gas  and electricity 
companies,  network  managers,  SME,  consumers'  associations,  non  governmental 
environmental organisations, power exchanges). 
102 The complete list of the organisations and their comments are available on the site europa at 
the following address:  · 
http  :I I  europa.eu.intl  comm./  energy  I  en! elec  _single_  market/hearing/index_  en.htm 
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